Splitting the catch, remuneration of Icelandic fishermen in a Sea of change
In: Marine policy, Band 117, S. 103959
ISSN: 0308-597X
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In: Marine policy, Band 117, S. 103959
ISSN: 0308-597X
In: Institute of Economic Studies Working Paper Series No. W13:01
SSRN
Working paper
Inflation was a growing problem during the 1960's and the 1970's in Iceland. Inflation represents a problem for any entity that tries to write up a budget, whether an individual, a company or a governmental entity. Many governmental entities do not have right to spend money unless what has been prescribed in the budget. The purpose of this paper is to map out how inflation affected different parts of municipality budgets in Iceland during the 1960's and the 1970's. Furthermore, to look at how well budget makers in the Icelandic municipality sector managed the task of forecasting inflation during the high inflation period of the 1970s. ; Peer Reviewed ; Ritrýnt tímarit
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In: Marine policy: the international journal of ocean affairs, Band 25, Heft 4, S. 303-312
ISSN: 0308-597X
In: Journal of development economics, Band 58, Heft 1, S. 25-44
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Marine policy, Band 30, Heft 3, S. 199-206
ISSN: 0308-597X
In: Marine policy: the international journal of ocean affairs, Band 30, Heft 3, S. 199-206
ISSN: 0308-597X
In: Economic Analysis and Policy, Band 58, S. 121-130
In: Economic Analysis and Policy, Band 56, S. 37-50
In: Marine policy: the international journal of ocean affairs, Band 32, Heft 4, S. 630-634
ISSN: 0308-597X
In: Marine policy, Band 32, Heft 4, S. 630-634
ISSN: 0308-597X
peer-reviewed ; The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection. ; ACCEPTED ; peer-reviewed
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The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ ineconomic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.
BASE
The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.
BASE
The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.
BASE