Suchergebnisse

Annotation

The 2018 election of Premier Doug Ford and the Progressive Conservative (PC) government ushered in a new era of neoliberal populism in Ontario, Canada. Ford's election platform, titled a "Plan for the People," resonated with the business elite who supported his free-market reforms but also with middle-class and blue-collar workers living in suburban and northern areas of the province. The article examines how Ford positioned his rivals as "out of touch" members of the political and cultural urban elite, responsible for a spiralling deficit that would economi-cally burden hard-working people. Unlike many other right-wing populist leaders, who have relied on xenophobic or anti-immigrant narratives, we argue that Ford's populist stance is dema-gogic and pragmatic. This enabled him to pivot and shift his political strategy to amass support from a diverse range of economic, racial, ethnic, and religious groups, including new immigrants. We draw on newspaper articles, public documents and reports, as well as thirteen interviews with politicians, teachers and civil servants. The article highlights how Ford's government operated to weaken democratic institutions through measures such as "strong mayor powers," invoking the notwithstanding clause, as well as undermining the public sector. We trace how Ford's populism undermined public education through overt and subtle measures that weaken school boards and unions while advancing privatization. We show how Ford bypassed intermediaries, in this case, school boards and teachers' unions, and appealed directly to "the parents" through the media and employed cli-entelist strategies such as cash transfers under the guise of "parental choice" to hollow out public education. The analysis demonstrates how Ontario stands out as a unique case study for exam-ining neoliberal populism in Canada and North America.

The targeting of Muslim communities through "the War on Terror" has given rise to a variety of schemes and tactics informed by Islamophobia and racializing narratives. Yet, there are few studies examining the specific intelligence practices deployed by governments as they engage in forms of racialized surveillance. This study analyses 95 in-depth interviews with Muslim community leaders in five Canadian cities to map the material structural practices employed by the Canadian Security Intelligence Services (CSIS) in its racialized surveillance of Muslim communities. This study documents how CSIS engages in the mass surveillance of Muslim communities, transforms Mosques into spaces of surveillance, creates a community of informants, and targets political activism. Moreover, we found that CSIS deploys illegal practices such as threatening citizenship and refugee status, intimidating people in their homes during the night and denying legal representation during interrogations. The article also explores how these state-led anti-Muslim surveillance tactics produce internal forms of community surveillance where individuals begin to self-regulate their own behavior. The level of CSIS surveillance of Muslim communities raises questions about the extent to which CSIS is overstepping its powers and engaging in illegal practices.

While it is widely acknowledged that Canadian Muslims are targeted at airports and borders, few studies have focused on their actual experiences of state surveillance practices. Moreover, little attention has been paid to how these experiences impact and shape identity formation and their understanding of citizenship. To address this gap, we conducted 50 in-depth interviews with young Canadian Muslims living in Vancouver and Toronto. Our interviewees referred to being repeatedly stopped, questioned, detained, and harassed by security personnel. They felt that any evidence of their Muslim identity – name, country of birth, appearance, or clothing – makes them a target for extra surveillance, resulting in heightened fears about being stripped of their rights and a lack of ability to assert their religious identities. This paper explores the implications of racialized border practices on identity formation and citizenship depletion among Muslim Canadians.

AbstractReforms to Canadian sentencing law in 1996 and the Supreme Court of Canada decisionR. v. Gladue[1999] opened the door to a new normative set of legal practices that endeavour to integrate racial knowledge about offenders' collective and individual experiences of race relations and oppression into traditional legal criminal practices. One outcome of the reforms and court cases was the formation of dedicated Gladue courts for Aboriginal peoples. This paper explores the formation of Gladue courts, the legal techniques used to produce contextualized racial knowledges, how this information is admitted as evidence before the court, and how this knowledge is used to reframe legal subjects and the risk they pose.

In the past two decades, Canadian policies governing the structure and content of presentence reports (PSRs) have shifted to focus more directly on the systematic identification of offender's criminogenic risk and needs. In this article, we (1) examine how risk-based approaches to offender management have altered the structure and format of the PSR in Canada, and (2) contrast the structure of risk-based PSRs to Gladue reports for Aboriginal offenders in Canada. Gladue reports are designed to identify the unique systemic race/cultural and historical factors specific to Aboriginal offenders and to recommend alternatives to incarceration. We argue that although risk-based PSRs incorporate recognition of race-related issues, their structure and emphasis on actuarially based risk assessments frames race and risk differently from Gladue reports. In Gladue reports, holistic approaches and cultural impact factors are documented and used to understand risk and need. Finally, we argue that the conceptualization and relevance of race is limited by actuarial risk logic.

RésuméUne « peine juste » est de plus en plus structurée selon le cadre de la probabilité actuarielle. Les technologies du risque actuariel sont souvent considérées comme des procédés ayant, en grande partie, supplanté la prise de décision discrétionnaire de la part des intervenants par des modèles décisionnaires structurés et quantitatifs. Certains savants soutiennent que la transition vers des pénalités basées sur le risque a mené à la «déqualification», à la «scientificité» et à «l'érosion de la discrétion professionnelle», voire même à l'élimination du pouvoir discrétionnaire professionnel de la part des praticiens du droit criminel. Basé sur 71 entrevues semi-structurées et non directives avec des professionnels de la justice criminelle, cet article analyse comment l'introduction des outils du risque façonne la discrétion sans toutefois l'éliminer. Nous soutenons que les outils du risque ne sont pas simplement imposés sur les praticiens de la justice criminelle. Au contraire, les praticiens résistent et utilisent activement les technologies du risque tout en atténuant l'impaete de ces outils sur leur capacité de prendre des décisions discrétionnaires. Nous soutenons que l'adoption des technologies du risque représente une négociation procédurale : les praticiens accueillent les avantages professionnels que ces technologies apportent tout en affirmant l'importance de l'expérience et de la connaissance clinique dans la prise de décision. Nous démontrons comment, premièrement, les praticiens font la distinction entre la standardisation de l'évaluation du risque et leurs propres expériences et connaissances cliniques et comment, deuxièmement, ils exercent de la discrétion dans le but de mitiger les effets discriminatoires associés à l'évaluation du risque. Ainsi, bien que les praticiens sont attirés vers les outils du risque par le fait que leur soi-disant «objectivité» les aident à défendre leurs décisions auprès du public, l'adoption et l'utilisation de ces outils dans le contexte de la prise de décisions professionnelles est plus complexe et contradictoire que laisserait croire la littérature théorique.