Suchergebnisse

It has been over 50 years since the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories. It is estimated that there are over 600,000 Israeli settlers living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and they are supported, protected, and maintained by the Israeli state. This book discusses whether international criminal law could apply to those responsible for allowing and promoting this growth, and examines what this application would reveal about the operation of international criminal law. It provides a comprehensive analysis of how the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court could apply to the settlements in the West Bank through a close examination of the potential operation of two relevant Statute crimes: first, the war crime of transfer of population; and second, the war crime of unlawful appropriation of property. It also addresses the threshold question of whether the law of occupation applies to the West Bank, and how the principles of individual criminal responsibility might operate in this context. It explores the relevance and coherence of the legal arguments relied on by Israel in defence of the legality of the settlements and considers how these arguments might apply in the context of the Rome Statute. The work also has wider aims, raising questions about the Rome Statute's capacity to meet its aim of establishing a coherent and legally effective system of international criminal justice.

Abstract
States have long trespassed on the territory of other States to carry out surveillance. However, new technologies are changing the stakes of these incursions: uncrewed aerial vehicles (uav s) and uncrewed maritime vehicles (umv s) used for surveillance can trespass in on foreign territory without risk to their operators. In addition, States appear to be more willing to capture or destroy trespassing uncrewed vehicles. This paper assesses whether these developments suggest there is a basis to denying trespassing uncrewed devices sovereign immunity from the enforcement jurisdiction of territorial States. It argues that while uncrewed devices (like other forms of military property used for non-commercial purposes) are entitled to sovereign immunity, they can lose that immunity through their conduct, including by trespassing on the territory of another State. This allows for the territorial State to exercise enforcement jurisdiction, including the use of force, over the uav or umv.

Abstract
The obligations of international humanitarian law are not limited to the attacker; the defender is also required to take steps to protect civilians from harm. The requirement to take precautions against the effects of attack requires the defender to minimize the risk that civilians and civilian objects will be harmed by enemy military operations. At its most basic, it obliges defenders to locate military installations away from civilians. Furthermore, where appropriate, the status of objects should be clearly marked. It is – somewhat counterintuitively – about making it easier for the attacker to select lawful targets by making visible the distinction between civilian objects and military objectives.
The increasing importance of digital infrastructure to modern life may make complying with these precautionary obligations more complicated. Maintaining separation between military and civilian networks is challenging as both operate using at least some of the same infrastructure, relying on the same cables, systems, and electromagnetic spectrum. In addition, the speed at which operations against digital infrastructure can occur increases the difficulty of complying with the obligation – particularly if such operations involve a degree of automation or the use of artificial intelligence (ai).
This paper sets out the source and extent of the obligation to take precautions against hostile military operations and considers how they might apply to digital infrastructure. As well as clarifying the extent of the obligation, it applies the obligation to take precautions against hostile military operations to digital infrastructure, giving examples of where systems designers are taking these obligations into account, and other examples of where they must.