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Cover -- Half Title -- Dedication -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Tables -- Preface -- 1 Introduction: State Power and Policy Making -- State Power and Capabilities -- State Power and Policy Making in Peru -- Notes -- PART ONE STATE DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY CHOICES, 1968-1995 -- 2 The Military and Popular Mobilization -- Neither Communism Nor Capitalism -- Conflict and Disintegration, 1973-1975 -- Rededications, 1975-1977 -- Searching for a Transition Formula, 1976-1977 -- Conclusion -- Notes -- 3 International Actors and the Politics of Economic Austerity -- The Pressure to Adjust and the Transition -- Neoliberalism and the State -- Economic Austerity and Social Conflict -- Conclusion -- Notes -- 4 The Failures of State Populism -- The Populist Coalition, 1984-1987 -- From Populism to Polarization, 1987-1989 -- Conclusion -- Notes -- 5 Retooling the State: The Fujimori Coalition and State Reform -- Neoliberalism and the New Authoritarian State -- Bringing the Military Back In -- Small State, Effective State? -- Democracy and Neoliberal State Reform -- Conclusion -- Notes -- PART TWO STATE POWER AND SOCIAL CONTROL -- 6 Villa El Salvador: Popular Organization and the State in a Lima Shantytown -- From Corporatist Experiment to Socialist Utopia -- The Municipal Experience, 1984-1989 -- New Social Movements and the State -- Conclusion -- Notes -- 7 Sendero Luminoso: Ideology and the State in the Andes -- From Chairman Mao to President Gonzalo -- State Vacuum and the Social Base of Sendero -- Conclusion -- Notes -- 8 State Capacities and Counterinsurgency -- The Military and Counterinsurgency, 1980-1989 -- Restructuring State-Society Linkages, 1990-1995 -- Conclusion -- Notes -- 9 Conclusions: From State Developmentalism to Neoliberal Reforms -- The State Organizational Arena -- The International Arena -- The State-Society Arena -- Notes

In this article the author compares insurgency violence in Colombia and Perú. Having identified a shared trait, state weakness, the distinct strategies employed in the two countries to combat armed movements are evaluated. Based upon a conceptual analysis of the characteristics of the state in both cases, the author argües that the difference between the configuration of socio-economic élites and their relationship wiih the state in each country explains the distinctions between the counterinsurgency models of socio-centric "privatization" (adopted in Colombia) and state-centric "authoritarianism" (in Perú). The comparative study of these strategies illustrates that both represented enormous costs for the respective societies in these countries and were not accompanied by transformations in their respectiv political structures, designed to assure the stability and preservation of the democratic system.