Market integration and strike activity
In: Journal of international economics, Band 81, Heft 1, S. 154-161
ISSN: 0022-1996
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In: Journal of international economics, Band 81, Heft 1, S. 154-161
ISSN: 0022-1996
A unionized duopoly model to analyse how unions affect the incentives for merger is considered. It is found that both firms will merge if and only if unions are weak. However, once surplus-maximizing unions have the option to delegate the wage bargaining to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members), both firms may have incentives to merge even if the union bargaining power is strong. Moreover, the option of strategic delegation may harm both the unions and the firms.
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In: The Canadian journal of economics: the journal of the Canadian Economics Association = Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 149-173
ISSN: 1540-5982
Abstract. We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to either surplus‐maximizing delegates or to wage‐maximizing delegates (such as senior union members). We show that the wage outcome in case of surplus‐maximizing delegates is not necessarily smaller than the wage outcome in case of wage‐maximizing delegates, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the firm and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then delegating to wage‐maximizing delegates definitely increases the wage at equilibrium. The maximum delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the union chooses wage‐maximizing delegates instead of surplus‐maximizing delegates and remains finite even when the period length shrinks to zero. JEL classification: C70, C71, C72, C78
This paper aims at estimating the effect on achievement of various types of schools: private, private but government-dependent and public ones. It is based on the analysis of Reading test scores of 15-year-old students surveyed in 2002 across OEC.
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This paper aims at estimating the effect on achievement of various types of schools: private, private but government-dependent and public ones. It is based on the analysis of Reading test scores of 15-year-old students surveyed in 2002 across OEC.
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Within an incomplete-information framework. we develop a model of wage determination in a unionized Cournot oligopoly. The assumption of incomplete information allows the possibility of strikes or lockouts, which waste industry potential resources, at equilibrium. Facing such deadweight loss, the government or the social planner may decide to adopt a policy, such as a profit-sharing scheme. Under two different bargaining structures (firm level vs. industry level), we investigate the effects of adopting profit sharing on the wage outcome and the strike activity. If the base-wage bargaining takes place at the industry level, then the introduction of a profit-sharing scheme increases the strike activity. But if the base-wage bargaining takes place at the firm level and the number of firms in the industry is greater than two, then the introduction of a profit-sharing scheme reduces the strike activity.
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Within an incomplete-information framework. we develop a model of wage determination in a unionized Cournot oligopoly. The assumption of incomplete information allows the possibility of strikes or lockouts, which waste industry potential resources, at equilibrium. Facing such deadweight loss, the government or the social planner may decide to adopt a policy, such as a profit-sharing scheme. Under two different bargaining structures (firm level vs. industry level), we investigate the effects of adopting profit sharing on the wage outcome and the strike activity. If the base-wage bargaining takes place at the industry level, then the introduction of a profit-sharing scheme increases the strike activity. But if the base-wage bargaining takes place at the firm level and the number of firms in the industry is greater than two, then the introduction of a profit-sharing scheme reduces the strike activity.
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In: Journal of economics, Band 69, Heft 1, S. 19-40
ISSN: 1617-7134
In: Journal of economic behavior & organization, Band 221, S. 1-16
ISSN: 1879-1751, 0167-2681
In: Dynamic games and applications: DGA, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 435-439
ISSN: 2153-0793
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 80, S. 70-82
We study a model in which heterogeneous agents first form a trading network where linking costs are positive but infinitesimally small. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We determine both the trading path and the allocation of the surplus among the seller, the buyer and the intermediaries at equilibrium. We show that, under the initiator bargaining protocol, a trading network is pairwise stable if it is a core–periphery network where the core consists of all impatient agents who are linked to each other and the periphery consists of all patient agents who have a single link towards an impatient agent. Once agents do not know the impatience of other agents, each bilateral bargaining session may involve delay. Then, core–periphery networks may not be pairwise stable because agents may prefer to add links for reducing the length of trading paths and so avoiding costly delays in reaching a global agreement.
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In: Revue économique, Band 60, Heft 2, S. 471-488
ISSN: 1950-6694
Résumé Nous analysons les conséquences du passage d'un financement par dotation globale à un financement prospectif lié à l'activité et tentons de déterminer en quoi la réforme pourrait être préjudiciable ou bénéfique à la santé financière des hôpitaux publics. Nous développons un modèle théorique qui lie la demande des patients aux décisions conjointes des médecins et des managers d'hôpitaux pour analyser la façon dont le nouveau mode de financement affecte les décisions prises par l'ensemble des agents et donc l'équilibre budgétaire des établissements.