THE RESEARCH REPORTED HERE EXAMINES LONG- AND SHORT-TERM IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION ON EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYMENT. AN ANALYSIS OF 16 STATE GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1965 SUGGESTS THAT SUCH REORGANIZATION RARELY ACCOUNTS FOR SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN EITHER EMPLOYMENT RATES OR EXPENDITURE RATES.
TORT REFORM WAS A KEY ISSUE FOR STATE LEGISLATURES IN 1986. IT PITTED POWERFUL INTERESTS AGAINST OTHER POWERFUL INTERESTS; IT RAISED BASIC QUESTIONS ABOUT COMMON LAW; AND IT THREATENED TO ALTER THE FEDERAL SYSTEM BY HAVING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CLAIM GREATER CONTROL OVER TORT LAW AND INSURANCE REGULATION. IN THIS ARTICLE THE AUTHORS EXPLAIN THE BACKGROUND THAT LED TO THIS FLURRY OF ATTENTION, REVIEW THE MAJOR PROPOSALS FOR REFORM, AND OUTLINE THE ACTIONS OF BOTH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND STATE GOVERNMENTS. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DID LITTLE IN 1986. AT THE SAME TIME, VIRTUALLY EVERY STATE ACTED. EARLY IN THE YEAR, THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY (AND PHYSICIANS) SET THE DEBATE--ITS TOPIC, TONE, AND TERMS. BY THE TIME OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES GOT ORGANIZED, MANY STATES HAD ACTED GENERALLY FOLLOWING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY. LATER IN THE YEAR, THE DEBATE BECAME MORE HEATED, AND THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY HAD MUCH MORE DIFFICULTY SECURING DESIRED STATE ACTION. AS A RESULT, MANY ISSUES WERE CARRIED FORWARD TO 1987.
ONE KEY POLICY DISPUTE IN THE SCHOOL CHOICE DEBATE CONCERNS WHETHER THE EDUCATION BUREAUCRACY IS A CAUSE OR A CONSEQUENCE OF POOR PERFORMANCE. THIS DISPUTE IS STRIKING BECAUSE BOTH SIDES ACCEPT THE SAME NEO-INSTITUTIONALIST ORGANIZATION THEORY. THIS ARTICLE USES A LARGE PANEL OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS TO ADDRESS THE DISPUTE. THE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT POOR PERFORMANCE RESULTS IN A GROWING BUREAUCRACY NOT VICE VERSA. FURTHER EVIDENCE THEN SHOWS THAT THE GROWTH IN BUREAUCRACY IS ASSOCIATED IN AN INCREASE IN TEACHERS AND SMALLER CLASS SIZES; IN SHORT, BUREAUCRACY INCREASES AS SCHOOLS TAKE ACTIONS THAT ARE LINKED TO IMPROVED PERFORMANCE.
