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Although difficult to quantify, the effects of inflation on the arts are observable and increasingly negative. Arts institutions are people-intensive and energy-intensive, and certain of their essential expenses are increasing at a faster rate than inflation. Other items, most notably funding from city, state, and federal governments, are not keeping up with inflation. Furthermore, reductions in federal spending are imminent, and it is unlikely that corporate contributions will replace that funding. The arts are taking a number of steps— some of which have questionable future implications—to increase their income. Contributions from the three sources in the private section—individuals, foundations, and corporations—have been generous in the past 25 years; they are predicted to remain so during the 1980-84 period. The "mix" of contributions will shift, however, with the foundations being the least able to contribute, the corporations fluctuating in their contributions, and individual contributors assuming increasing importance. There is little doubt that inflation harms the arts, but it is reflective of a weak economy in which other factors, for example, harsh tax laws and weak stock and bond markets, cause distress to nonprofit institutions. Until there is a strengthening of the economy, the arts will have serious financial problems.

Arms control has become an increasingly important aspect of U.S. security and foreign policy; at the same time, verification has emerged as the major consideration in judging arms-control agreements. Although the concept of military significance has been used as the criterion for determining effective verification of arms-control agreements over several presidential administrations, the demand for stringent and comprehensive verification regimes has increased in the past seven years to the point where implementing the regimes for the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreements will be costly, albeit beneficial because the agreements will contribute to bilateral relations and international security. The verification regime being put into place for the INF Treaty is the most rigorous and comprehensive ever negotiated. Verification of the START agreement will be far more extensive and expensive due to its broader scope and the fact that it reduces rather than eliminates classes of weapons. This article analyzes the verification criteria, costs, and benefits associated with current bilateral arms-control endeavors.

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