Suchergebnisse

Just war theory -- Comrades in arms - the equal innocence of solders -- In defense of the defenseless - the morality of the laws of war -- Fighting for independence - what can just war theory -- Just war theory in practice -- Proportionality and risk -- Economic warfare - the case of Gaza -- Preemptive strikes - Israel and Iran -- Assassination: targeting nuclear scientists -- Conclusions.

"This book offers a renewed defense of traditional just war theory and considers its application to certain contemporary cases, particularly in the Middle East. The first part of the book addresses and responds to the central theoretical criticisms levelled at traditional just war theory. It offers a detailed defense of civilian immunity, the moral equality of soldiers and the related dichotomy between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and argues that these principles taken together amount to a morally coherent ethics of war. In this sense this project is traditional (or "orthodox"). In another sense, however, it is highly relevant to the modern world. While the first part of the book defends the just war tradition against its revisionist critics, the second part applies it to an array of timely issues: civil war, economic warfare, excessive harm to civilians, pre-emptive military strikes, and state-sponsored assassination, which require applying just war theory in practice. This book sets out to reaffirm the basic tenets of the traditional ethics of war and to lend them further moral support, subsequently applying them to a variety of practical issues. This book will be of great interest to students of just war theory, ethics, security studies, war and conflict studies, and IR in general."--Provided by publisher.

The question of how to contend with terrorism in keeping with our preexisting moral and legal commitments now challenges Europe as well as Israel and the United States: how do we apply Just War Theory and International Law to asymmetrical warfare, specifically to our counter terrorism measures? What can the classic moral argument in Just and Unjust Wars teach us about contemporary targeted killings with drones? I begin with a defense of targeted killing, arguing for the advantages of pin pointed attacks over any alternative measure available for combatting terrorism. Assuming the legitimacy of killing combatants in wartime, I argue, there is nothing wrong, and in fact much that is right, with targeting particular terrorists selected by name, as long as their assassinations can be reasonably expected to reduce terrorist hostilities rather than increase it. Subsequently, I offer some further thoughts and comments on the use of remotely piloted aircrafts to carry out targeted killings, and address the various sources for discomfort with this practice identified by Michael Walzer and others. ; Pitanje kako se boriti s terorizmom u skladu s našim postojećim moralnim i zakonskim obvezama sada izaziva Europu, kao i Izrael i Sjedinjene Američke Države: kako primeniti teoriju pravednog rata i međunarodno pravo na asimetrični rat, posebno na naše protivterorističke mere? Šta nas može klasični moralni argument u pravednim i nepravednim ratovima naučiti o savremenim ciljanim ubistvima dronovima? Počinjem odbranom ciljanog ubijanja, raspravljajući o prednostima napada sa tačno određenim ciljem nad bilo kojom alternativnom merom koja je na raspolaganju za borbu protiv terorizma. Pretpostavljajući legitimnost ubijanja boraca u periodima rata, tvrdim da nema ničega lošeg, i zapravo da ima mnogo toga što je dobro, s ciljanjem određenih terorista odabranih po imenu, sve dok se može razumno očekivati da će se njihovim ubistvom smanjiti teroristička neprijateljstva, a ne povećati. Nakon toga, nudim neka dalja razmišljanja i ...

The question of how to contend with terrorism in keeping with our preexisting
moral and legal commitments now challenges Europe as well as Israel and the
United States: how do we apply Just War Theory and International Law to
asymmetrical warfare, specifically to our counter terrorism measures? What
can the classic moral argument in Just and Unjust Wars teach us about
contemporary targeted killings with drones? I begin with a defense of
targeted killing, arguing for the advantages of pin pointed attacks over any
alternative measure available for combatting terrorism. Assuming the
legitimacy of killing combatants in wartime, I argue, there is nothing wrong,
and in fact much that is right, with targeting particular terrorists selected
by name, as long as their assassinations can be reasonably expected to reduce
terrorist hostilities rather than increase it. Subsequently, I offer some
further thoughts and comments on the use of remotely piloted aircrafts to
carry out targeted killings, and address the various sources for discomfort
with this practice identified by Michael Walzer and others.

This article takes issue with Jeff McMahan's well-known argument according to which, morally speaking, some civilians and POWs may be liable to wartime attack, and that in this respect the laws of armed conflict prohibiting such attacks diverge significantly from the deep morality of war. I reject McMahan's suggestion that at the deepest moral level it is sometimes justified to violate these legal protections of non-combatants and prisoners. I argue instead that the rules of war – moral as well as legal – are grounded in an age-old commitment to protect the defenseless and vulnerable, and can go only so deep without rendering them totally inapplicable to belligerent action. Consequently, I argue that there is little divergence between the laws of war and its deep morality. Ultimately, I suggest, this moral commitment to the defenseless supplies us with a significant point of convergence both between the law and morality of war, and between ad bellum and in bello considerations.

AbstractThis essay considers, and rejects, the proposal that territorial disputes among nations should be settled on the basis of principles of equal distribution. Primarily, it argues that egalitarian principles are applicable only within multilateral relationships and, as far as territory is concerned, only with regard to decisions that involve the relationship between all nations of the world and the entire Earth's surface. In contrast, territorial disputes are bilateral by nature, and concern only a small portion of the globe. As for 'territorial justice' on a global scale, the second half of this article questions egalitarian proposals for global justice that deal directly with the distribution of land. Specifically, it rejects the egalitarian contention, advanced most explicitly by Hillel Steiner, that nations' territorial holdings can be appraised objectively in terms of real‐estate value to the exclusion of any national considerations, and divided equally among the world's inhabitants.

As terrorism increasingly penetrates Western democracies, liberals and libertarians are obliged to ask themselves whether contending with it justifies restricting civil liberty and, if so, to what extent. Neither personal security nor individual liberty is ever fully realised – both are a matter of degree – and they are often perceived as being at odds with each other. Hence it has been suggested that we reconsider the existing trade-off between them, or reassess their 'rate of exchange'. While such questions are sometimes raised by left-leaning liberals, they are in fact particularly acute for liberals on the right, or libertarians, who would normally resist any increase in government intervention. Right-wingers who advocate 'hands off' policies on all other occasions now call for an increase in government intervention as regards security measures. Many left-liberals, on the other hand, are reluctant to concede any further power to the state in order to combat terrorism.