Suchergebnisse

Exploring risk and resilience : implications for comparative genocide studies, and mass atrocity prevention / Stephen McLoughlin -- The next 'spring' is certain to come-and certain to be missed : deficits in conflict prevention and research / Witold Mucha -- Who is the subject of atrocities prevention? / Bridget Conley-Zilkic -- Rethinking the structural prevention of mass atrocities / Stephen McLoughlin -- International affinity and the prevention of genocide : implications for R2P / Manus L Midlarslry -- Rethinking approaches to prevention under the responsibility to protect : agency and empowerment within vulnerable populations / Deborah Mayersen -- Indigenous state-building : 'local' actors in Somaliland's stabilization / Michael Walls -- Iran 1998-2008 : insight on the containment of risk / Sara E. Davies -- Azerbaijan 1998-2008 : ceasefire, stalemate and simmering tensions / Stephen McLoughlin

Mass Atrocities, Risk and Resilience examines the relationship between risk and resilience in the prevention of genocide and other mass atrocities and explores two broad areas of neglect. In terms of prevention, there is very little research that analyzes how local and national actors manage the risk associated with mass atrocities. In the field of comparative genocide studies, to date there has been very little interest in examining negative cases. Although much is known about why mass atrocities occur, much less is established about why they do not occur. The contributions in this book address this neglect in two important ways. First, they challenge commonly-accepted approaches to prevention. Second, they explore negative cases in order to better understand how local and national actors have mitigated risk over time.

This book offers a different approach to the structural prevention of mass atrocities. It investigates the conditions that enable vulnerable countries to prevent the perpetration of such violence. Structural prevention is commonly framed as the identifying and ameliorating of the 'root causes' of violent conflict, a process which typically involves international actors determining what these root causes are, and what the best courses of action are to deal with them. This overlooks why mass atrocities do not occur in countries that contain the presence of root causes. In fact,

This article examines the impact that three political leaders—Seretse Khama, Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere—had on navigating the long-term risk associated with mass atrocities. While the scholarship on comparative genocide studies has acknowledged the crucial dimension of leadership in the perpetration of such violence, very little is known about the preventive influence of leaders in cases where risk is present. This influence works both ways: the ideas, decisions and policies of political leaders are often the most instrumental factor in effective processes of risk mitigation. Yet to date, there has been no systematic study of the role of leadership in managing and ameliorating risk associated with mass atrocities. Indeed, the more general question of why mass atrocities do not occur is also largely neglected. I argue that these leaders were cognisant of the disruptive potential of tribal, ethnic and religious division; they advocated for inclusive national identities and developed policies that fostered social cohesion; and were effective in creating social and political environments that had an inhibitory effect on structural risk factors associated with atrocity crimes.

The purpose of this article is to provide a better understanding of why some countries experience mass atrocities during periods of democratic transition, while others do not. Scholars have long regarded democracy as an important source of stability and protection from mass atrocities such as genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. But democratic transition itself is fraught with the heightened risk of violent conflict and even mass atrocities. Indeed, a number of studies have identified regimes in transition as containing the highest risk of political instability and mass atrocities. What is overlooked is the question of how and why some regimes undergo such transitions without experiencing mass atrocities, despite the presence of a number of salient risk factors, including state-based discrimination, inter-group tension and horizontal inequality. Utilizing a new analytical framework, this article investigates this lacuna by conducting a comparative analysis of two countries—one that experienced atrocities (Burundi) during transition, and one that did not (Guyana). How countries avoid such violence during transition has the potential to yield insights for the mitigation of risk associated with mass atrocity crimes.

The purpose of this article is to provide a better understanding of why some countries experience mass atrocities during periods of democratic transition, while others do not. Scholars have long regarded democracy as an important source of stability and protection from mass atrocities such as genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. But democratic transition itself is fraught with the heightened risk of violent conflict and even mass atrocities. Indeed, a number of studies have identified regimes in transition as containing the highest risk of political instability and mass atrocities. What is overlooked is the question of how and why some regimes undergo such transitions without experiencing mass atrocities, despite the presence of a number of salient risk factors, including state-based discrimination, inter-group tension and horizontal inequality. Utilizing a new analytical framework, this article investigates this lacuna by conducting a comparative analysis of two countries—one that experienced atrocities (Burundi) during transition, and one that did not (Guyana). How countries avoid such violence during transition has the potential to yield insights for the mitigation of risk associated with mass atrocity crimes.

Interest amongst scholars and policy decision-makers in the prevention of genocide and other mass atrocities has grown in recent years. Despite this, many have overlooked problems inherent in the commonly accepted notion of prevention. Crystalized in the Carnegie Commission's 1997 report, 'Preventing Deadly Conflict', prevention has typically been understood in two parts, one addressing impending cases of violence (direct prevention) and the other focusing on the underlying causes of violence (structural prevention). The concept of structural prevention is especially problematic. Commonly defined as the identification and addressing of 'root causes', this conceptualisation contains at least two limitations: first, there is an implicit assumption that root causes lead inevitably to violence, and second, there has been a tendency for international actors to decide, in general and global terms, what counts as root causes and how to ameliorate them, downplaying the role of local contexts and overlooking the preventive work of local and national actors. This article argues that the concept of structural prevention needs broadening to incorporate an understanding of the dynamic interaction between the risk that root causes pose, and locally-based mitigation factors that foster resilience. Effective long-term prevention should be based – not only on identifying and ameliorating negative characteristics in countries at risk – but also on contributing to the complex management of diversity. While this makes intuitive sense – and may in fact reflect the reality of how much preventive work is done – such an approach has not hitherto been reflected in conceptual understandings of prevention adopted by the United Nations, as well as academic researchers.