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IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CONSTRUCTIVE ADVICE, THE AUTHOR REVIEWS ERRORS ONE CAN COMMIT WHEN DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVESMISCLASSIFYING PROBLEMS, APPLYING STOCK SOLUTIONS, PRESCRIBING ACTIONS TOP DOWN, DUMMYING UP ALTERNATIVES, AND DOING EVERYTHING AT ONCEAND DESCRIBES A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FROM "MANIPULATING" KEY POLICY VARIABLES.

The cataloging of failures when putting policies in place has been the hallmark of implementation studies since the 1970s. The numerous lessons from this research can be distilled into guidance about improving policy design to enhance implementation prospects and other suggestions for overcoming administrative obstacles. This contribution extends these lessons by addressing how the governing arrangements for addressing policy problems—the policy regimes that are put in place—either work to reinforce or undermine political commitments enshrined within policies. Regimes mediate feedback effects of policies in affecting policy legitimacy, coherence, and durability. These notions about policy regimes are contrasted with traditional perspectives about implementation failures. The value of a regime perspective in studying policy implementation and governing is illustrated for the case of the Affordable Care Act in the United States of America (USA).

AbstractThis research considers accountability issues for new forms of regulation that shift the emphasis from prescribing actions to regulating systems or regulating for results. Shortfalls at various levels of accountability are identified from experiences with these regimes in the regulation of building and fire safety, food safety and nuclear power plant safety. These experiences illustrate how accountability shortfalls can undermine regulatory performance and introduce a potential for subtle forms of regulatory capture. These concerns underscore the importance of finding the right fit between regulatory circumstances and the design of regulatory regimes.

This paper addresses the role of differing regulatory contexts in shaping compliance motivations. These are examined for farmers and environmental regulation in Denmark, homebuilders and building safety in the United States, and marine facilities and water quality in the United States. The findings show that the influence of different regulatory practices and the relevance of normative and social considerations differ among these regulatory contexts. This calls attention to the need for more research on the interplay of regulatory arrangements and contexts in shaping motivations for regulatory compliance.

Regulatory reformers have widely endorsed greater use of a performance‐based approach to regulation that defines objectives in terms of desired outcomes. The appeal of the performance‐based approach is as much about introducing a regime that overcomes problems of overly rigid rules and inflexible enforcement as it is about regulating for results. The case of leaky buildings in New Zealand provides a cautionary tale of a flawed performance‐based regulatory regime. It allowed for flexibility without sufficient accountability and in so doing showed the Achilles' heel of performance‐based regulation.