Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
Alternativ können Sie versuchen, selbst über Ihren lokalen Bibliothekskatalog auf das gewünschte Dokument zuzugreifen.
Bei Zugriffsproblemen kontaktieren Sie uns gern.
67 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
SSRN
In: Contemporary economic policy: a journal of Western Economic Association International, Band 42, Heft 1, S. 110-119
ISSN: 1465-7287
AbstractPlea bargaining dominates the U.S. criminal justice system and has garnered calls to reduce its prevalence. In 2013 Alaska's Attorney General acted banning a practice known as sentencing bargaining where the prosecutor negotiates with the defense over the length of the incarceration. I provide the first causal identification of this policy's impact on the plea bargaining rate. I show that the policy, by leaving open the charging discretion (in effect allowing charge bargaining), was ineffective at changing plea bargaining's prevalence across the state. Policymakers should look elsewhere for tools if they want to mitigate its rate.
SSRN
SSRN
In: Eastern economic journal: EEJ, Band 47, Heft 4, S. 506-518
ISSN: 1939-4632
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Band 65, Heft 1, S. 68-96
SSRN
In: Scottish journal of political economy: the journal of the Scottish Economic Society, Band 65, Heft 1, S. 68-96
ISSN: 1467-9485
AbstractResults from a leader–follower public goods game are presented. An individual, when randomly selected to make a contribution knowing others will observe the selection, gives more than in the simultaneous‐move public goods game. Followers adopt a quasi‐matching strategy where they systematically donate less than the leader, but contribute more when the leader does and contribute less when the leader free rides. The net result is increased provision of a public good when contributions are sequential. The results highlight that psychological preferences, rather than solely social preferences, can explain behavior.
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: The American economist: journal of the International Honor Society in Economics, Omicron Delta Epsilon, Band 59, Heft 1, S. 27-33
ISSN: 2328-1235
In: Journal of institutional economics, Band 10, Heft 3, S. 451-470
ISSN: 1744-1382
Abstract:Do those who prefer economic freedom behave differently than those who prefer government intervention? Experiments of the Dictator and Trust games are studied. A survey elicits preference for private solutions to potential market failures. Trust and reciprocation are highest for those who score both high and low on the assessment. In the Dictator Game, there is a strong inverse relationship between one's preference for economic freedom and giving. Thus, the results can be interpreted as those with a strong preference for government intervention altruistically give, while those with a preference for economic freedom give primarily in response to wealth-generating investments.
In: Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Band 10, Heft 4, S. 696-714
SSRN