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ObjectiveThis study sets out to examine the roles of party identification, political knowledge, education, and media use in citizens' perceptions of changes in the economy, federal deficit, poverty, and crime rates between 2001 and 2008. It also tests the predictions of motivated reasoning versus Bayesian updating in seeing how (or if) perceptions of the economy changed as conditions worsened during 2008.MethodThis research used American National Election Studies (ANES) panel data in creating regression analyses for perceptions in January and November 2008, with the former as a control for the latter. A repeated‐measures analysis of variance tracked changes in partisans' perceptions of the economy during the year.ResultsPartisanship was a robust predictor of perceptions. Political knowledge and education tended to promote perceptions that were in the same direction as actual trends, but political knowledge interacted with party identification to promote partisan polarization in perceptions. Television news exposure was the most important media variable, although it promoted pessimism on all trends. As economic conditions worsened throughout 2008, partisans' perceptions of the economy converged, suggesting that citizens, especially Republicans, updated their perceptions.ConclusionThe findings for partisanship and its interaction with political knowledge are consistent with the motivated reasoning literature, but the emergence of a bipartisan consensus about the worsening of the economy by the end of 2008 supports Bayesian updating, although it may take pretty undeniable facts for it to work.

This study drew on the literature in motivated reasoning and 2009 Pew survey data to examine the roles of partisanship, education, news exposure, and their interactions in the misperception that health care reform would create "death panels." Radio news exposure encouraged the misperception only among Republicans, while newspaper exposure discouraged it, especially among non-Republicans. But rather than polarize perceptions along partisan lines as predicted, Fox News exposure contributed to misperception mainstreaming. Finally, this study identified a complex role for education in both inhibiting misperceptions (as a main effect) and promoting them (as an interaction with Fox News exposure).

Media schemas about the power of the media are widely thought to influence perceived media effects and third-person perception, but only one study has shown this, and it did not consider desirable messages. The current research finds focus group evidence for the existence of additional media schemas relevant to estimating effects of pro-social messages, then examines the relationships between media schemas, perceived media effects of desirable and undesirable messages on self and others, and first-, second-, and third-person perceptions. Results indicate that some media schemas can be applied to perceived media effects of self and others, although not exclusively to desirable or undesirable messages. There was no evidence that these schemas are related to first- or third-person perception, but they seem to be better suited to predict the mutual perceived effects of second-person perception.

This study examines the effects of social distance, perceived exposure, and perceived predispositions on perceived media effects for desirable and undesirable health messages. It finds support for the effect social distance as traditionally measured; that is, groups that are more socially distant from the self, like the public, are perceived to be more affected by cigarette ads than close groups, such as friends. However, individual measures of respondents' social distance from any given comparison group generally are unrelated to perceived effects on the group. The influence of a group's perceived exposure on perceived message effects is confirmed for cigarette ads but not for desirable messages. Perceived attitudes of comparison groups toward message-relevant behaviors emerge as a factor that deserves inclusion in models of perceived effects.

This article argues for using topic-relevant reference groups in examining first and third-person effects. It also proposes using topic-relevant dimensions of distance to assess relationships not only between self and target groups but also relationships both have with communicators. The study showed 2000 presidential primary ads from Al Gore and George W. Bush to a combined sample of student and nonstudent partisans (N = 140). Participants perceived greater effects on the out-group and on the general public then on themselves for ads from the out-group candidate. A third-person effect was also observed for ads from the in-group candidate in self-in-group and self-public comparisons. The only first-person effect was found for the self-out-group comparison of responses to the in-group candidate ads. Self-candidate political distance, an analogue of message desirability, was negatively related to perceived effects on self and target groups, whereas self-group and group-candidate distance measures showed only sporadic relationships to perceived effects.

Intro -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1. The Public Agenda in the Information Age -- 2. A History of the Public Agenda, 1975-2014 -- 3. The Character of the Public Agenda, 1975-2014 -- 4. Broadcast News and the Public Agenda, 1968-2010 -- 5. Media Choice, News Agendas, and the Public Agenda -- 6. Building Consensus on Public Priorities: Can the Public Agenda Be Focused? -- 7. Political Responsiveness and the Public Agenda -- 8. What Happened to Us? -- Appendix A: Coding the "Most Important Problem" Question -- Appendix B: Computing Diversity and Volatility in the Public Agenda -- Appendix C: Measuring Agenda-Setting and Alternate Time Series Models -- Appendix D: Collecting Data on the Media System and Using Ridge Regression -- Appendix E: Analyzing the Pew Excellence in Journalism News Coverage Index -- Appendix F: Coding Major Presidential Addresses -- Appendix G: Public Agenda and House Hearings Data of the Policy Agendas Project -- References -- Index.

AbstractObjectiveThe study set out to examine how diversity and volatility in the public's issue agenda are related to trust in government and congressional approval.MethodData from 1975 through 2014 for public agenda issue concerns, agenda diversity, agenda volatility, congressional polarization, trust in government, and congressional approval were transformed into a quarterly time series and analyzed with ridge regression.ResultsA more diverse public agenda is associated with less trust in government. When agenda volatility is higher, congressional approval is higher, perhaps because the government is perceived as dealing effectively with public problems —or perhaps because the public is distracted. Diversity and volatility interact: When many evenly matched issues are on a public agenda that is turning over quickly, congressional approval is higher than when a similarly diverse agenda is stagnant.ConclusionThe American public's evaluations of government are affected not only by the issue content of the public agenda but also by the character of the public agenda.

Abstract
Generating public consensus on issue priorities is one of the most important functions of news agenda setting. However, the nature of that consensus is not well understood. Agenda setting might build a public consensus focused on a limited set of priorities, but it also has potential to build a consensus that broadens the public's issue agenda by generating shared concerns about problems beyond the bounds of personal experience. Evidence shows that from 1968–2010, broadcast news' agenda-setting effect tended to broaden the public agenda rather than focus it. This tendency of news agenda setting to broaden the public agenda is not affected by the news agenda's breadth or by which issues dominate the news, although issue-level agenda setting effects may, under some circumstances, focus the public agenda. If broadcast news does not focus the public agenda, it is unlikely a focused agenda will be generated by a more fragmented media ecology.

Selective news media exposure and political misperceptions have potentially troubling implications for democracy. In an online survey (N = 486) conducted in the context of the 2012 U.S. presidential election, we drew on a motivated reasoning framework to examine how rational and experiential engagement and need for closure were related to selective exposure and misperceptions. Because previous research has focused on conservative media and misperceptions that serve Republican causes, we also looked at how conservative and liberal media exposure were related to Republican‐ and Democratic‐serving misperceptions among the overall sample as well as respondents of each party. Rational engagement had positive relationships with media use and (surprisingly) selective exposure among Democrats. It also was negatively related with Republican‐serving misperceptions. Experiential engagement, on the other hand, had no relationships with media use but was positively related to Republican‐serving misperceptions. Need for closure was positively related to Republican‐serving misperceptions, but not after control variables were added. Finally, exposure to either kind of partisan media both discouraged misperceptions that served the opposing party and promoted misperceptions that served their own party, although the extent to which it did so appeared to vary depending on the partisanship of the media and of the audience. Implications of these findings for theory and policy are discussed.