Suchergebnisse

Hydrogen is seen as a means to decarbonise sectors with greenhouse gas emissions that are hard to reduce, as a medium for energy storage, and as a fallback in case halted fossil-fuel imports lead to energy shortages. Hydrogen is likely to play at least some role in the European Union's achievement by 2050 of a net-zero greenhouse gas emissions target. However, production of hydrogen in the EU is currently emissions intensive. Hydrogen supply could be decarbonised if produced via electrolysis based on electricity from renewable sources, or produced from natural gas with carbon, capture, and storage. The theoretical production potential of low-carbon hydrogen is virtually unlimited and production volumes will thus depend only on demand and supply cost. Estimates of final hydrogen demand in 2050 range from levels similar to today's in a low-demand scenario, to ten times today's level in a high-demand scenario. Hydrogen is used as either a chemical feedstock or an energy source. A base level of 2050 demand can be derived from looking at sectors that already consume hydrogen and others that are likely to adopt hydrogen. The use of hydrogen in many sectors has been demonstrated. Whether use will increase depends on the complex interplay between competing energy supplies, public policy, technological and systems innovation, and consumer preferences. Policymakers must address the need to displace carbon-intensive hydrogen with low-carbon hydrogen, and incentivise the uptake of hydrogen as a means to decarbonise sectors with hard-to-reduce emissions. Certain key principles can be followed without regret: driving down supply costs of low-carbon hydrogen production; accelerating initial deployment with public support to test the economic viability and enable learning; and continued strengthening of climate policies such as the EU emissions trading system to stimulate the growth of hydrogen-based solutions in the areas for which hydrogen is most suitable.

Many of the technologies that can help the European Union become a net-zero emissions economy by 2050 have been shown to work but are not yet commercially competitive with incumbent fossil-fuel technologies. There is not enough private investment to drive the deployment of new low-carbon alternatives. This is primarily because carbon prices are neither high enough nor stable. There are a number of benefits from the deployment of low-carbon technologies that private firms do not factor in. These include the benefits of decreasing industry-wide costs over time, and the global climate benefits from the development of low-carbon technologies within the EU that can subsequently be exported. The result is an investment level below the socially optimal value in the EU. Commercialisation contracts could be implemented as a temporary measure to remove the risk associated with uncertain carbon prices for ambitious low-carbon projects. The aim of the contracts would be to increase private investment to the socially optimal level. Contracts would be allocated through auctions in which fixed prices for abated emissions over a fixed duration would be agreed on a project-by-project basis. On an annual basis, public subsidies amounting to the difference between the agreed carbon price and the actual EU carbon price would be provided to investors, depending on the total carbon emissions abated. As long as EU carbon prices are low, investors would receive larger subsidies to ensure their competitiveness. Contracts would be auctioned at EU level. This would generate increased competition compared to national auctions, leading to more efficient outcomes and preventing fragmentation of the single market. From about €3 billion to €6 billion would be provided to the main industrial emitting sectors annually, with the amount reducing as the EU carbon price rises and low-carbon technologies become competitive without subsidy.

The European Green Deal has set a target of reducing European Union carbon emissions by about 40 percent over the next ten years. Reaching this target is likely to involve a significant increase in carbon prices. Theoretically, higher carbon prices can lead to carbon leakage, or the relocation of industrial activity and its accompanying emissions out of economies with high carbon prices and into economies with low carbon prices. To address this perceived threat, the European Commission will consider the inclusion of a carbon border adjustment mechanism within the European Green Deal. This will apply a charge on goods imported into the EU, based on the emissions emitted during their production. The European Commission should not make the implementation of a carbon border adjustment mechanism into a must-have element of its climate policy. There is little in the way of strong empirical evidence that would justify a carbon-adjustment measure. Assessments of current carbon pricing schemes typically find no leakage, while ex-ante modelling tends to find limited leakage, with results highly sensitive to underlying assumptions. Energy price differentials - a proxy for carbon prices do not necessarily result in a relocation of energy-intensive production. Furthermore, significant logistical, legal and political challenges will arise during the design of a carbon border mechanism. Choices would have to be made between more efficient but highly complex and politically risky approaches, and mainly symbolic but more easily implementable solutions. To simplify the design of a carbon border mechanism whilst maximising its benefits, the Commission has proposed focusing only on carbon-intensive and trade-exposed sectors. But it will be difficult to draw a strict line between covered and non-covered sectors. Trade deviation will potentially lead to lobbying and the temptation for "cascading protectionism", with tariffs extended to industries further along value chains. A strategy of tying future climate policy to the implementation of a border adjustment mechanism might therefore hinder rather than help EU climate policy. The EU should instead focus upon the implementation of measures to trigger the development of a competitive low-carbon industry in Europe.

Die Umstellung des europäischen Energiesystems auf einen geringeren Ausstoß von Treibhausgasen wird einen grundsätzlichen Wandel der Art und Weise erfordern, wie Energie bereitgestellt, transportiert und genutzt wird. Als hauptsächliche Energieträger kommen Strom, Wasserstoff und synthetisches Gas in Frage. Die kostengünstigste Option ist die weitgehende Elektrifizierung aller Wirtschaftssektoren. Unabhängig von der genauen Ausgestaltung des zukünftigen europäischen Energiesystems gibt es einige Politikmaßnahmen, die notwendig sind, um das Ziel der Klimaneutralität bis 2050 zu erreichen: Ein umfangreicher Ausbau der Erzeugungskapazitäten erneuerbarer Energien, das möglichst schnelle Ende der Nutzung der fossilen Energieträger Kohle und Erdgas, sowie eine stärkere Nutzung von Elektrizität als Energieträger. Die zukünftige Rolle von neuen Energieträgern wie Wasserstoff und synthetischem Gas ist jedoch noch unklar.

Die Umstellung des europäischen Energiesystems auf einen geringeren Ausstoß von Treibhausgasen wird einen grundsätzlichen Wandel der Art und Weise erfordern, wie Energie bereitgestellt, transportiert und genutzt wird. Als hauptsächliche Energieträger kommen Strom, Wasserstoff und synthetisches Gas in Frage. Die kostengünstigste Option ist die weitgehende Elektrifizierung aller Wirtschaftssektoren. Unabhängig von der genauen Ausgestaltung des zukünftigen europäischen Energiesystems gibt es einige Politikmaßnahmen, die notwendig sind, um das Ziel der Klimaneutralität bis 2050 zu erreichen: Ein umfangreicher Ausbau der Erzeugungskapazitäten erneuerbarer Energien, das möglichst schnelle Ende der Nutzung der fossilen Energieträger Kohle und Erdgas, sowie eine stärkere Nutzung von Elektrizität als Energieträger. Die zukünftige Rolle von neuen Energieträgern wie Wasserstoff und synthetischem Gas ist jedoch noch unklar.

[Key Findings] The Fit for 55 package foresees a significant speeding up of European decarbonisation. This requires many new and upgraded policy frameworks. The European Commission has already proposed extensive reforms to the EU's energy and climate policy framework, and more are forthcoming before the end of 2021. The purpose of this report is to provide insight into the rationale behind these revisions. Spe-cifically, this is done by informing policymakers about the implications of different fuel mixes in a decarbonised EU in 2050. We explore three scenarios with differing demand assumptions for electricity, hydrogen and alternative green gases.

Recent calls to do climate policy research with, rather than for, stakeholders have been answered in non-modelling science. Notwithstanding progress in modelling literature, however, very little of the scenario space traces back to what stakeholders are ultimately concerned about. With a suite of eleven integrated assessment, energy system and sectoral models, we carry out a model inter-comparison for the EU, the scenario logic and research questions of which have been formulated based on stakeholders' concerns. The output of this process is a scenario framework exploring where the region is headed rather than how to achieve its goals, extrapolating its current policy efforts into the future. We find that Europe is currently on track to overperforming its pre-2020 40% target yet far from its newest ambition of 55% emissions cuts by 2030, as well as looking at a 1.0–2.35 GtCO2 emissions range in 2050. Aside from the importance of transport electrification, deployment levels of carbon capture and storage are found intertwined with deeper emissions cuts and with hydrogen diffusion, with most hydrogen produced post-2040 being blue. Finally, the multi-model exercise has highlighted benefits from deeper decarbonisation in terms of energy security and jobs, and moderate to high renewables-dominated investment needs.

Recent calls to do climate policy research with, rather than for, stakeholders have been answered in non-modelling science. Notwithstanding progress in modelling literature, however, very little of the scenario space traces back to what stakeholders are ultimately concerned about. With a suite of eleven integrated assessment, energy system and sectoral models, we carry out a model inter-comparison for the EU, the scenario logic and research questions of which have been formulated based on stakeholders' concerns. The output of this process is a scenario framework exploring where the region is headed rather than how to achieve its goals, extrapolating its current policy efforts into the future. We find that Europe is currently on track to overperforming its pre-2020 40% target yet far from its newest ambition of 55% emissions cuts by 2030, as well as looking at a 1.0–2.35 GtCO2 emissions range in 2050. Aside from the importance of transport electrification, deployment levels of carbon capture and storage are found intertwined with deeper emissions cuts and with hydrogen diffusion, with most hydrogen produced post-2040 being blue. Finally, the multi-model exercise has highlighted benefits from deeper decarbonisation in terms of energy security and jobs, and moderate to high renewables-dominated investment needs. ; publishedVersion

Recent calls to do climate policy research with, rather than for, stakeholders have been answered in nonmodellingscience. Notwithstanding progress in modelling literature, however, very little of the scenario spacetraces back to what stakeholders are ultimately concerned about. With a suite of eleven integrated assessment,energy system and sectoralmodels, we carry out amodel inter-comparison for the EU, the scenario logic and researchquestions of which have been formulated based on stakeholders' concerns. The output of this process is ascenario framework exploring where the region is headed rather than how to achieve its goals, extrapolating itscurrent policy efforts into the future. We find that Europe is currently on track to overperforming its pre-202040% target yet far from its newest ambition of 55% emissions cuts by 2030, as well as looking at a 1.0–2.35 GtCO2 emissions range in 2050. Aside from the importance of transport electrification, deployment levels of carboncapture and storage are found intertwined with deeper emissions cuts and with hydrogen diffusion, withmost hydrogen produced post-2040 being blue. Finally, the multi-model exercise has highlighted benefitsfrom deeper decarbonisation in terms of energy security and jobs, and moderate to high renewablesdominatedinvestment needs.