Suchergebnisse

This paper investigates the effectiveness of planning prompts on organizations' tax compliance behavior. We conducted a large-scale, multi-wave field experiment examining the tax-paying behavior of all organizations that failed to file timely annual returns for a payroll tax in the province of Ontario. Organizations were randomly assigned to receive one of two letters: Ontario's standard late notice (control) and a revised experimental late notice, which included step-by-step instructions of when, where and how to file a return. Our data indicate that planning prompts are effective at increasing organizations' timely tax payment. In addition to replicating these findings across two waves, we demonstrate that while our intervention did not appear to have effects that persisted across tax years, organizations also did not habituate to our manipulation and its effects were consistent across repeated exposures. Our study is among the first to demonstrate that a simple behavioral intervention that has typically been applied to individuals to help them to act upon their existing motivations can be effective in the realm of tax compliance and organizational behavior. ; https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/pdf/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3744 ; Published version

Mobilizing domestic revenues efficiently is a priority for the Government of Poland, but it is not easy. There are numerous instruments that can be used to achieve this objective. Traditional measures to boost government revenues include changes to the tax legislation and reforms in the area of tax administration. Such measures can have a large fiscal impact, but are often politically challenging to design and negotiate, and can take time to implement. Behavioral interventions often focus on adapting existing systems and processes and can thus be implemented relatively quickly and at a low cost. Overall, they are an additional tool in the policy toolkit that country authorities have to improve tax compliance, and thus complement but do not substitute traditional measures to establish effective tax collection systems including changes in tax legislations and tax administration reforms. Behavioral interventions can also help the Tax Authority to align its strategy more accurately to taxpayer behavior. The Polish authorities were interested in applying insights from behavioral economics to their communications with taxpayers to see if making small changes could promote tax compliance. This paper summarizes the results of a randomized controlled trial (RCT) that used letters to remind taxpayers in Poland to pay their taxes. These taxpayers had declared their personal income tax (PIT) for the 2015 fiscal year but had failed to pay what they owed by the deadline, April 30, 2016 (i.e., taxpayers in arrears). The trial took place between May and August 2016 and covered a total of 149,925 individual taxpayers.

Many written forms required by businesses and governments rely on honest reporting. Proof of honest intent is typically provided through signature at the end of, e.g., tax returns or insurance policy forms. Still, people sometimes cheat to advance their financial self-interests—at great costs to society. We test an easy-to-implement method to discourage dishonesty: signing at the beginning rather than at the end of a self-report, thereby reversing the order of the current practice. Using laboratory and field experiments, we find that signing before—rather than after—the opportunity to cheat makes ethics salient when they are needed most and significantly reduces dishonesty.

Honest reporting is essential for society to function well. However, people frequently lie when asked to provide information, such as misrepresenting their income to save money on taxes. A landmark finding published in PNAS [L. L. Shu, N. Mazar, F. Gino, D. Ariely, M. H. Bazerman, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 109, 15197–15200 (2012)] provided evidence for a simple way of encouraging honest reporting: asking people to sign a veracity statement at the beginning instead of at the end of a self-report form. Since this finding was published, various government agencies have adopted this practice. However, in this project, we failed to replicate this result. Across five conceptual replications (n = 4,559) and one highly powered, preregistered, direct replication (n = 1,235) conducted with the authors of the original paper, we observed no effect of signing first on honest reporting. Given the policy applications of this result, it is important to update the scientific record regarding the veracity of these results.

Honest reporting is essential for society to function well. However, people frequently lie when asked to provide information, such as misrepresenting their income to save money on taxes. A landmark finding published in PNAS [L. L. Shu, N. Mazar, F. Gino, D. Ariely,M. H. Bazerman,Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.109, 15197–15200 (2012)] provided evidence for a simple way of encouraging honest reporting: asking people to sign a veracity statement at the beginning instead of at the end of a self-report form. Since this finding was published, various government agencies have adopted this practice. However, in this project, we failed to replicate this result. Across five conceptual replications (n=4,559) and one highly powered, preregistered, direct replication (n=1,235) conducted with the authors of the original paper, we observed no effect of signing first on honest reporting. Given the policy applications of this result, it is important to update the scientific record regarding the veracity of these results. ; Published version