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This paper is concerned with the institutional role of courts in dealing with long term political conflict. Such conflict is likely to involve group mobilization on both sides; the analysis therefore utilizes a judicial interest group approach, presenting evidence from the on‐going policy debate surrounding presentation of the Darwinian theory of evolution in public schools. The findings demonstrate the importance of courts in developing public policies, not only by articulating policy, but also by affecting subsequent moves by interest groups to promote their agendas elsewhere in the system. Many extended conflicts may not be resolved in institutional settings, but they may be repetitively reformulated and translated to engage the decisionmaking process of specific forums in on‐going activities. In successive moves, each adversary attempts to shift the balance of power to its respective advantage, where, paradoxically, the parties may change sides as the debate travels full circle. The analysis also illustrates the advancement of the creation science advocates' game plan, beginning with a publicity‐oriented strategy, which is a hallmark of the relatively "amateurish" litigant, and eventually moving to a result‐oriented position, a more "professional" approach to the courts.

Suggests that, as the information superhighway continues to develop, the courts will face a range of difficult First Amendment issues, particularly as related to free speech. Until now, various forms of communications have appeared separately & serially, allowing the courts to address issues according to technological differences as they have arisen, rather than developing a comprehensive view, yielding an array of internal contradictions that will need to be reconciled. Signals from the courts suggest that the drift of First Amendment reconciliation favors corporate interests. Adapted from the source document.

Lawyers probably hold public office & engage in political activity more than members of any other single occupational group. Examined is the hypothesis that, in Ur areas, individual practitioners are more active politically than lawyers in large law firms. The purpose is to employ explicitly political variables, notably political party identification, to determine the influence of structural legal variables on lawyers' political activity. The data were collected in a mail survey of lawyers in Wichita, Kan during the spring of 1974. Of 708 lawyers surveyed, 351 (49.6%) returned usable questionnaires. A political activity index was constructed from seven items drawn from L. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965). Lawyers with firms of fewer than five members were classified with solo lawyers; those with firms of eleven or more members, as large firm lawyers. Analysis of the data reveals that political activity and type of practice are related, but political party identification qualifies the relationship. Only for Republicans are type of practice & political activity related at an acceptable level of statistical significance. Political independents are not very politically active, regardless of practice situation. Democratic attorneys in all practice situations exhibit a relatively high propensity to engage in political activity. Democratic lawyers have greater opportunities for participation &/or are more likely to be co-opted into politics than are Republican attorneys. The type of practice, however, seems to affect lawyers' propensities to engage in specific types of political activity, even when party is held constant. Attorneys in small firms or solo practice exhibit a strong tendency to seek & hold office; large firm lawyers tend to restrict their political activities to such other forms of participation as making campaign contributions. The type of legal practice may also help explain the amount of interest lawyers have in politics. Republican solo & small firm lawyers express as much interest in politics as do their Democratic counterparts, but Democrats in small firms are much more likely to be highly active in politics. Legal practice may help inspire political interest or ambition, but the pool of potential leaders available to the parties may influence political participation. 2 Tables. Modified AA.