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Composers generally write music alone, and we commonly understand the great figures of classical music as singular geniuses. Even where composers' social networks and friendships are of contextual interest, it is arguable that their association with other musicians arises because they choose to socialize with similar others. However, it is also possible that creative work, even for artists as solitary as composers, depends significantly on interaction and collaboration. Certain periods and places are considered hotspots of creativity where new musical ideas are shared and movements arise. In this paper we consider the case of British classical composition, both as an example of a music network, and to contribute to debates in music history.

"Social networks are critical for the creation and consumption of music. An edited collection, Social Networks and Music Worlds introduces students and scholars of music in society through the core concepts and tools of social network analysis. The collection showcases their use by sociologists, historians and musicologists examining, in turn, the punk, jazz, folk, classical music, Riot Grrrl, indie acoustic, R&B and calypso scenes. An overarching introduction is provided by leading network scholar and cultural sociologist Nick Crossley. The collection builds upon insights from canonic texts in the sociology of music, with the crucial innovation of examining musical network interaction via formal methods. With network analysis in the arts and humanities at an emergent stage, Social Networks and Music Worlds highlights its possibilities for non-scientists. Contributions hail from leading and emerging scholars who present social network graphs to represent different music worlds, locating individuals, resources and styles within them. The collection sits at the nexus of sociological, musicological and cultural studies traditions. Its range should ensure a large scholarly readership"--Provided by publisher

Die Tendenz, dass Frauen religiöser sind als Männer wurde häufig beobachtet. Zur Begründung dieses Unterschieds wurden viele Theorien formuliert, deren Erklärung von biologisch bis soziologisch reichen; ein Konsens zur Erklärung des Geschlechtsunterschieds in der Religiosität wurde nicht erreicht. Auf der Basis von Daten aus dem European Social Survey, der European Values Study und dem International Social Survey Programme sowie einer neuen Methode zur Messung des Gender Gap vergleichen wir Länder, Generationen und Zeiträume in Europa, um drei Schlüsselfragen zu beantworten: 1) Wie stark hängt der Unterschied zwischen Männern und Frauen vom verwendeten Indikator für Religiosität (z. B. Mitgliedschaft, Kirchgang, Beten, Glauben) ab? 2) Besteht auf der Ebene der Nationalstaaten eine Beziehung zwischen der Größe des Gender Gap und dem Ausmaß der Säkularisierung oder der Gleichheit der Geschlechter? 3) Nähert sich die Religiosität von Männern und Frauen in der Generationenfolge oder über die Zeit an? Die Ergebnisse deuten auf eine Verringerung des Gender Gap in Europa, insbesondere in Süd- und Osteuropa hin, nach wie vor sind jedoch Differenzen beobachtbar. Selbst in sehr säkularen Ländern und solchen, in denen die Ungleichheit zwischen den Geschlechtern stark reduziert wurde, identifizieren sich Frauen deutlich häufiger als Männer mit einer Religionsgemeinschaft, sie halten sich für religiöser und praktizieren ihre Religiosität sowohl öffentlich als auch privat häufiger.

Cultural consumption and production are both characterised by multiple dimensions of inequality. Research in cultural stratification has highlighted the links between the exclusivity of cultural production, the type of cultural works created, and the audiences and public receptions for culture. We contribute to this agenda by examining a hitherto unexplored area: the cultural values and political identities of workers in the creative industries and cultural sector. Analysis of the British Social Attitudes (2010–2015) surveys and British Election Study Internet Panel (2016–2017) surveys demonstrates that creative and cultural workers have distinct cultural values. They are among the most left-wing, liberal and pro-welfare of any occupations and industries. This sets them apart from the average respondent who is relatively more right-wing, authoritarian and more in favour of welfare control. When examining their non-electoral participation, we also find they are highly civically engaged in terms of contacting elected representatives and government officials, signing petitions, political volunteering, political donations, participating in demonstrations, ethical consumption and boycotts, and industrial action. Moreover, they are more likely to report that they supported Remain in the 2016 EU 'Brexit' Referendum, to report unhappiness with the Leave result, and to identify with Remain voters. We conclude that distinct occupational cultures are particularly significant in the case of the cultural and creative sector, given creative workers' role in representing society and the civic realm via the products of their work. We also argue that occupational cultures constitute an important, under-recognised source of social and cultural division.

This study addresses the question of whether a relationship exists between sympathy for violent extremism and openness to ideological positions associated with the revolutionary far left. We begin by analysing the characteristics of British far-left sectarian groups: that is, small, ideologically homogeneous organisations, each of which rejects parliamentary politics as a route to socialism and instead aspires to become the 'vanguard party' of Leninist revolutionary theory. We distinguish the members of such groups from members of the public who identify as 'very left-wing'. We then develop a survey instrument derived from publications by sectarian far-left groups and pilot it on a stratified random sample of the selfidentified 'very left-wing' (N = 1073). The data collected is then re-used as a boost sample for a nationally-representative sample of the British public (N = 3823). Using these data, we test the hypothesis of a positive association between the belief system disseminated by the sectarian far left – which we term 'revolutionary workerism' – and sympathy with violent extremist tactics. We find a relationship which is highly significant in both statistical and substantive terms: those who express strong agreement with revolutionary workerist ideas are far more likely to express sympathy with violent extremist tactics than those who express strong disagreement. We also find a positive relationship between sympathy for violent extremism and a geopolitical outlook resembling the 'anti-imperialist' ideology promoted by the sectarian far left, in that those who see the US and the UK (and, among the 'very leftwing', also Israel) as a greater threat to world peace than NATO strategic adversaries such as North Korea tend to be more sympathetic to violent extremism than those who do not.

OBJECTIVE: To test whether demographic variation in vaccine hesitancy can be explained by trust and healthcare experiences. DESIGN: Cross-sectional study. SETTING: Data collected online in April 2021. PARTICIPANTS: Data were collected from 4885 UK resident adults, of whom 3223 had received the invitation to be vaccinated against the novel coronavirus and could therefore be included in the study. 1629 included participants identified as female and 1594 as male. 234 identified as belonging to other than white ethnic groups, while 2967 identified as belonging to white ethnic groups. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OUTCOME MEASURES: Uptake of coronavirus vaccination. RESULTS: Membership of an other than white ethnic group (adjusted OR (AOR)=0.53, 95% CI 0.35 to 0.84, p=0.005) and age (AOR=1.61, 95% CI 1.39 to 1.87, p<0.001 for a 1 SD change from the mean) were the only statistically significant demographic predictors of vaccine uptake. After controls for National Health Service (NHS) healthcare experiences and trust in government, scientists and medical professionals, the effect associated with membership of an other than white ethnic group appears more marginal (AOR=0.61, 95% CI 0.38 to 1.01, p=0.046), while the effect associated with age remains virtually unchanged. Exploratory analysis suggests that NHS healthcare experiences mediate 24% (95% CI 8% to 100%, p=0.024) of the association between ethnicity and uptake, while trust mediates 94% (95% CI 56% to 100%, p=0.001) of the association between NHS healthcare experiences and uptake. CONCLUSIONS: Members of other than white ethnic groups report inferior NHS healthcare experiences, potentially explaining their lower reported trust in government, scientists and medical professionals. However, this does not fully explain the ethnic gap in coronavirus vaccination uptake.

BACKGROUND: Vaccine hesitancy presents an obstacle to the campaign to control COVID-19. It has previously been found to be associated with youth, female gender, low income, low education, low medical trust, minority ethnic group membership, low perceived risk from COVID-19, use of certain social media platforms and conspiracy beliefs. However, it is unclear which of these predictors might explain variance associated with others. METHODS: An online survey was conducted with a representative sample of 4343 UK residents, aged 18–75, between 21 November and 21 December 2020. Predictors of vaccine hesitancy were assessed using linear rank-order models. RESULTS: Coronavirus vaccine hesitancy is associated with youth, female gender, low income, low education, high informational reliance on social media, low informational reliance on print and broadcast media, membership of other than white ethnic groups, low perceived risk from COVID-19 and low trust in scientists and medics, as well as (to a much lesser extent) low trust in government. Coronavirus conspiracy suspicions and general vaccine attitudes appear uniquely predictive, jointly explaining 35% of variance. Following controls for these variables, effects associated with trust, ethnicity and social media reliance largely or completely disappear, whereas the effect associated with education is reversed. CONCLUSIONS: Strengthening positive attitudes to vaccination and reducing conspiracy suspicions with regards to the coronavirus may have a positive effect on vaccine uptake, especially among ethnic groups with heightened vaccine hesitancy. However, vaccine hesitancy associated with age and gender does not appear to be explained by other predictor variables tested here.

A collaborative ebook on the effects of the Brexit vote on the UK's cultural sector and its agents: "It's not just the economy, stupid! Brexit and the Cultural Sector", edited by Gesa Stedman and Sandra van Lente. Our contributors come from a broad range of cultural and artistic practice and many of them worry about two aspects which have come to the fore in the context of Brexit: the stark social rift which separates the Leave and Remain camps, and the nasty rise of xenophobia and insularity in all its different shapes and forms. Although our authors do not intend to be read or viewed as all-encompassing, and although they differ in respect to the focus they chose for their essays, poems, or statements, one aspect unifies their utterances: passion. Passion for the multi-faceted characteristics of culture, language, exchange, dialogue, border-crossings, passion for an outward-looking approach to both Britain, its different nations, and its neighbours close and far. A passionate fear of what Britain might lose in the process of departing from the EU. And the fear of loss does not concentrate on the loss of revenue or even on the probable obstacles to travel and artistic exchange once Brexit is in place. But the loss of ambivalence and ambiguity, the loss of conflicting opinions, texts, stances, diversity, in short: everything that culture, which is free to find its own forms of expression, is valued for.