Suchergebnisse

In this article, we assess the future prospects of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) from the perspective of a developing country, drawing on Vietnam as a case study. First, we review the performance of the CDM and describe the evolution of carbon markets on the path towards a post-2012 climate regime. Next, we place Vietnam in a post-2012 context, and assess potential project resources, challenges, and opportunities that could arise for the country from a future climate policy framework. Our analysis suggests that the CDM should remain in place and be improved to facilitate more meaningful participation by developing countries in climate mitigation efforts beyond 2012. Finally, the article sets out eight proposals that could help improve the CDM as the world progresses towards a new international climate policy framework. ; Dans cet article nous évaluons les perspectives à venir du Mécanisme de Développement Propre (MDP) du point de vue d'un Pays en développement, en s'appuyant sur le Vietnam comme étude de cas. D'abord, nous reconsidérons les performances du MDP en décrivant l'évolution des marchés carbone sur la trajectoire d'un régime climatique post-2012. Puis nous replaçons le Vietnam dans un contexte post-2012 pour évaluer les ressources potentielles du projet, les défis, et les opportunités qui peuvent survenir pour le pays dans le cadre d'une politique climatique future. Notre analyse suggère que le MDP devrait être maintenu en place et amélioré pour faciliter une participation plus significative des pays en développement aux efforts d'atténuation climatique au-delà de 2012. Finalement, l'article dégage huit propositions pouvant aider à l'amélioration du MDP tandis que le monde s'avance vers un nouveau cadre international de politique climatique.

In this article, we assess the future prospects of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) from the perspective of a developing country, drawing on Vietnam as a case study. First, we review the performance of the CDM and describe the evolution of carbon markets on the path towards a post-2012 climate regime. Next, we place Vietnam in a post-2012 context, and assess potential project resources, challenges, and opportunities that could arise for the country from a future climate policy framework. Our analysis suggests that the CDM should remain in place and be improved to facilitate more meaningful participation by developing countries in climate mitigation efforts beyond 2012. Finally, the article sets out eight proposals that could help improve the CDM as the world progresses towards a new international climate policy framework. ; Dans cet article nous évaluons les perspectives à venir du Mécanisme de Développement Propre (MDP) du point de vue d'un Pays en développement, en s'appuyant sur le Vietnam comme étude de cas. D'abord, nous reconsidérons les performances du MDP en décrivant l'évolution des marchés carbone sur la trajectoire d'un régime climatique post-2012. Puis nous replaçons le Vietnam dans un contexte post-2012 pour évaluer les ressources potentielles du projet, les défis, et les opportunités qui peuvent survenir pour le pays dans le cadre d'une politique climatique future. Notre analyse suggère que le MDP devrait être maintenu en place et amélioré pour faciliter une participation plus significative des pays en développement aux efforts d'atténuation climatique au-delà de 2012. Finalement, l'article dégage huit propositions pouvant aider à l'amélioration du MDP tandis que le monde s'avance vers un nouveau cadre international de politique climatique.

The Paris Agreement on climate change constitutes an important milestone in international climate negotiations. Its key objective is the strengthening of the global response to climate change by transitioning the world to an increasingly green economy. In this book, environmental tax and climate law experts address the various issues surrounding green market transitions. Key chapters examine carbon taxes and systems of implementation, energy subsidies, and support schemes for carbon and energy policies. Using a multitude of international case studies, several contributing authors reflect on the underlying policy dynamics and the constraints of various fiscal measures. In addition, this timely work considers the important issue of smart instrument mixes, going beyond instrument choice to examine how they can work in harmony together. Astute and engaging, this book is a vital companion for students and scholars in environmental law, economics and sustainability. Its practical approach also renders it an excellent guide for policy makers and those involved in fiscal reform and green market transition.--

ABSTRACT
To reach climate neutrality, carbon emissions from the production of basic materials need to be curtailed. When governments encourage this transition by adopting support measures, the measures must comply with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. This article analyzes three selected support schemes under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: (i) free allocation under emissions trading systems to operators of installations at risk of carbon leakage; (ii) the combination of a charge on carbon-intensive materials with free allocation; and (iii) carbon contracts for difference, under which governments cover the incremental costs of climate-neutral production processes relative to conventional processes. The analysis reveals that the current regime of free allocation is vulnerable to challenges under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. By contrast, the combination of free allocation and a charge on carbon-intensive materials would ensure consistent carbon pricing and thus would not amount to a subsidy under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. In a similar vein, the carbon contracts for difference could be designed so that they would not confer a benefit and hence not constitute a subsidy.

To reach climate neutrality, carbon emissions from the production of basic materials need to be significantly reduced. For governments' support measures to be consistent with their World Trade Organization obligations, they need to be compatible with the WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). This paper analyzes the ASCM consistency of three selected support schemes, namely: (1) free allocation under emissions trading systems such as the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to operators of installations deemed to be at significant risk of carbon leakage; (2) a combination of a charge on carbon-intensive materials with free allocation; and (3) carbon contracts for differences (CCfDs) for operators of climate-neutral installations, in which governments pay out the incremental costs of climate neutral-production processes relative to the costs of conventional primary material production. The analysis reveals that the current system of carbon leakage protection through free allocation is vulnerable to challenges under the ASCM. By contrast, a transition to a combination of free allocation and a charge on carbon-intensive materials would implement consistent carbon-pricing and thus would very likely not amount to a subsidy under the ASCM. In a similar vein, support for climate-neutral installations through CCfDs could be designed in such a way that it confers no benefit, so that it would also not constitute a subsidy.

To reach climate neutrality, carbon emissions from the production of basic materials need to be significantly reduced. For governments' support measures to be consistent with their World Trade Organization obligations, they need to be compatible with the WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). This paper analyzes the ASCM consistency of three selected support schemes, namely: (1) free allocation under emissions trading systems such as the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to operators of installations deemed to be at significant risk of carbon leakage; (2) a combination of a charge on carbon-intensive materials with free allocation; and (3) carbon contracts for differences (CCfDs) for operators of climate-neutral installations, in which governments pay out the incremental costs of climate neutral-production processes relative to the costs of conventional primary material production. The analysis reveals that the current system of carbon leakage protection through free allocation is vulnerable to challenges under the ASCM. By contrast, a transition to a combination of free allocation and a charge on carbon-intensive materials would implement consistent carbon-pricing and thus would very likely not amount to a subsidy under the ASCM. In a similar vein, support for climate-neutral installations through CCfDs could be designed in such a way that it confers no benefit, so that it would also not constitute a subsidy.

This report analyses the influence of the Cap and Trade (CaT) system and the electricity market in California along two main questions: How do CaT design features affect the environmental effectiveness of the system and the quality of the carbon price signal? How do electricity market design features affect the carbon price induced abatement in the power sector? Based on publicly availabledata and expert interviews, we derive four main findings on the impact of the electricity market structure on the quality of the California Carbon Allowances (CCA) price.First, the capacity mix impacts the role of the CCA price for the electricity sector. Due to the large share of gas capacities and the very small share of coal plants, carbon reduction in the electricity sector can only be achieved by decreasing output or investing in carbon-free technologies. Second, complementary policies affect the marginal abatement cost (MAC) in the electricity sector and indirectly also the carbon price. Thus, the CCA price only reflects the MAC conditional on all the complementary policies. Third, the redistribution of large shares of the carbon revenue to consumers, as so-called California Climate Credits, increases the political acceptance of the system. Finally, the CaT system should currently not be seen as the major climate policy instrument in the Californian electricity sector. The broad mix of other policies buffer the carbon price and make the total costs for the transformation less transparent. Yet, this might change in the future when reduction targets become more stringent.This case study is part of the project "Influence of market structures and market regulation on the carbon market" that aims to investigate the interdependencies between carbon and energy markets in Europe, California, China, South Korea, and Mexico.

The European Union (EU) has been advocating climate policy ambitions from the very beginning of the international climate regime. Climate action to support the implementation of the Paris Agreement (2015) involves nearly all fields of national and international policy-making. In this research paper, we look into the role of trade policy in this respect. There are several legal and institutional options for how policy-makers in the EU and elsewhere could promote a productive relationship between the UN climate regime and the international trade regime, comprising the World Trade Organization (WTO) and regional trade agreements (RTAs). The increasing number of WTO disputes over national renewable energy policy regulations points to a systemic conflict between national climate policies and WTO obligations, whereas a number of RTAs including environmental standards demonstrate positive ways forward, in particular on how to avoid a race to the bottom. As a longer-term vision, we identify the legal options under the WTO regime, and for the medium term we suggest synergies that the EU can achieve through RTA negotiations and reviews. In the short term, the EU and its Member States should push for more transparency on trade-related climate measures, for example through notifications, between the bodies of the WTO and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, as well as follow up with climate policy allies on trade initiatives that support the climate agenda. (author's abstract)

When it first launched in 2005, the European Union emissions trading system (EU ETS) expected to see carbon dioxide prices of around €30/ton and be a cornerstone of the EU's climate policy. The reality was a cascade offalling prices, a ballooning privately held emissions bank, and a decade of muted incentives for investment in the technology and innovation necessary to achieve long-term climate goals. The European Commission responded with various administrative measures, including postponing the introduction of allowances ("backloading") and using a quantitybased criterion for regulating future allowance sales ("the market stability reserve"). While prices have now begun to recover, it is farfrom clear whether these measures are sufficient to adequately support the price of carbon dioxide into the future.

When it was launched in 2005, the European Union emissions trading system (EU ETS) was projected to have prices of around €30/ton CO2 and to be a cornerstone of the EU's climate policy. The reality was a cascade of falling prices, a ballooning privately held emissions bank, and a decade of low prices providing inadequate incentive to drive investment in the technologies and innovation necessary to achieve long-term climate goals. The European Commission responded with administrative measures, including postponing the introduction of allowances (backloading) and using a quantity-based criterion for regulating future allowance sales (the market stability reserve); although prices are beginning to recover, it is far from clear whether these measures will adequately support the price into the future. In the meantime, governments have been turning away from carbon pricing and adopting overlapping regulatory measures that reinforce low prices and further undermine the confidence in market-based approaches to addressing climate change. The solution in other carbon markets has been the introduction of a reserve price that would set a minimum price in allowance auctions. Opponents of an auction reserve price in the EU ETS have expressed concern that a minimum auction price would interfere with economic operations in the market or would be tantamount to a tax, which would trigger a decision rule requiring unanimity among EU Member States. This Article reviews the economic and legal arguments for and against an auction reserve price. Our economic analysis concludes that an auction reserve price is necessary to accommodate overlapping policies and for the allowance market to operate efficiently. Our legal analysis concludes that an auction reserve price is not a "provision primarily of a fiscal nature," nor would it "significantly affect a Member State's choice between different energy sources." We describe pathways through which a reserve price could be introduced.