De nouvelles initiatives de micro-finance émergent dans des pays aux marchés bancaires et financiers pourtant très développés. Au Nord, la micro-finance est perçue comme un nouveau moyen de résoudre la contrainte de financement des micro-entreprises et d'offrir aux individus les moyens de leur propre développement. Nous sommes ainsi amenés à nous interroger sur l'applicabilité des mécanismes du Sud. Cet apprentissage Sud-Nord implique d'analyser les différences de contexte qui font que tant les objectifs que les instruments ne peuvent pas être exactement les mêmes. Nous défendons la thèse selon laquelle les institutions de micro-finance au Nord ont sans doute un rôle à jouer en tant que politique active d'emploi et de promotion de l'entrepreneuriat, à condition qu'elles s'inscrivent dans une stratégie de développement local. Trois pistes d'action publique sont alors envisagées afin de soutenir le développement des institutions de micro-finance dans ce contexte particulier.
Rule-based intergovernmental transfers are often presented as the panacea to avoid the manipulation of transfers for political motives. We question that assertion in the case of Nigeria, where these transfers are highly dependent on natural resources and likely to be subject to elite capture. In this article, we use oil windfalls as a source of exogenous variation in the political discretion an incumbent government can exert in rule-based transfers. Exploiting within-state variation between 2007 and 2015 in Nigeria, an increase in VAT transfers induced by higher oil windfalls is found to improve the electoral fortune of an incumbent government. Our results question the promotion of rule-based transfers as a one-fits-all institutional solution in resource-abundant countries with relatively weak institutions.
Rule-based intergovernmental transfers are often presented as the panacea to avoid the manipulation of transfers for political motives. We question that assertion in the case of Nigeria, where these transfers are highly dependent on natural resources and likely to be subject to elite capture. In this article, we use oil windfalls as a source of exogenous variation in the political discretion an incumbent government can exert in rule-based transfers. Exploiting within-state variation between 2007 and 2015 in Nigeria, an increase in VAT transfers induced by higher oil windfalls is found to improve the electoral fortune of an incumbent government. Our results question the promotion of rule-based transfers as a one-fits-all institutional solution in resource-abundant countries with relatively weak institutions.
L'afflux de réfugiés ukrainiens est inédit dans l'histoire de l'Europe depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Fin mars 2022, le Haut-Commissariat aux Réfugiés enregistre plus de 4 millions de réfugiés en provenance d'Ukraine. D'autres sources prédisent un total proche de 10 millions si la guerre perdure. Dans ce numéro de Regards économiques, nous discutons d'abord des potentielles conséquences économiques associées, avant de souligner l'importance d'une coordination renforcée entre pays de l'Union européenne. Le caractère historique de cet afflux de réfugiés ne doit pas faire oublier que la grande majorité des réfugiés continuera à résider dans des pays à faible ou moyen revenu, hors Union européenne. Une mise en perspective s'impose également quant à la capacité d'absorption des pays européens. Sans même évoquer les différences de richesse, le nombre de réfugiés ukrainiens représenterait à peine plus d'1% de la population européenne. Sans pour autant sous-estimer les défis liés à l'accueil des individus originaires d'Ukraine, la distribution des réfugiés au sein de l'Union européenne aura sans doute une incidence considérable sur les conséquences de cet épisode migratoire. La littérature économique nous montre qu'à terme la migration n'a pas d'effets néfastes sur les finances publiques ou sur le marché du travail. Au contraire, les réfugiés peuvent contribuer de manière positive à leur économie d'accueil en occupant, par exemple, des emplois en manque de main d'oeuvre, en créant eux-mêmes du travail pour la population du pays d'accueil, ou simplement en consommant ou en investissant dans le pays de destination. Toutefois, il faudra du temps pour voir se matérialiser de tels effets économiques et ceux-ci sont sans doute conditionnés à une réception et une intégration réussies des réfugiés ukrainiens à court terme. À cet égard, nous soutenons qu'une plus grande coordination entre pays de l'Union européenne est nécessaire. À l'aide de différentes clés de répartition, nous proposons certaines pistes pour déterminer une répartition plus équilibrée des réfugiés en fonction des capacités d'absorption de chaque pays. Un manque de coordination aboutirait certainement à une situation asymétrique où des pays comme l'Allemagne, la Pologne, la Tchéquie, la Hongrie et la Roumanie, caractérisés par une forte diaspora ukrainienne et proche géographiquement de l'Ukraine, accueilleraient la majorité des réfugiés. En supposant un rôle de soutien identique des réseaux ukrainiens entre les destinations, la Belgique en accueillerait moins de 40.000. Une entente sur la distribution des réfugiés ukrainiens à moyen terme, en fonction de critères comme la population, le PIB ou une combinaison des deux favoriserait une responsabilité partagée entre pays européens en fonction de leurs capacités d'absorption. Selon un scénario pessimiste de 10 millions de réfugiés ukrainiens, la Belgique devrait accueillir entre 259.000 et 305.000 individus.
Introduction Despite considerable improvements in vaccination coverage over the last decade, half of the world's unvaccinated and undervaccinated children are located in Africa. The role of institutional trust in explaining vaccination gaps has been highlighted in several qualitative reports but so far has only been quantified in a small number of high-income countries. Methods We matched information on child vaccination status from the Demographic Health Surveys with information on institutional trust from the Afrobarometer surveys at the subnational level. A total of 166 953 children from 41 surveys administered in 22 African countries covering 216 subnational regions were used. Based on a principal component analysis, we constructed an institutional mistrust index that combined the level of mistrust in the head of state, parliament, electoral system, courts and local government. Associations between institutional mistrust and child vaccination uptake were assessed with multivariable fixed effects logistic regressions that controlled for time-invariant subnational region characteristics and various child, caregiver, household and community characteristics. Results A 1 SD increase in the institutional mistrust index was associated with a 10% (95% CI of ORs: 1.03 to 1.18) increase in the likelihood that a child had not received any of eight basic vaccines and with a 6% decrease in the likelihood a child had received all of the basic vaccines (95% CI: 0.92 to 0.97). Institutional mistrust was negatively associated with the likelihood that a child had received each of the eight basic vaccinations (p<0.05). Conclusions Child vaccination rates in Africa are considerably lower in areas in which the local population displays high levels of mistrust towards local authorities. Institutional mistrust is an important dimension of vaccine hesitancy, considered as one of the most important threats to global health. Empowering local authorities with resources and communication strategies to address institutional mistrust may be needed to close the remaining vaccination gaps in Africa.
Introduction Despite considerable improvements in vaccination coverage over the last decade, half of the world's unvaccinated and undervaccinated children are located in Africa. The role of institutional trust in explaining vaccination gaps has been highlighted in several qualitative reports but so far has only been quantified in a small number of high-income countries. Methods We matched information on child vaccination status from the Demographic Health Surveys with information on institutional trust from the Afrobarometer surveys at the subnational level. A total of 166 953 children from 41 surveys administered in 22 African countries covering 216 subnational regions were used. Based on a principal component analysis, we constructed an institutional mistrust index that combined the level of mistrust in the head of state, parliament, electoral system, courts and local government. Associations between institutional mistrust and child vaccination uptake were assessed with multivariable fixed effects logistic regressions that controlled for time-invariant subnational region characteristics and various child, caregiver, household and community characteristics. Results A 1 SD increase in the institutional mistrust index was associated with a 10% (95% CI of ORs: 1.03 to 1.18) increase in the likelihood that a child had not received any of eight basic vaccines and with a 6% decrease in the likelihood a child had received all of the basic vaccines (95% CI: 0.92 to 0.97). Institutional mistrust was negatively associated with the likelihood that a child had received each of the eight basic vaccinations (p<0.05). Conclusions Child vaccination rates in Africa are considerably lower in areas in which the local population displays high levels of mistrust towards local authorities. Institutional mistrust is an important dimension of vaccine hesitancy, considered as one of the most important threats to global health. Empowering local authorities with resources and communication strategies to address institutional mistrust may be needed to close the remaining vaccination gaps in Africa.
This paper documents the effects of the recent civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo on mortality both in utero and during the first year of life. It instruments for conflict intensity using a mineral price index, which exploits the exogenous variation in the potential value of mineral resources generated by changes in world mineral prices to predict the geographic distribution of the conflict. Using estimates of civil war exposure on mortality across male and female newborn to assess their relative health, it provides evidence of culling effect (in utero selection) as a consequence of in utero shocks.
This paper documents the impact of the violent civil war affecting the Democratic Republic of Congo in the period 1997–2004 on infant mortality. It adopts an instrumental variable approach to correct for the nonrandom timing and location of conflict events using mineral price index variations by district, taking account of the mineral locations and prices, as instrument. Strong and robust evidence, including mother fixed effects regressions comparing siblings, shows that conflict significantly increases girl mortality. The paper also examines the mechanisms explaining this phenomenon, with a focus on disentangling the behavioral from the biological factors. The analysis suggests that gender imbalances in infant mortality are driven by the selection induced by a higher vulnerability of boys in utero rather than by gender discrimination. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; GRP32; D.1 Agriculture's role in national development strategy ; DSGD