Suchergebnisse

The aim of this article is to understand why, in the aftermath of the 1998 Sydney water contamination crisis, policy and institutional reform was comparatively minor—despite intense scrutiny and criticism of the framework of water policy in New South Wales (NSW). The article should be of serious interest to scholars interested in crisis and policy change, rather than simply those with a particular interest in water policy in Australia. It frames the Sydney case as a disconfirming one but finds that an understanding of the stability/change relationship in NSW water policy can only partially be understood through applying key contemporary institutional, actor, and interest‐centered explanations. Therefore, it probes the plausibility of an additional explanation and develops the rudiments of a new "policy configuration" approach to help explain policy stability and change. It concludes by suggesting that there is potential for a policy configuration perspective to be tested against other cases.

Résumé Pendant de nombreuses années, les partisans d'un Parlement écossais espéraient que son arrivée éventuelle marquerait le début d'une nouvelle phase dans le gouvernement local : un accroissement de l'autonomie locale et une réparation de la centralisation rampante de la période conservatrice. Dans cet article, nous abordons la question suivante: dans quelle mesure l'équilibre des forces entre le gouvernement central et le gouvernement local a-t-il évolué, le cas échéant, depuis l'avènement du Parlement écossais en 1999 ? Nous examinerons les périodes avant et après 1999 sur le plan de la gouvernance écossaise et plus particulièrement les paramètres juridiques/constitutionnels, financiers et stratégiques définis par le centre. Nous soutenons que la continuité a été plus importante que le changement, et que la domination persistante du centre s'explique plus particulièrement par: (a) l'influence généralisée de l'Union britannique (b) la continuité relative des acteurs politiques et (c) l'intérêt personnel permanent du « centre ».

For many years, advocates of a Scottish Parliament hoped that its eventual arrival would mark a new phase in local government: an increase in local autonomy and a redressing of the creeping centralization of the Conservative years. This article addresses the question: to what extent, if any, has there been a shift in the balance of power between centre and local government since the advent of a Scottish Parliament in 1999? It examines the pre- and post-1999 periods in this area of Scottish governance, focusing particularly on the legal/constitutional, financial and policy parameters set by the centre. It argues that continuity has been more important than change, and that reasons for the continued domination of the centre lie particularly with (a) the pervasive influence of the UK Union (b) a relative continuity in political actors and (c) the ongoing self-interest of the 'centre'.

Comments on Peter John's "Ideas and Interests; Agendas and Implementation: An Evolutionary Explanation of Policy Change in British Local Government Finance" (1999), which advocates using an evolutionary account to explain policy change & uses the poll tax passage & abolition as an example. McConnell believes the article is valuable in pointing out the role of ideas in policy formation, but has weaknesses in its two main arguments that evolutionary theory is the best explanation of policy change & that other explanations for the adoption of the poll tax do not exist. Four issues of the poll tax conflict somewhat with John's use of evolutionary theory: (1) the importance placed on powerful socioeconomic forces showing a manifest interest in the "idea"; (2) the importance of the forces setting parameters of the "criteria" for the selection of an alternative; (3) the importance of the role of the government & Parliament in the process; & (4) the tax's abolition happening not just because it was a bad idea, but also because of the contradictions of the interests of the conservative Thatcher era. McConnell believes that ideas, governments, parties, & wider socioeconomic factors are all linked in a sociohistorical context where the most powerful ruling interests uphold their rule through state policy. 7 References. L. A. Hoffman