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Experiments have become an increasingly common tool for political science researchers over the last decade, particularly laboratory experiments performed on small convenience samples. We argue that the standard normal theory statistical paradigm used in political science fails to meet the needs of these experimenters and outline an alternative approach to statistical inference based on randomization of the treatment. The randomization inference approach not only provides direct estimation of the experimenter's quantity of interest—the certainty of the causal inference about the observed units—but also helps to deal with other challenges of small samples. We offer an introduction to the logic of randomization inference, a brief overview of its technical details, and guidance for political science experimenters about making analytic choices within the randomization inference framework. Finally, we reanalyze data from two political science experiments using randomization tests to illustrate the inferential differences that choosing a randomization inference approach can make.

We seek to explain how states govern big cities. Political scientists' accounts of urban politics either fail to treat the state systematically or place state hostility at the center of such an account. Accounts by historians, by contrast, offer tools political scientists can use to theorize urban politics in the state arena. We use those tools, and we find that cities can manage the legislative process. This power starts with bill introduction and carries through to the vote on the floor. This ability results from a central feature of American state politics: on bills about big cities, state legislators now and in the past find their primary voting cues in the unity of local delegations. The city delegation, then, has tremendous power to manage the state's involvement in city affairs. In many respects, ours is an account of a special kind of divided government, with two institutional arenas where urban government is carried out.

We examine the development of legislative capacity in U.S. state legislatures in the twentieth century. This capacity can be derived from the legislators themselves, or from institutions and practices. We consider both sources as we provide an account of the ragged and piecemeal development of legislative capacity in the states. We argue that most state legislatures have been neither entirely professional nor amateur, but rather have existed somewhere in between, in a place where pockets of expertise fill in for professional capacity.

Many politicians and reformers have suggested that allowing non- or bipartisan redistricting commissions to draw congressional districts will make elections more competitive and reduce partisan polarization. Although such commissions reduce the power of political parties and elected officials, they have been considered in 24 states from 1999 to 2006. We combine an analysis of national patterns of bill consideration with an intensive examination of legislative activity in three states. Our study suggests that internal pressures, such as redistricting controversies, and external pressures, such as the initiative process, contribute to the consideration of redistricting commission legislation. Furthermore, the precise combination of internal and external pressures in a state leads proposals to take one of two paths in the legislative process: a "partisan path" dominated by legislative insiders and interparty wrangling and a "good government path" where outside interest groups exercise more influence and the debate surrounds specific features of the proposal.