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Abstract
Research on policy shifts has found that repositioning can be costly as it affects candidates' perceived honesty, reliability, and competence. It remains unclear, however, whether a politician's gender affects perceptions of repositioning. Research on gender stereotypes has found that while male politicians are viewed as more competent, decisive, and displaying strong leadership, female politicians are believed to be more honest. Applying expectancy-violation theory, I test the hypothesis that the reputational cost of repositioning is more pronounced for female politicians in a preregistered survey experiment fielded on a large convenience sample in Flanders, Belgium (n = 6,957). I find that while frequent repositioning is evaluated negatively, the negative effect of repositioning is not more pronounced for female candidates than for male candidates on most outcome measures.

This article examines whether the support for Eurosceptic challenger parties influences mainstream party position change on European integration in Western Europe. The key finding is that Eurosceptic challenger support is capable of influencing mainstream position shifts on European integration provided that, on average, EU issues are regarded as important by the Eurosceptic challengers. Moreover, the centre-left is more affected by Eurosceptic contagion since it is influenced by both radical right and radical left Eurosceptic success, whereas the centre-right is only susceptible to radical right success. The empirical analyses are based on panel regression analysis employing expert survey data provided by Chapel Hill Expert Survey. The findings presented in this article have important implications for the study of party positioning on European integration as well as for the study of party competition in general.

New parties can shake up party systems by advancing new issues, influencing established competitors and affecting the dynamics of party competition. However, which kinds of new parties are successful? While the literature has extensively focused on institutional-level and election-level drivers of new party success, the literature on party-level determinants of new party success is scarce. As most studies on new party success focus on party entry at the election level or on new party survival, we argue that these studies suffer from selection bias as they do not leverage information on unsuccessful parties. This is understandable, since quality data on unsuccessful parties' vote shares, party organizations and ideological characteristics are scant. To overcome this limitation, we examine the party-level determinants of new party success in the Netherlands, including all parties that have participated in national parliamentary elections since 1946. Our findings have important implications for the study of new parties in modern democracies.

Populism has become a pervasive concept in political science research. However, a central and basic question remains unanswered: which European parties are more populist than others? Despite the increasing wealth of studies on populism in parties, we lack data that measures populism in political parties in a valid and precise manner, that recognizes that populism is constituted by multiple dimensions, and that ensures full coverage of all parties in Europe. In this article, we first appraise the weaknesses of existing approaches. Arguing that parties' populism should be measured as a latent construct, we then advocate a new approach to operationalizing and measuring populism in political parties using expert surveys. Relying on the Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey spanning 250 political parties in 28 European countries, we show that populism is best measured in a multi-dimensional and continuous manner. We subsequently illustrate the advantages of our approach for empirical analysis in political science.

While some consider populist parties to be a threat to liberal democracy, others have argued that populist parties may positively affect the quality of democracy by increasing political participation of citizens. This supposition, however, has hitherto not been subjected to rigorous empirical tests. The voter turnout literature, moreover, has primarily focused on stable institutional and party system characteristics – ignoring more dynamic determinants of voter turnout related to party competition. To fill this double gap in the literature, we examine the effect of populist parties, both left and right, on aggregate-level turnout in Western and Eastern European parliamentary elections. Based on a dataset on 315 elections in 31 European democracies since 1970s, we find that turnout is higher when populist parties are represented in parliament prior to an election in Eastern Europe, but not in Western Europe. These findings further our understanding of the relationship between populism, political participation and democracy.

AbstractIn the ideational approach to populism, populism and pluralism do not go together. While evidence indeed suggests that populist politicians consider a politically pluralist parliament as an obstacle to the expression of the true people's will in politics, it is however an open question whether 'the people', and especially those with high populist attitudes, are just as opposed towards pluralism in parliament and coalition government. Thus far, evidence of a negative relationship between populist attitudes and preferences for pluralism in politics has been inconclusive. We asked ca. 2000 Dutch respondents—raked to be representative of the population—to draw up their ideal assembly and to select the parties that they wish to be part of coalition government. Results show that populist attitudes positively associate with the total number of parties included in the assembly, and non-negatively with the number of parties in the coalition. Parties with government experience, however, are much less preferred. These results shed new light on the presumed incompatibility between populism and pluralism.

AbstractAs scholars explore opportunities for democratic renewal, the potential of ballot structures to improve the quality of representation has been largely neglected. We argue that expressive ballots can improve the congruence of political preferences between voters and their vote choice and, subsequently, decrease parliamentary polarization. Recognizing that voters' political preferences are more complex than a dichotomous party-vote allows, we propose the 'assembly ballot', which allows voters to choose their 'ideal parliament' by distributing 150 parliamentary seats across all participating parties. To assess the consequences of the assembly ballot for ideological congruence and parliamentary composition, we conducted a survey experiment with over 16,000 respondents around the 2017 Dutch parliamentary elections in which respondents cast a vote in a mock-election using the assembly ballot or a closed-list PR ballot. Results show that ideological congruence is, on average, significantly higher for voters voting with the assembly ballot for both the left–right dimension and the cultural dimension, while also producing a more centripetal, less polarized parliament.

AbstractThe governments of Hungary and Poland have been accused of sliding toward semi‐authoritarianism. Systematic analyses of the responses of political actors at the EU level to these instances of alleged democratic backsliding are scarce, however. This article therefore investigates the responses of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to the issue of the quality of democracy and the rule of law in Hungary and Poland. On the basis of data on parliamentary questions and motions for resolutions, we analyse who puts these issues on the European Parliament's (EP's) internal agenda and what positions legislators subsequently take in votes on resolutions. We find that both ideological preferences and strategic interests determine MEPs' responses to democratic backsliding. Our findings are important for research on EU responses to democratic backsliding in EU member states as well as for the literature on party competition in the EP.