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Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents
In: American political science review, Band 92, Heft 2, S. 413-418
ISSN: 1537-5943
"Naïve" Condorcet Jury Theorems automatically have "sophisticated" versions as corollaries. A Condorcet Jury Theorem is a result, pertaining to an election in which the agents have common preferences but diverse information, asserting that the outcome is better, on average, than the one that would be chosen by any particular individual. Sometimes there is the additional assertion that, as the population grows, the probability of an incorrect decision goes to zero. As a consequence of simple properties of common interest games, whenever "sincere" voting leads to the conclusions of the theorem, there are Nash equilibria with these properties. In symmetric environments the equilibria may be taken to be symmetric.
Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents
In: American political science review, Band 92, Heft 2, S. 413-418
ISSN: 0003-0554
Price dispersion and incomplete learning in the long run
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 7, Heft 3, S. 331-347
ISSN: 0165-1889
SSRN
Working paper
Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, the proposer's identity (and whether there is a proposer) are randomly determined; the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one; each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal; and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer. The theory of the fixed point index is used to show that stationary equilibrium expected payoffs of this coalitional bargaining game are unique. This generalizes Eraslan (2002) insofar as: (a) there are no restrictions on the structure of sets of winning coalitions; (b) different proposers may have different sets of winning coalitions; (c) there may be a positive probability that no proposer is selected.
BASE
Some People Never Learn, Rationally: Multidimensional Learning Traps and Smooth Solutions of Dynamic Programs
In: JME-D-23-00038
SSRN