Resolving a Non-Performing Loan Crisis: The Ongoing Case of the Irish Mortgage Market
In: ESRB: Working Paper Series No. 2018/71
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In: ESRB: Working Paper Series No. 2018/71
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Working paper
I outline the effect of business networks on trade, FDI and welfare in a two-country, two-firm duopoly. The network effect, following Greaney (2002), is modelled as a marginal cost disadvantage facing a firm from Foreign in selling to Home. Unlike traditional trade costs, this cost cannot be avoided by investing in Home. My main addition is a Nash game between governments in which they subsidise the fixed costs of inward FDI. While the network effect is shown to lead to favourable outcomes for the Home firm, I show that once government subsidies to the fixed costs of FDI are included and welfare functions analysed, the network effect leads to asymmetric outcomes unfavourable to Home. This result can help inform the debate on countries' (in particular Japan's) international trade and investment relations.
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In: ESRB: Working Paper Series 2021/121
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In: ESRB: Working Paper Series No. 2019/92
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In: ECB Working Paper No. 2092
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In: Central Bank of Ireland, Research Technical Paper 09/RT/23
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In: IMF Economic Review, Band 63, Heft 3, S. 542-567
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In: Economics & Politics, Band 26, Heft 2, S. 263-284
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In: National Institute economic review: journal of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Band 225, S. R52-R67
ISSN: 1741-3036
Cross-country divergence in credit availability to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) has been a salient feature of the recent Euro Area economic crisis. This paper uses firm level and macroeconomic data to identify heterogeneity in SME credit conditions within the Euro Area since 2009. By taking account of differences in firm quality and in the risk-free interest rate, we use remaining residual differences in credit supply conditions to identify a 'credit crunch'. We investigate whether macroeconomic conditions such as real economy growth and private sector leverage can explain these residual credit crunches, finding that banks respond to these factors when allocating credit to SMEs. The analysis allows identification of economies where credit conditions appear both unexpectedly restrictive and accommodative.
This paper considers the relationship between democratic accountability in de- veloping countries and the policies they use to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). We isolate two policy areas that governments of developing countries use to attract FDI: the tax burden on firms and the regulatory standards within which they operate. Countries that maintain high business taxes can only attract FDI by offering a less regulated business environment, which may have associated po- litical costs. The extent to which democratic accountability constrains leaders in their tax/regulatory policy choices is our main line of analysis. The novelty of the paper is that it endogenously determines policy choices within a political economy framework that recognizes the trade-offs between attracting FDI and maintaining political control. Examination of firm-level survey data from foreign firms operating in eastern Europe and central Asian economies confirms our model's main conclusion: regulation is seen to be a relatively larger obstacle to doing business in countries with greater democratic accountability.
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In: ESRB: Working Paper Series No. 2017/36
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In: Economics & politics, Band 26, Heft 2, S. 263-284
ISSN: 1468-0343
We examine the effect of domestic political accountability on leaders' strategies for attracting foreign direct investment to less developed countries. We consider two policy areas: the tax burden imposed on firms and the regulatory environment in which they operate. We find that democratic governments are more likely to offer relatively lower tax rates to foreign investors, whereas autocratic governments are more likely to offer relatively lax regulation. This result is driven by the greater elasticity of the political survival function to environmental and labor regulations in more democratic countries. Analyses of firm‐level survey data confirm our main theoretical conclusions.
In: Economics & politics, Band 26, Heft 2, S. 263-284
ISSN: 0954-1985
In: IMF Working Paper No. 20/58
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14959
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