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We analyze strategic communication and voting when agents do not necessarily have common beliefs and values. The potential for some pairs of participants to have opposed preferences makes truthful revelation difficult to support. Nonetheless, truthful equilibria are shown to exist for some parameterizations in which non-common values are likely. Truthful equilibria exist if and only if participants of all possible preference types are optimistic that a majority of the group has their preference type. In settings in which truthful equilibria exist for all population sizes, asymptotic efficiency attains. The probability that the collective choice corresponds to that which a majority would choose with full-information approaches one as population size tends to infinity. In many settings, however, truthful equilibria exist only for small groups. In these cases, we characterize a natural partially revealing equilibrium; asymptotic efficiency fails in these equilibria. Interestingly, we find that larger groups need not outperform smaller groups as truthful equilibria are easier to support with small deliberative bodies. Thus, the design of deliberative institutions involves a trade-off between the statistical benefit of more participants and the difficulty in supporting information transmission in larger settings. For many reasonable cases, the latter effect is dominant and excluding randomly chosen participants is desirable.

We analyze strategic communication and voting when agents do not necessarily have common beliefs and values. The potential for some pairs of participants to have opposed preferences makes truthful revelation difficult to support. Nonetheless, truthful equilibria are shown to exist for some parameterizations in which non-common values are likely. Truthful equilibria exist if and only if participants of all possible preference types are optimistic that a majority of the group has their preference type. In settings in which truthful equilibria exist for all population sizes, asymptotic efficiency attains. The probability that the collective choice corresponds to that which a majority would choose with full-information approaches one as population size tends to infinity. In many settings, however, truthful equilibria exist only for small groups. In these cases, we characterize a natural partially revealing equilibrium; asymptotic efficiency fails in these equilibria. Interestingly, we find that larger groups need not outperform smaller groups as truthful equilibria are easier to support with small deliberative bodies. Thus, the design of deliberative institutions involves a trade-off between the statistical benefit of more participants and the difficulty in supporting information transmission in larger settings. For many reasonable cases, the latter effect is dominant and excluding randomly chosen participants is desirable. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2007.]

I consider the design of policy-making institutions to aggregate preferences & information. A pervasive incentive problem hinders the creation of desirable deliberative institutions; participants that expect to have minority interests have an incentive to misrepresent their information. Moreover, contrary to conventional wisdom, diversity of preferences or information sources amplifies this incentive problem. It is only when all types of participants expect to have the majority interests or no individual's private information can be decisive that full aggregation is possible. The addition of external incentives enables efficient aggregation of preferences & information. The external incentives need only depend on agent actions &, interestingly, the magnitude of these external incentives can be vanishingly small for large groups. These external incentives can be created by augmenting deliberation with concerns about ex-poste monitoring or ex-interum perceptions of competence, the opportunity to trade in information markets, or the opportunity to join clubs with network externalities. Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

While scholars have thoroughly explored the logic of two candidate electoral competition, much less has been accomplished in gaining an understanding of the role of party primaries. This paper presents an incomplete information model of primary & general elections & argues that party primaries do more than select party candidates. Party primaries serve an informational function. In an environment where candidates are uncertain about the preferences of voters, selection of desirable policy platforms is a risky, if not difficult, undertaking. Primary elections offer voters an early opportunity to signal their preferences to candidates. Before primary elections, the candidates, aware that information about voter preferences is forthcoming, have an incentive to remain ambiguous about their policy platforms. Early commitment makes them vulnerable to better informed candidates that they might face in the general election. The fully revealing equilibrium of the game yields a joint explanation of the role of party primaries & candidate ambiguity. Primaries aggregate information about voter preferences & candidate ambiguity has an option value. 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 45 References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2005.]

While scholars have thoroughly explored the logic of two candidate electoral competition, much less has been accomplished in gaining an understanding of the role of party primaries. This paper presents an incomplete information model of primary and general elections and argues that party primaries do more than select party candidates. Party primaries serve an informational function. In an environment where candidates are uncertain about the preferences of voters, selection of desirable policy platforms is a risky, if not difficult, undertaking. Primary elections offer voters an early opportunity to signal their preferences to candidates. Before primary elections, the candidates, aware that information about voter preferences is forthcoming, have an incentive to remain ambiguous about their policy platforms. Early commitment makes them vulnerable to better informed candidates that they might face in the general election. The fully revealing equilibrium of the game yields a joint explanation of the role of party primaries and candidate ambiguity. Primaries aggregate information about voter preferences and candidate ambiguity has an option value.

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, a crucial question is whether popular protest is now likely to be a permanent part of Middle Eastern politics or if the protests that have taken place over the past two years are more likely to be a "one‐shot deal." We consider this question from a theoretical perspective, focusing on the relationship between the consequences of protests in one period and the incentives to protest in the future. The model provides numerous predictions for why we might observe a phenomenon that we call the "one‐shot deal": when protest occurs at one time but not in the future despite an intervening period of bad governance. The analysis focuses on the learning process of citizens. We suggest that citizens may not only be discovering the type or quality of their new government—as most previous models of adverse selection assume—but rather citizens may also be learning about the universe of potential governments in their country. In this way, bad performance by one government induces some pessimism about possible replacements. This modeling approach expands the formal literature on adverse selection in elections in two ways: it takes seriously the fact that removing governments can be costly, and it explores the relevance of allowing the citizen/principal to face uncertainty about the underlying distribution from which possible government/agent types are drawn.