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This book considers the political and constitutional consequences of Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004), where the Supreme Court held that partisan gerrymandering challenges could no longer be adjudicated by the courts. Through a rigorous scientific analysis of US House district maps, the authors argue that partisan bias increased dramatically in the 2010 redistricting round after the Vieth decision, both at the national and state level. From a constitutional perspective, unrestrained partisan gerrymandering poses a critical threat to a central pillar of American democracy, popular sovereignty. State legislatures now effectively determine the political composition of the US House. The book answers the Court's challenge to find a new standard for gerrymandering that is both constitutionally grounded and legally manageable. It argues that the scientifically rigorous partisan symmetry measure is an appropriate legal standard for partisan gerrymandering, as it logically implies the constitutional right to individual equality and can be practically applied

This article provides an algorithm to produce a time-series estimate of the political center (or median voter) from aggregate survey data, even when the same questions are not asked in most years. This is compared to the existing Stimson dyad ratios approach, which has been applied to various questions in political science. Unlike the dyad ratios approach, the model developed here is derived from an explicit model of individual behavior—the widely used item response theory model. I compare the results of both techniques using the data on public opinion from the United Kingdom from 1947 to 2005 from Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda, and Stimson. Measures of overall model fit are provided, as well as techniques for testing model's assumptions and the fit of individual items. Full code is provided for estimation with free software WinBUGS and JAGS.

InVieth v. Jubilirer(2004) the Supreme Court found that claims of political gerrymandering could not be adjudicated by the courts. The reason for this was the finding that there did not exist a suitable standard to determine the existence of a political gerrymander that was both constitutionally justified and practically manageable. This paper questions the social science assumptions behind this finding. In particular it questions the assertion that the proposed standard that a majority of voters should be able to elect a majority of representative rests on a group right to equal representation, which does exist in the Constitution. Using social choice theory it is shown that the standard can be sustained strictly in terms of granting equal rights to individuals. The paper also considers how such a standard could be practically applied.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 219-232) and index. ; Introduction -- Groundwork : political equality and political institutions -- Political equality in electoral systems : equality implies proportionality -- Political equality in decision rules : equality implies majority rule -- Minority protection, rights, and supermajoritarianism -- Deliberation, rationality, and representation -- The logical bases of deliberative democracy : the limits of consensus -- Political equality in practice : stability and economic outcomes in the consensual democracies -- Conclusions: Political equality and the beauty of cycling. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This paper demonstrates that majority rule offers more protection to the worst-off minority than any other system, in that it maximizes the ability to overturn an unfavorable outcome. It is known (May 1952, Dahl 1956) that majority rule is the only decision rule that completely respects political equality. However, it is frequently argued that other decision rules (such as system of checks and balances, which are implicitly super-majoritarian) better serve the goals of protecting minorities rights and preserving stability. This paper argues that this trade-off is illusory and that majority rule actually provides most protection to minorities. Furthermore it does so precisely because of the instability inherent in majority rule, which overcomes the problem of majority tyranny.

We present a theory of comparative political institutions based on the concept of consensus democracy and social choice theory. Unlike Lijphart, we argue that "consensus democracy" is not a special form of democracy characterized by mutual vetoes, but rather the simplest form of democracy, which we refer to as PR-majority rule. We construct a typology of political institutions based on differences with this simple model. Contra Tsebelis's veto players approach, our theory predicts that PR-majority rule should be the most flexible form of democracy. We test this with data on overall patterns of government spending and on welfare state reform.