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AbstractErnest Gellner's work on nationalism continues to draw a mix of both admiration and criticism. In a recent article, Riga and Hall find fault with a new line of criticism of Gellner's theory of nationalism that I introduced in a series of articles in this journal. They claim that I have merely repeated a well‐known criticism of Gellner – that his work is functionalist. This would be convenient for their arguments if it were true. While I would agree, and have explicitly acknowledged, that there is nothing new in the charge of functionalism, I do not take a functionalist line on Gellner. Functionalism is not the issue. My work shows that his theory of nationalism is plagued with problems that have little or nothing to do with functionalism.

AbstractErnest Gellner's work on nationalism is situated in a larger social metaphysic and philosophical anthropology. This paper investigates some of these overarching intellectual commitments and their implications for his arguments about nationalism. Two main issues are examined. Does the method of 'philosophic history' provide any philosophical or methodological support for his treatment of nationalism? What are the implications of the common culture of industrial civilization for his arguments about nationalism? Addressing these issues together contributes to the continuing evaluation of Gellner's work, particularly to recent discussion of his arguments about necessity and nationalism.

The work of Ernest Gellner continues to be an influential part of nationalism studies. A recent appraisal has raised questions about the argument that Gellner offered in his central text on nationalism, Nations and Nationalism. This article takes up other issues in Gellner's work on nationalism. The article examines Gellner's influential definition of nationalism and the interpretation that he placed on that definition, as well as his treatment of 'political cohabitation'. It also pays more attention to Gellner's later work, namely, Gellner's discussion of 'the time zones of nationalism'. The paper draws on secondary literature but its primary purpose is to assess the coherence of Gellner's arguments. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThe work of Ernest Gellner continues to be an influential part of nationalism studies. A recent appraisal has raised questions about the argument that Gellner offered in his central text on nationalism, Nations and Nationalism. This article takes up other issues in Gellner's work on nationalism. The article examines Gellner's influential definition of nationalism and the interpretation that he placed on that definition, as well as his treatment of 'political cohabitation'. It also pays more attention to Gellner's later work, namely, Gellner's discussion of 'the time zones of nationalism'. The paper draws on secondary literature but its primary purpose is to assess the coherence of Gellner's arguments.

AbstractThe central distinguishing feature ofErnestGellner's most important treatment of nationalism is the proposition that nationalism is necessary for industrial society. Relatively little attention has been paid to the philosophical dimension of this proposition. The question of necessity in social explanation, however, is a complicated philosophical problem and must be dealt with directly if this proposition is to be endorsed. I argue thatGellner's argument is philosophically flawed. The 'ordinary prose' ofNations andNationalismfails to deliver whatGellner claims to have delivered: the demonstration of a necessary connection between nationalism and industrial society. This result is of particular relevance givenGellner's philosophical interests.

Action is a central category in the social sciences. It is also commonplace to assume that the social world has a causal structure. Yet standard ways of specifying causal relations in social science lack explanatory force when the subject matter is intentional action. The present article considers this problem. The metaphysics of action are distinguished from the metaphysics of intentional action, and it is argued that the former forces an implausible unity on the actions of inanimate nature and of rational agents. Agency in the metaphysics of action adds nothing to state-variable causation. Agency in the metaphysics of intentional action, in contrast, is argued to have a different structure, not reducible to state-variable causation. Work on endogenous choice in social science suggests that the concept of agency that is on view in literature on selection effects and social generation implies the metaphysics of intentional action. Recent research in the philosophy of action is considered in order to specify the structure of intentional action and the force of intentional explanations.

Analyzes the desirability of a multination federation in Canada as discussed by Will Kymlicka. Challenges to the feasibility of Kymlicka's depiction of a multination federation are posed: (1) framing of the Canadian case in comparative perspective is deemed erroneous & (2) considering the dynamics of the nationalist movement in Quebec, Kymlicka's argument is not compelling. Political philosophy & ideologies concerning multicultural citizenship & the idea of multination federations are discussed, & multinational federalism in Canada is not supported. L. Collins Leigh