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Recent research examines when and why women join rebel groups as combatants. However, we are only beginning to understand how their presence affects rebel group behaviour and conflict dynamics more generally. I address this gap by analysing how women's participation influences two dimensions of rebel behaviour: their relationship to civilians and their fighting performance. I argue that a greater number of female rebels decreases civilian victimization, but also reduces rebel combat performance. I test these propositions using time-varying district-level data from the Nepalese civil war. The results support both expectations. These findings increase our understanding of the effects of women's participation in civil war.

There is an ongoing discussion regarding the role of mechanized forces in counterinsurgency warfare. Proponents note that they boost counterinsurgents' ability to fight while critics point out that they diminish their ability to gather information. This note adds to this discussion by focusing on violence against civilians, an outcome that theory suggests should be affected by mechanization via both of these channels. Results from quantitative analyses employing new data on mechanization and covering the period 1989–2016 indicate that mechanization is unrelated to the number of civilians killed by government forces but positively associated with that killed by rebels. These results are in line with the idea that mechanization increases counterinsurgents' fighting but decreases their information-gathering abilities. By offering quantitative evidence that mechanized forces have a place in modern counterinsurgency, these results contribute to both academics' and practitioners' understanding of armed intrastate conflict.

Abstract
There is an ongoing discussion regarding the role of mechanized forces in counterinsurgency warfare. Proponents note that they boost counterinsurgents' ability to fight while critics point out that they diminish their ability to gather information. This note adds to this discussion by focusing on violence against civilians, an outcome that theory suggests should be affected by mechanization via both of these channels. Results from quantitative analyses employing new data on mechanization and covering the period 1989–2016 indicate that mechanization is unrelated to the number of civilians killed by government forces but positively associated with that killed by rebels. These results are in line with the idea that mechanization increases counterinsurgents' fighting but decreases their information-gathering abilities. By offering quantitative evidence that mechanized forces have a place in modern counterinsurgency, these results contribute to both academics' and practitioners' understanding of armed intrastate conflict.

Recent research examines when and why women join rebel groups as combatants. However, we are only beginning to understand how their presence affects rebel group behaviour and conflict dynamics more generally. I address this gap by analysing how women's participation influences two dimensions of rebel behaviour: their relationship to civilians and their fighting performance. I argue that a greater number of female rebels decreases civilian victimization, but also reduces rebel combat performance. I test these propositions using time-varying district-level data from the Nepalese civil war. The results support both expectations. These findings increase our understanding of the effects of women's participation in civil war.

Whereas existing research posits that the presence of female fighters in armed groups decreases their propensity for wartime rape, one recent study tests this claim quantitatively and is unable to detect a statistically significant effect. This leads the author to conclude that female combatants do not decrease rape. Using that study's original data, this article reexamines the evidence for the relationship between female rebel combatants and wartime sexual violence. Replications of the original models suggest that they make strong functional form assumptions regarding numerous independent variables and time dependence and that relaxing them results in substantively different findings. Namely, women's participation in armed groups decreases groups' use of wartime rape. In support of Loken's organizational theory of rape, results also suggest that this effect is moderated by group norms. These findings contribute to the literature on female participation in rebel groups and beyond.

Whereas existing research posits that the presence of female fighters in armed groups decreases their propensity for wartime rape, one recent study tests this claim quantitatively and is unable to detect a statistically significant effect. This leads the author to conclude that female combatants do not decrease rape. Using that study's original data, this article reexamines the evidence for the relationship between female rebel combatants and wartime sexual violence. Replications of the original models suggest that they make strong functional form assumptions regarding numerous independent variables and time dependence and that relaxing them results in substantively different findings. Namely, women's participation in armed groups decreases groups' use of wartime rape. In support of Loken's organizational theory of rape, results also suggest that this effect is moderated by group norms. These findings contribute to the literature on female participation in rebel groups and beyond.

Existing work describes child soldiers as very violent towards civilians. Challenging this, I posit that children's effect on group behaviour is conditioned by rebels' civilian support. Because they have weak pre-existing norms, children are both prone to normalize violence and susceptible to rebel efforts to control their use of violence. They should thus closely follow group rules in their behaviour towards civilians, implying a moderating effect of these rules. I expect that child soldiering increases civilian victimization only for groups who lack incentives to show restraint towards civilians because they receive no support from them. Empirical tests support this expectation.

Whereas existing research posits that the presence of female fighters in armed groups decreases their propensity for wartime rape, one recent study tests this claim quantitatively and is unable to detect a statistically significant effect. This leads the author to conclude that female combatants do not decrease rape. Using that study's original data, this article reexamines the evidence for the relationship between female rebel combatants and wartime sexual violence. Replications of the original models suggest that they make strong functional form assumptions regarding numerous independent variables and time dependence and that relaxing them results in substantively different findings. Namely, women's participation in armed groups decreases groups' use of wartime rape. In support of Loken's organizational theory of rape, results also suggest that this effect is moderated by group norms. These findings contribute to the literature on female participation in rebel groups and beyond.

Secret police are generally viewed as key institutions in autocrats' repression apparatus. However, we lack clear empirical evidence on the link between secret police and repression. Instead, recent studies indicate that the surveillance provided by secret police reduces physical human rights abuses. This paper re-examines the relationship between secret police and physical state repression. We identify four mechanisms linking these variables, deterrence, targeting, organizational practices, and institutional self-preservation. These mechanisms provide contrasting expectations for the overall relationship but also contextual expectations on when secret police may (not) increase repression. To test these expectations, we collect data on the global existence of secret police. Results indicate that secret police are associated with increased physical repression, particularly when they must develop a reputation to deter dissidents or when multiple rival security organizations exist. In contrast, older, more established secret police or ones without institutional rivals are not associated with physical repression.

Secret police are generally viewed as key institutions in autocrats' repression apparatus. However, we lack clear empirical evidence on the link between secret police and repression. Instead, recent studies indicate that the surveillance provided by secret police reduces physical human rights abuses. This paper re-examines the relationship between secret police and physical state repression. We identify four mechanisms linking these variables, deterrence, targeting, organizational practices, and institutional self-preservation. These mechanisms provide contrasting expectations for the overall relationship but also contextual expectations on when secret police may (not) increase repression. To test these expectations, we collect data on the global existence of secret police. Results indicate that secret police are associated with increased physical repression, particularly when they must develop a reputation to deter dissidents or when multiple rival security organizations exist. In contrast, older, more established secret police or ones without institutional rivals are not associated with physical repression.

Abstract
Are migrants and refugees systematically linked to insecurity? This article, for the first time, takes stock of the interdisciplinary quantitative research on this question using meta-analysis. We compiled a unique dataset comprising more than 70 published studies across a variety of spatial and temporal scales covering 1951–2016. We show that an overall effect linking foreign-born populations to insecurity may exist, but there is little evidence for refugees or migrants consistently leading to more insecurity when assuming a disaggregated perspective. Specifically, foreign-born populations are unlikely to be systematically related to terrorism and hate crimes, while they can be associated with a higher risk of state-based disputes, inter-group conflict, and one-sided violence. This study adds to our understanding of the security implications of refugees and migrants as it sheds more light on the actual effect transnational population movements have on insecurity, thereby informing the research agenda in the years to come.

How does the presence of female rebel combatants during conflict influence the likelihood of United Nations post-conflict peacekeeping deployment? While past literature on peacekeeping emphasizes the role of conflict attributes and security council interests, only few studies investigate the importance of belligerent characteristics. We argue that, because dominant gender stereotypes paint women as peaceful, female rebel combatants lead domestic and international audiences to perceive conflicts in which they fight as more severe. Given that recent UN resolutions and mission mandates align with these stereotypes, this in turn, causes the UN to intervene and deploy peacekeepers. Multivariate regression models drawing on a global sample of UN post-conflict missions provide empirical support for our hypothesis. Our findings add to the growing body of literature emphasizing the role of women in combat roles, and contribute to the discussion on the UN's Women, Peace, and Security agenda.

How does the presence of female rebel combatants during conflict influence the likelihood of United Nations post-conflict peacekeeping deployment? While past literature on peacekeeping emphasizes the role of conflict attributes and security council interests, only few studies investigate the importance of belligerent characteristics. We argue that, because dominant gender stereotypes paint women as peaceful, female rebel combatants lead domestic and international audiences to perceive conflicts in which they fight as more severe. Given that recent UN resolutions and mission mandates align with these stereotypes, this in turn, causes the UN to intervene and deploy peacekeepers. Multivariate regression models drawing on a global sample of UN post-conflict missions provide empirical support for our hypothesis. Our findings add to the growing body of literature emphasizing the role of women in combat roles, and contribute to the discussion on the UN's Women, Peace, and Security agenda.

Abstract
Diversionary theories of interstate conflict suggest that domestic problems push leaders to initiate hostilities against foreign foes in order to garner support. However, the empirical support for this proposition is mixed as critics point out that leaders should not start conflicts that can be extremely costly for them, potentially even removing them from office. We propose that while leaders may not initiate new conflicts, they do tap into existing territorial disputes when facing internal disapproval. That is, they engage in material acts of foreign policy showing domestic audiences that they defend or emphasize their country's claim while being unlikely to result in full-scale armed confrontations. To test this claim, we use monthly data, covering the period 2013–2020, on leader approval and incursions into contested airspace from Turkey's long-standing territorial dispute with Greece. Results from time-series models offer support for our expectation.