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AbstractThis article makes the case that the literature of hegemonic orders and debates on the crisis of US hegemony have been shaped and up to a point intellectually confined by a tradition or idea of world history understood as a series of hegemonic powers. This tradition of history as a succession of hegemonic powers is traced from ancient to modern sources, later reconstituted as a theoretical discourse. In drawing attention to the historical traditions underpinning this literature, these findings contribute to advancing the historiography of International Relations and to studying the role of multiple contemporaneous histories in the emerging international order.

AbstractThis article contributes a step towards the consolidation of the wide-ranging intellectual history and rapidly growing literature of international order theory. It traces the development of international order theory across three eras: 1919 and the interwar era; 1945 and the Cold War era; and 1989–1991, the post-Cold War era and rise of the "liberal" order debate. Gathering this history finds that critics in contemporary debates are deploying arguments with a quasi-polemical style similar to those used by E.H. Carr and others in past international order debates. These polemical qualities, it is suggested, may likely make contemporary debates difficult to assess and persistently controversial, even after the contemporary crisis of international order has run its course in practice.

AbstractThe international society approach to the study of international relations has advanced a distinct understanding of international order in world politics. Does this approach therefore also implicitly have a distinct understanding of disorder in world politics, too? From a close reading of this literature, and the writings of Hedley Bull in particular, I argue that a "purposive" understanding of disorder in world politics is evident, as well as a set of sociological explanations of it, including hierarchy conflict, political value conflict, and the structural contradictions of international society. I suggest that this approach is more insightful and promising for studying increasing manifestations of disorder in world politics than alternative realist approaches. Finally, I make the case that this concept's analytical utility and theoretical role in this approach is the assessment of the continued viability of international society as a path to order in world politics.

AbstractIn a context of crisis in global order today, this article proposes revisiting the World Order Models Project (WOMP), towards an evaluation of its relevance and potential contributions to contemporary debates and challenges. From this revisiting, this article argues that WOMP suffered from problematic methodological limitations and does not constitute a substitute for conventional contemporary approaches to global order today, but some of its proposals nevertheless retain relevance, and as a mode of global order research it still offers the potential for providing an important supplement to contemporary approaches, if sufficiently modified to address its methodological limitations. The knowledge this kind of project produces is argued to offer integrative alternative non‐great power‐centric global order policy options that are increasingly in demand, especially from the Global South, as well as from Europe. This article proceeds to revisit WOMP's research design and outputs, evaluates the arguments of its critics, and outlines the modifying methodological options for a World Order Models Project 2.0.

In a context of crisis in global order today, this article proposes revisiting the World Order Models Project (WOMP), towards an evaluation of its relevance and potential contributions to contemporary debates and challenges. From this revisiting, this article argues that WOMP suffered from problematic methodological limitations and does not constitute a substitute for conventional contemporary approaches to global order today, but some of its proposals nevertheless retain relevance, and as a mode of global order research it still offers the potential for providing an important supplement to contemporary approaches, if sufficiently modified to address its methodological limitations. The knowledge this kind of project produces is argued to offer integrative alternative non-great power-centric global order policy options that are increasingly in demand, especially from the Global South, as well as from Europe. This article proceeds to revisit WOMP's research design and outputs, evaluates the arguments of its critics, and outlines the modifying methodological options for a World Order Models Project 2.0.

This review essay conducts and works to contribute an assessment of recent realist critiques of liberal hegemony. It finds that realists identify important problems with liberal hegemony, but also finds that under scrutiny the alternative foreign policies that realist critics offer suffer from their own serious limitations. It makes the case that realist proposals of "restraint" and "offshore balancing" avoid the problems realists associate with liberal interventionism, but would also be generative of proxy wars, while offering insufficient additional institutions, practices, and norms for mitigating and managing proxy wars and great power conflict, among other global and international challenges. From closer examination and consideration, that is, the argument is made that these limitations of alternative realist foreign policies question their ability to contribute to international order in the twenty-first century and suggest, quite the opposite, that if pursued they would instead become new sources of international disorder, albeit while avoiding some of the problems associated with liberal internationalism.

AbstractThis review essay conducts and works to contribute an assessment of recent realist critiques of liberal hegemony. It finds that realists identify important problems with liberal hegemony, but also finds that under scrutiny the alternative foreign policies that realist critics offer suffer from their own serious limitations. It makes the case that realist proposals of "restraint" and "offshore balancing" avoid the problems realists associate with liberal interventionism, but would also be generative of proxy wars, while offering insufficient additional institutions, practices, and norms for mitigating and managing proxy wars and great power conflict, among other global and international challenges. From closer examination and consideration, that is, the argument is made that these limitations of alternative realist foreign policies question their ability to contribute to international order in the twenty-first century and suggest, quite the opposite, that if pursued they would instead become new sources of international disorder, albeit while avoiding some of the problems associated with liberal internationalism.

International relations today are widely considered to be experiencing deepening disorder and the topic of international disorder is gaining increased attention. Yet, despite this recent interest in international disorder, in and beyond the academy, and despite the decades-long interest in international order, there is still little agreement on the concept of international disorder, which is often used imprecisely and with an alarmist rather than analytical usage. This is a problem if international disorder is to be understood in theory, towards addressing its concomitant problems and effects in practice. As such, this article identifies and explores two ways international order studies can benefit from a clearer and more precise conception of international disorder. First, it enables a more complete picture of how orderly international orders have been. Second, a greater understanding of the problem of international order is illuminated by a clearer grasp of the relation between order and disorder in world politics. The article advances these arguments in three steps. First, an analytical concept of international disorder is developed and proposed. Second, applying it to the modern history of international order, the extent to which there is a generative relationship between order and disorder in international systems is explored. Third, it specifies the deepening international disorder in international affairs today. It concludes by indicating a research agenda for International Relations and international order studies that takes the role of international disorder more seriously.

This article contributes a step towards the consolidation of the wide-ranging intellectual history and rapidly growing literature of international order theory. It traces the development of international order theory across three eras: 1919 and the interwar era; 1945 and the Cold War era; and 1989–1991, the post-Cold War era and rise of the "liberal" order debate. Gathering this history finds that critics in contemporary debates are deploying arguments with a quasi-polemical style similar to those used by E.H. Carr and others in past international order debates. These polemical qualities, it is suggested, may likely make contemporary debates difficult to assess and persistently controversial, even after the contemporary crisis of international order has run its course in practice.

International relations today are widely considered to be experiencing deepening disorder and the topic of international disorder is gaining increased attention. Yet, despite this recent interest in international disorder, in and beyond the academy, and despite the decades-long interest in international order, there is still little agreement on the concept of international disorder, which is often used imprecisely and with an alarmist rather than analytical usage. This is a problem if international disorder is to be understood in theory, towards addressing its concomitant problems and effects in practice. As such, this article identifies and explores two ways international order studies can benefit from a clearer and more precise conception of international disorder. First, it enables a more complete picture of how orderly international orders have been. Second, a greater understanding of the problem of international order is illuminated by a clearer grasp of the relation between order and disorder in world politics. The article advances these arguments in three steps. First, an analytical concept of international disorder is developed and proposed. Second, applying it to the modern history of international order, the extent to which there is a generative relationship between order and disorder in international systems is explored. Third, it specifies the deepening international disorder in international affairs today. It concludes by indicating a research agenda for International Relations and international order studies that takes the role of international disorder more seriously.