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Abstract: In the face of rapid global heating, ideas of solar geoengineering are receiving increased attention. Yet the governance of such risky emerging technologies is poorly explored. Here I examine how the risks involved in solar geoengineering might be assessed in the context of climate risks in two different models of risk management: the technocratic, and the securitized. I show that neither model alone provides a sufficient foundation for a meaningful 'risk-risk' assessment, and suggest a need for better defined, yet broad scope, symmetric assessments using worst-case as well as idealised scenarios, taking into account risks in research and development as well as deployment, and considering the social distribution of risks. I conclude that effective anticipatory and ethical risk assessment may usefully supplement, but cannot replace democratic political judgements on responses to climate change.

Greenhouse Gas Removal Techniques (GGR) appear to offer hopes of balancing limited global carbon budgets by removing substantial amounts of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere later this century. This hope rests on an assumption that GGR will largely supplement emissions reduction. The paper reviews the expectations of GGR implied by integrated assessment modelling, categorises ways in which delivery or promises of GGR might instead deter or delay emissions reduction, and offers a preliminary estimate of the possible extent of three such forms of 'mitigation deterrence'. Type 1 is described as 'substitution and failure': an estimated 50-229 Gt-C (or 70% of expected GGR) may substitute for emissions otherwise reduced, yet may not be delivered (as a result of political, economic or technical shortcomings, or subsequent leakage or diversion of captured carbon into short-term utilization). Type 2, described as 'rebounds', encompasses rebounds, multipliers and side-effects, such as those arising from land-use change, or use of captured CO2 in enhanced oil recovery. A partial estimate suggests that this could add 25-134Gt-C to unabated emissions. Type 3, described as 'imagined offsets', is estimated to affect 17-27% of the emissions reductions required, reducing abatement by a further 182-297 Gt-C. The combined effect of these unanticipated net additions of CO2 to the atmosphere is equivalent to an additional temperature rise of up to 1.4°C. The paper concludes that such a risk merits further deeper analysis and serious consideration of measures which might limit the occurrence and extent of mitigation deterrence.

In this age of transnational capitalism most victims of corporate malpractice have no means to hold the wrongdoers to account – especially those whose lives are blighted day‐in, day‐out by the "normal" operations of companies within the letter of the law. This paper argues that corporate social and environmental abuses are rooted in a lack of accountability of corporations to their stakeholders. It explores how governance mechanisms such as corporate engagement by "socially responsible" investors could enhance stakeholder accountability. It identifies and contrasts two paradigms in socially responsible investment engagement, and relates them to voluntary and regulatory responses to corporate abuses. It concludes that the development of standards for stakeholder‐oriented engagement and governance could help stimulate effective regulatory measures to protect stakeholder interests.

With the power to break earth systems comes responsibility to care for them, and arguably to repair them. Climate geoengineering is one possible approach. But repair is under-researched and underspecified in this context. In a first attempt to establish basic principles for the obligations of repair in the Anthropocene, five disciplines of repair are briefly reviewed: reconstruction of historic buildings, remediation of human bodies, restoration of ecosystems; reconfiguration of cultural materials and artifacts; and reconciliation of broken relationships. In each case ethical practices and debates are described to help identify key themes and challenges in understanding repair. Three interlinked pragmatic ethics or virtues of repair in the Anthropocene are suggested: care, integrity, and legibility. Implications of for climate geoengineering, climate politics, and the possibilities of climate justice are explored. Climate repair is defended against objections that it would exacerbate a moral hazard effect, or frame climate responses as politically conservative.

The work makes a case for understanding cities as shared spaces and venues for collaboration; and proposes policies and practices to share cities fairly. It argues that with modern technologies the intersection of urban space and cyberspace provides an unrivalled platform for more just, inclusive and environmentally efficient economies and societies rooted in a sharing culture.

Abstract
'Climate security' conventionally refers to climate change being a multiplier of threats to national security, international peace and stability, or human security. Here we identify a hitherto overlooked inverted climate security discourse in which climate responses (rather than climate impacts) are held to pose an existential threat to dominant fossil fuel-dependent 'ways of life', justifying extraordinary measures—societal climate security. In doing so, we seek to make three novel contributions. First, we set out how societal securitization applies beyond a national frame and in relation to transnational threats like climate change, arguing it promotes not just exceptional measures but also palliative ones that avoid challenging incumbent identities. Second, we draw on recent evidence and extant literatures to show that 'societal climate security' already has substantial material emanations in the form of exceptional measures, deployed domestically against climate protestors and externally against climate migrants, in the name of societal order and cohesion. Third, we turn to wider climate policy implications, arguing that societal securitization tilts policy agendas further away from rapid mitigation pathways and toward promissory measures such as 'geoengineering'—schemes for future, large-scale technological interventions in the climate system—that may appear less threatening to established societal identities. While there are sound ecological and humanitarian rationales to research such technologies, in the context of societal securitization these can be appropriated to defend dominant 'ways of life' instead. To conclude, we reflect on how, were it attempted, deployment of solar geoengineering for societal security would affect security politics more widely.

AbstractIn recent years, the target of reaching "net zero" emissions by 2050 has come to the forefront of global climate politics. Net zero would see carbon emissions matched by carbon removals and should allow the planet to avoid dangerous climate change. But the recent prominence of this goal should not distract from the fact that there are many possible versions of net zero. Each of them will have different climate justice implications, and some of them could have very negative consequences for the world's poor. This article demonstrates the many ambiguities of net zero, and argues in favor of a net zero strategy in which those who can reasonably bear the burden adopt early and aggressive mitigation policies. We also argue for a net zero strategy in which countries place the lion's share of their faith in known emissions reduction approaches, rather than being heavily reliant on as-yet-unproven "negative emissions techniques." Our overarching goal is to put net zero in its place, by providing a clear-sighted view of what net zero will achieve, and where the "net" in net zero needs to be tightened further if the world is to achieve climate justice.

AbstractClimate engineering (geoengineering) is rising up the global policy agenda, partly because international divisions pose deep challenges to collective climate mitigation. However, geoengineering is similarly subject to clashing interests, knowledge‐traditions and geopolitics. Modelling and technical assessments of geoengineering are facilitated by assumptions of a single global planner (or some as yet unspecified rational governance), but the practicality of international governance remains mostly speculative. Using evidence gathered from state delegates, climate activists and modellers, we reveal three underlying and clashing 'geofutures': an idealised understanding of governable geoengineering that abstracts from technical and political realities; a situated understanding of geoengineering emphasising power hierarchies in world order; and a pragmatist precautionary understanding emerging in spaces of negotiation such as UN Environment Assembly (UNEA). Set in the wider historical context of climate politics, the failure to agree even to a study of geoengineering at UNEA indicates underlying obstacles to global rules and institutions for geoengineering posed by divergent interests and underlying epistemic and political differences. Technology assessments should recognise that geoengineering will not be exempt from international fractures; that deployment of geoengineering through imposition is a serious risk; and that contestations over geofutures pertain, not only to climate policy, but also the future of planetary order.

Hvordan påvirker forskning i klimaengineeringsteknikker, der sigter mod at styre klodens temperatur ved hjælp af kunstige 'solskærme' rammerne for politiske beslutninger omkring slige teknologier og klimapolitik i bredere forstand? Or hvordan bør forskning i den slags teknologi styres eller reguleres? ; Research into solar geoengineering, far from being societally neutral, is already highly intertwined with its emerging politics. This review outlines ways in which research conditions or constructs solar geoengineering in diverse ways, including the forms of possible material technologies of solar geoengineering; the criteria and targets for their assessment; the scenarios in which they might be deployed; the publics which may support or oppose them; their political implications for other climate responses, and the international relations, governance mechanisms and configurations of power that are presumed in order to regulate them. The review also examines proposals for governance of research, including suggested frameworks, principles, procedures and institutions. It critically assesses these proposals, revealing their limitations given the context of the conditioning effects of current research, and particularly highlights problems of the reproduction of Northern norms, instrumental approaches to public engagement, a weak embrace of precaution, and a persistent but questionable separation of research from deployment. It details complexities inherent in effective research governance which contribute to making the pursuit of solar geoengineering risky, controversial and ethically contentious. In conclusion it suggests a case for an explicit, reflexive research governance regime developed with international participation. It suggests that such a regime should encompass modelling and social science as well as field experimentation and must address not only technical and environmental but also the emergent social and political implications of research.

Research into solar geoengineering, far from being societally neutral, is already highly intertwined with its emerging politics. This review outlines ways in which research conditions or constructs solar geoengineering in diverse ways, including the forms of possible material technologies of solar geoengineering; the criteria and targets for their assessment; the scenarios in which they might be deployed; the publics which may support or oppose them; their political implications for other climate responses, and the international relations, governance mechanisms and configurations of power that are presumed in order to regulate them. The review also examines proposals for governance of research, including suggested frameworks, principles, procedures and institutions. It critically assesses these proposals, revealing their limitations given the context of the conditioning effects of current research, and particularly highlights problems of the reproduction of Northern norms, instrumental approaches to public engagement, a weak embrace of precaution, and a persistent but questionable separation of research from deployment. It details complexities inherent in effective research governance which contribute to making the pursuit of solar geoengineering risky, controversial and ethically contentious. In conclusion it suggests a case for an explicit, reflexive research governance regime developed with international participation. It suggests that such a regime should encompass modelling and social science as well as field experimentation and must address not only technical and environmental but also the emergent social and political implications of research.

Climate engineering (geoengineering) is rising up the global policy agenda, partly because international divisions pose deep challenges to collective climate mitigation. However, geoengineering is similarly subject to clashing interests, knowledge‐traditions and geopolitics. Modelling and technical assessments of geoengineering are facilitated by assumptions of a single global planner (or some as yet unspecified rational governance), but the practicality of international governance remains mostly speculative. Using evidence gathered from state delegates, climate activists and modellers, we question conventional assumptions to reveal three underlying and clashing 'geofutures': an idealised understanding of governable geoengineering that abstracts from technical and political realities; a situated understanding of geoengineering emphasising power hierarchies in world order; and a pragmatist precautionary understanding emerging in spaces of negotiation such as UN Environment Assembly (UNEA). Set in the wider historical context of climate politics, the failure to agree even to a study of geoengineering at UNEA indicates underlying obstacles to global rules and institutions for geoengineering posed by divergent interests and underlying epistemic and political differences. Technology assessments should recognise that geoengineering will not be exempt from international fractures; that deployment of geoengineering through imposition is a serious risk; and that contestations over geofutures pertain to the future of planetary order. ; Climate engineering (geoengineering) is rising up the global policy agenda, partly because international divisions pose deep challenges to collective climate mitigation. However, geoengineering is similarly subject to clashing interests, knowledge-tradi- tions and geopolitics. Modelling and technical assessments of geoengineering are facilitated by assumptions of a single global planner (or some as yet unspecified rational governance), but the practicality of international governance ...

The dominant technocratic and neoliberal imaginary of a circular economy dependent on corporate leadership, market mechanisms, and changed consumer behaviour is here explored using the findings of deliberative stakeholder workshops examining diverse scenarios for the promotion of repair as part of a circular economy. Stakeholder responses to four scenarios—digital circularity, planned circularity, circular modernism, and bottomup sufficiency—are described with reference to the ideologies, interests, and institutions involved. We distinguish two levels of discourse in the stakeholder discussions. The main narrative in which individualist and consumerist ideologies dominate, even within ideals of sustainability, reflects a conjunction of corporate, labour, and public interests in the market liberal social democratic state, with proposed interventions focused on the institutions of markets and education. A subaltern narrative present in the margins of the discussions challenges the consumerist and productivist presumptions of the market liberal political economy and hints at more transformative change. These conflicting responses not only cast light on the ways in which the political economy of contemporary Sweden (within the European Union) constrains and conditions current expectations and imaginaries of circularity, but also suggest ways in which the future political economy of circular economies might be contested and evolve. ; Funded by: Open access funding provided by Linköping University. The work was written with support from grant FR-2017/0007 from the Svenska Forskningsrådet Formas and with support from the Mistra-Formas Environmental Humanities Collaboratory "The SeedBox".