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This article examines contemporary sources of democratic crisis and the international responses to these crises from 1990 to 2011. The analysis is based on an original dataset of five domestic sources of democratic crisis: classic military coup or coup attempt, incumbent leaders, intragovernmental clashes between branches of government, armed non‐state actors, and unarmed nonstate actors including societal mass protests and blockades. Several trends are identified. The newest sources of democratic crises include nonstate actors and intragovernmental disputes resulting in constitutional crises; threats from incumbents are persistent over the entire time period; despite a decline in classic military coups since 1990, the Inter‐American Democratic Charter does not appear to have made a difference in preventing coups; the participation of rebellious military or police units in challenging civilian leaders presents a continued challenge from the armed forces in new guises; and many contemporary democratic crises include multiple actors and behaviors. This article offers explanations for the weak capacity of the international community to prevent democratic tensions from erupting into full‐blown crises or the undermining of democratic obligations by government, despite strong commitments in the form of international charters and protocols, and offers policy suggestions to strengthen that capacity.

We are currently witnessing a demand to expand citizenship to civil and social realms in Latin America, the region of the world with the most unequal income distribution. This may be seen as a new stage of democratization within the Third Wave begun in 1978, one that inherently creates conflict over the redistribution of power and resources. During the initial years of the Third Wave, Latin American societies adopted formal procedures of democracy and created a broad consensus on macroeconomic liberalization. In the second stage, citizens-particularly the urban poor and indigenous groups-are striving to move beyond the broadly established political rights of electoral competition in order to also enjoy civil rights (freedoms and access to justice) that are incompletely and inconsistently applied, and social rights (providing the basic capabilities to citizens to make free choices) that are woefully underprovided. Middle class groups are insisting that their governments perform better, deliver promised services, and represent broader societal interests. With existing political institutions failing to adequately include these groups in political and socioeconomic terms, they are finding their voice through street politics and the ballot box. Nearly a dozen presidents have been forced out of office prematurely in the last decade as a result, at least in part, of citizen mobilization and street protests. One interpretation sees this as a threatening sign of mob rule or even "civil society coups." Another interpretation views the active participation of citizens voicing their demands as a welcome sign of more truly democratic societies. This article seeks to make sense of the current attempts at democratic transformation in Latin America. Adapted from the source document.

The conditions that had facilitated the institutionalization of the Punto Fijo system during the 1960s had changed in the 1990s in the transition from a world society to highly unequal & urbanized society, the new era of globalization & integration, as well as the parallel backlash to the negative consequences of these developments throughout the world. The examination of the failure of the Punto Fijo democracy to structural changes, both nationally & globally identifies vulnerabilities that led to Chavez crosscutting electoral support. The beginning of the decline of Punto Fijo is pegged at the confluence of structural & institutional factors on Black Friday (February 18, 1983) in the Bolivarian Participatory Democracy (1998-2000) & the course of democracy in the Republic (2001-2003). This work confirms that political economy & political culture variables contribute to explaining political change in Venezuela, & institutional variables are even more central to explaining the unraveling of post-1958 representative democracy. A summarization of the institutional hypotheses generated from this analysis supports the conclusion that the Venezuelan case provides important clues of how apparently institutionalized representative democracies can unravel when stressed, & is a very important lesson for leaders seeking to normalize the political regime and the more recent democracies that took root in the 1980s in many countries of the developing world. References. J. Harwell