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The postwar electoral dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was founded on (1) strong incumbency advantage, which insulated its legislators from declining party popularity, and (2) the malapportionment of districts, which overvalued the electoral clout of the party's rural base. The LDP's demise in 2009 was due to the reversal of both factors, each of which was related to electoral reforms in the 1990s. First, I demonstrate that elections are becoming more "nationalized," due to the growing weight that voters attach to the attractiveness of party leaders. Past performance has become a poorer predictor of incumbent reelection, giving way to large partisan swings that are increasingly correlated across districts. Second, malapportionment was reduced by almost half in 1994, meaning that rural votes are now worth fewer seats. As a result, parties that can attract swing voters nationally are better positioned for victory than those with a narrow regional base.

This article argues that the LDP manufactured its parliamentary dominance in postwar Japan by strategically altering specific facets of the electoral system. More generally, I demonstrate that intraparty politics play a crucial role in determining when and how electoral rules are changed. Despite widespread evidence that the LDP would win more seats under an SMP electoral formula, party leaders were repeatedly blocked from replacing the postwar MMD‐SNTV system by intraparty incumbents, who feared that such a change would harm their individual reelection prospects. However, party leaders had greater leeway in altering rules that generated fewer intraparty conflicts. Between 1960 and 1990, the LDP implemented approximately fifty changes to campaign regulations, most of which were aimed at enhancing the incumbency advantage of all rank‐and‐file MPs. Statistical tests confirm that absent pro‐incumbent revisions to the electoral code, the LDP would have succumbed to declining public popularity and lost its majority at least a decade earlier.

AbstractSurvey experiments have shown mixed results about the effect of information provision on attitudes toward controversial policies. We argue that one reason is varied receptiveness to different modes of information. Prior research suggests that people selectively ignore factual, statistical information that contradicts prior beliefs but are more attentive to narrative information that describes individual experiences. We test this in the context of Japanese attitudes toward poverty relief programs, which are less popular than other welfare expenditures. Using a conjoint survey, we show that there is a "narrative premium": Respondents who are shown a narrative story about the plight of a single mother are more likely to support higher expenditures on poverty relief than those who are shown statistical information about the share of single parents living in poverty. This premium is particularly effective in strengthening the convictions of those who are already aware of levels of societal poverty.

AbstractElectoral gender quotas remain contentious among many publics. One hurdle is the "principle-policy puzzle": those who espouse gender egalitarianism may nevertheless oppose affirmative action measures because of disagreements about their necessity and worries about government overreach. Based on an original survey in Japan, where women's underrepresentation is particularly pronounced, we identify two dimensions that drive attitudes toward quotas. First, modern sexism matters: those who attribute underrepresentation to women's disinterest or who think that quotas will increase the number of unqualified women candidates are less likely to support quotas. Second, appropriateness matters: those who oppose government intervention in gender affairs are less likely to support quotas. Crucially, these differences hold even among those who desire more women in parliament. Our results suggest that public acceptance of quotas depends more on correcting misperceptions about structural gender barriers and the benign consequences of quotas ("policy"), rather than encouraging people to prefer more women in parliament ("principle").