Suchergebnisse

Identifying the Hidden Influence of Lobbyists in Public Policymaking -- Scheduling Influence and Buying Access -- The Strategic Behavior of Individual Lobbyists and their PACs -- Stealth Fundraising and Legislative Favors -- Stealth Lobbying, Stealth Contributions, and the Affordable Care Act -- Conclusions About Money in Politics.

When do campaign contributions matter? This article advances the claim that a group that gives campaign contributions to US Members of Congress is more likely to achieve legislative success when (1) a single legislator can deliver to the group (2) a private benefit (3) without attracting negative attention. Using an original data set based on the written comments of nearly 900 interest groups lobbying the US Senate Finance Committee on health reform legislation in 2009, I link group requests to corresponding legislation. The analysis shows a significant relationship between lobby groups' campaign contributions and their legislative success, and at distinct units of analysis—the group, the side, and the group‐senator dyad. The relationship is particularly strong in predicting senators' amendments in committee. The rare data presented here offer compelling evidence that interest groups' legislative victories are sometimes connected to campaign contributions in a way that previous studies could not identify.

Do legislators and lobbyists trade favors? This study uses uncommon data sources and plagiarism software to detect a rarely observed relationship between interest group lobbyists and sitting Members of Congress. Comparison of letters to a Senate committee written by lobby groups to legislative amendments introduced by committee members reveals similar and even identical language, providing compelling evidence that groups persuaded legislators to introduce amendments valued by the group. Moreover, the analysis suggests that these language matches are more likely when the requesting lobby group hosts a fundraising event for the senator. The results hold while controlling for ideological agreement between the senator and the group, the group's campaign contributions to the senator, and the group's lobbying expenditures, annual revenue, and home-state connections.

Despite a good deal of interest in lobbyists' tactics, virtually no research has been published examining the conditions under which interest groups lobby the bureaucracy rather than or in addition to the legislature. Using two comprehensive datasets, I show that lobbying increases in both branches when conflict is higher and when the lobbyist has professional or political connections to that venue. In addition, certain conditions cause lobbyists to specialize in one branch or a particular branch only, depending on the issue area being lobbied, the interest group type being represented, the lobbyist's resources, and other factors. Adapted from the source document.

This article presents the first direct analysis of the influence of revolving-door lobbyists over the content of adopted public laws. We use earmarks to evaluate both the effects of lobbying and the possible additional effects of lobbying by individuals who formerly worked as congressional members and staff. Employing a fixed-effects panel approach, we evaluate original data describing the lobbying efforts of the more than 5000 accredited U.S. colleges and universities over a 12-year timeframe. Our analysis indicates that schools that lobby in a given year can expect to receive 54% more earmarks and 24% more earmarked funds relative to other schools and other years. Further, there is an additional significant effect of revolving-door lobbying that is greatest at lower levels of lobbying expenditures. Our results contribute to the emerging literature on comparative lobbying and speak to concerns about the possible corrupting influence of revolving-door lobbying over public policy.

After the article was submitted for review, we continued improving the data. We performed a second attempt to merge groups in the lobby register with groups mentioned in ministerial meetings reports.

AbstractThe government of the UK is reputed to be among the world's most transparent governments. Yet in comparison with many other countries, its 5-year-old register of lobbyists provides little information about the lobbying activity directed at the British state. Further, its published lists of meetings with government ministers are vague, delayed, and scattered across numerous online locations. Our analysis of more than 72,000 reported ministerial meetings and nearly 1000 lobbying clients and consultants reveals major discrepancies between these two sources of information about lobbying in the UK. Over the same four quarters, we find that only about 29% of clients listed in the lobby register appear in the published record of ministerial meetings with outside groups, and less than 4% of groups disclosed in ministerial meetings records appear in the lobby register. This wide variation between the two sets of data, along with other evidence, contribute to our conclusion that the Government could have made, and still should make, the lobby register more robust.