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Why do English-speaking countries have relatively high fertility? The paper examines why English-speaking countries have relatively high levels of fertility despite the fact that their governments do not provide the same levels of family benefits as do France and the Nordic countries. The relative absence of public family supports has led to the development of a range of informal arrangements that support the combination of work and family. While these informal arrangements can be difficult and stressful, their emergence indicates the dedication of couples in these countries to the combination of work and family. More recently, public policy has become more supportive. At the same time, the English-speaking countries are high income, low taxing countries. Parents in these countries are more able to afford the direct costs of children and to pay for services that they may need such as childcare. As evidence of this, couples in these countries are more likely than couples in European countries to have three or more children. The very high fertility rates in New Zealand and the United States are associated with the ethnic composition of these countries. The United States has several other special circumstances that are associated with high fertility such as very early childbearing, a high proportion of unintended births and a substantial sub-population that is very religious. Finally, it seems that the long-term shift to later commencement of childbearing has ended in the English-speaking countries and some now are experiencing a reversal of this trend.

Background:Immigration to Australia pre 1995 was largely low skilled. Recessions led to competition between low-skilled domestic workers and new immigrants and subsequent cuts in migration intakes. Historical changes in birth rates, increased participation in tertiary education, increasing numbers retiring and the relatively rapid restructuring of the skill level of labour demand combined to produce a skilled labour supply crisis in Australia from the mid-1990s. The permanent and temporary skilled migration policies established by the Australian Government from 1995 played an important role in meeting that labour demand, especially in the boom years of the first decade of the 21st century. Aims:This paper examines the impact of immigration on employment in Australia subsequent to the global financial crisis (GFC) for the five-year period from July 2011 to July 2016. Data and methods:Data for the paper are sourced from the Australian Bureau of Statistics. The paper uses survival methods to decompose the growth in employment in Australia in the five-year period from 2011 to 2016: (1) change in age and sex distribution in the absence of migration; (2) changes in employment participation rates by age and sex; (3) net migration by age and sex. Results:Immigration in response to strong labour demand has continued post GFC. From July 2011 to July 2016, employment in Australia increased by 738,800. Immigrants accounted for 613,400 of the total increase, population growth 98,900 and changes in employment participation only 26,500. Migration has had a very large effect on the age structure of employment with most new immigrant workers (595,300) being under 55 years. Conclusions:Research indicates that immigration provides major benefits to the Australian economy. However, as strong labour demand is likely to sustain migration at relatively high levels in coming years, it is incumbent upon governments to plan for the effects of rapid population growth on infrastructure and resources.

AbstractDeclining fertility and mortality rates in the second half of the twentieth century have led to the twenty‐first century being characterised as the century of the aging population. Concurrently, the decline in the numbers of young people entering the labour force is exacerbating the problems arising from the aging population. Implications of these trends are analysed for a variety of Asian countries. Labour force growth in India and Pakistan will be sufficient to compensate for the shrinking labour forces in Europe and Asia excluding the massive fall in China; outsourcing labour to South Asia will be an increasing trend in the twenty‐first century. The Asian countries with less problematic demographic structures are instead facing economic challenges and require education and training to improve labour productivity.

The paper describes the evolution of migration policy in Australia from the 1950s onwards. It focuses in particular on the period after 1995 when the Australian Government concentrated its migration program on skilled immigrants, both permanent and temporary. While conceived as separate programs, over time, the permanent and temporary movements have been merged so that most new permanent skilled immigrants make an application on shore while holding a temporary resident visa. This approach seems to have served Australia well in a time of strong labour demand and a dwindling domestic supply of labour. Australia's international program will be important in the future as it slows the pace of population ageing and provides necessary skills to an otherwise static labour force.

The paper describes the evolution of migration policy in Australia from the 1950s onwards. It focuses in particular on the period after 1995 when the Australian Government concentrated its migration program on skilled immigrants, both permanent and temporary. While conceived as separate programs, over time, the permanent and temporary movements have been merged so that most new permanent skilled immigrants make an application on shore while holding a temporary resident visa. This approach seems to have served Australia well in a time of strong labour demand and a dwindling domestic supply of labour. Australia's international program will be important in the future as it slows the pace of population ageing and provides necessary skills to an otherwise static labour force.

This paper describes the range of policies that might be used to support fertility rates at a moderate level, that is, around an average of 1.7-1.9 births per woman. The paper argues that in selecting from the range of policy options, consideration must be given to the existing social-institutional framework in the particular country. In other words, there can be no single cross-national model for success. Each country must seek its own institutionally appropriate approach. Also, each country must deal with the realities of its own political economy. Strategies will not be accepted if they are not based upon a social consensus. In addition, as far as possible, policies to support fertility should be based upon a theory or theories as to why fertility has fallen to low levels in a particular setting. Given that fertility-support policies are likely to be expensive in one way or another, some understanding of the nature of low fertility will provide greater efficiency in policy implementation. The paper reviews several possible general theories relating to low fertility. Finally, it is argued that countries should have some notion about what it is that they are aiming to achieve. Inevitably, demographic sustainability (at least zero population growth) is an ultimate aim for all countries. The question is how far into the future is "ultimate"? Or expressed differently, how much of a decline in the size of the population or the labour force is the country willing to sustain before demographic sustainability is achieved? The example of Italy is used to illustrate this point.

Low fertility in advanced societies today has been an unintended outcome of two major waves of social and economic change, social liberalism and new capitalism. Both these waves have enhanced individual aspirations in relation to the quality of personal and economic lives. In differing cultural and welfare environments, however, both have also brought considerable pressure to bear upon the capacity to form and maintain families. The personal desire for intimacy and individuation through family relationships remains strong. In their support or promotion of social liberalism and economic deregulation, often through legislation, states have been principal players in the higher risks now associated with family life. Individual preferences are formed in the shadow of the social and economic institutions of the society. The shape of these institutions is within the realm of political choice. Governments of countries experiencing very low fertility can and should act to support family life and the bearing and raising of children.

This paper describes the range of policies that might be used to support fertility rates at a moderate level, that is, around an average of 1.7-1.9 births per woman. The paper argues that in selecting from the range of policy options, consideration must be given to the existing social-institutional framework in the particular country. In other words, there can be no single cross-national model for success. Each country must seek its own institutionally appropriate approach. Also, each country must deal with the realities of its own political economy. Strategies will not be accepted if they are not based upon a social consensus. In addition, as far as possible, policies to support fertility should be based upon a theory or theories as to why fertility has fallen to low levels in a particular setting. Given that fertility-support policies are likely to be expensive in one way or another, some understanding of the nature of low fertility will provide greater efficiency in policy implementation. The paper reviews several possible general theories relating to low fertility. Finally, it is argued that countries should have some notion about what it is that they are aiming to achieve. Inevitably, demographic sustainability (at least zero population growth) is an ultimate aim for all countries. The question is how far into the future is "ultimate"? Or expressed differently, how much of a decline in the size of the population or the labour force is the country willing to sustain before demographic sustainability is achieved? The example of Italy is used to illustrate this point.