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Including original cross-national data and in-depth case analyses of corporate actions and outcomes in Colombia, Northern Ireland, and Tunisia, 'The Building and Breaking of Peace' shows that corporations help to prevent violence but not resolve it. In examining the corporate motives for peacebuilding and the implications of these activities for preventing violence and conflict resolution, Molly M. Melin builds a more holistic picture of the peace and conflict process.

Efforts to resolve interstate disputes are often characterized by repeated engagement and evolving strategies. What explains a state's decision to continue conflict resolution efforts but escalate their management strategy? Drawing from foreign policy literature, I argue that third parties escalate policies in response to past failures, shifting conflict dynamics and their relationship with the disputants. Analysis of management efforts from 1946 to 2001 reveals that the changing nature of the conflict, policy failures and relationships between the third party and disputants are integral to understanding the management decision process, but the effects of these factors depend on the management history. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd.]

Efforts to resolve interstate disputes are often characterized by repeated engagement and evolving strategies. What explains a state's decision to continue conflict resolution efforts but escalate their management strategy? Drawing from foreign policy literature, I argue that third parties escalate policies in response to past failures, shifting conflict dynamics and their relationship with the disputants. Analysis of management efforts from 1946 to 2001 reveals that the changing nature of the conflict, policy failures and relationships between the third party and disputants are integral to understanding the management decision process, but the effects of these factors depend on the management history.

Why do some militarized interstate disputes involve multiple third party attempts to resolve the dispute, while others seemingly end before movement towards peace is possible? This article examines third party commitment to international conflict resolution. I argue that a third party's commitment reflects strategic interests, barriers to entry and the conflict's prospects for peace, which encourage third party involvement while having a dampening effect on their commitment. I also explore the role of bias in management onset and third party commitment. Analysis of conflict management in militarized interstate disputes from 1946 to 2001 offers significant support for the hypotheses. Adapted from the source document.

Why do some militarized interstate disputes involve multiple third party attempts to resolve the dispute, while others seemingly end before movement towards peace is possible? This paper examines third party commitment to international conflict resolution. I argue that a third party's commitment reflects strategic interests, barriers to entry and the conflict's prospects for peace, which encourage third party involvement while having a dampening effect on their commitment. I also explore the role of bias in management onset and third party commitment. Analysis of conflict management in militarized interstate disputes from 1946 to 2001 offers significant support for the hypotheses.

What explains UN member-state personnel withdrawals from peacekeeping operations? Withdrawals can occur at the behest of contributor states, as contributions are voluntary. We argue that withdrawal is motivated by violence in the peacekeeping operation host state. Research shows that well-resourced missions improve the prospects of success. Personnel withdrawals are dangerous, as they are more likely when continued deployments are needed. We thus need to understand why some states resist withdrawing in the face of instability. We argue that democracies are more stalwart than their counterparts given their constituency interests, the democratic benefits of peacekeeping and the political cover offered to democratic policymakers.

Recent research emphasizes the effectiveness of biased third parties and their use of leverage in resolving conflicts. However, scholars fail to explore systematically the conditions under which conflict management strategies straddle the confines between mediatory techniques and approaches more commonly associated with joining behavior. This article examines the threshold between neutral conflict management and overt joining by offering a model of third-party intervention based on the notion of international social proximity and situated within the familiar opportunity–willingness framework. Our arguments are tested with a novel combination of data on biased joining from Corbetta and Dixon and data on neutral mediatory efforts from Frazier and Dixon. Our findings reveal that the application of biased leverage and mediation is rare but salient, and asymmetrical ties between third parties and combatants explain their occurrence.