Suchergebnisse

In this work we will discuss about a project started by the Emilia-Romagna Regional Government regarding the manage of the public transport. In particular we will perform a data mining analysis on the data-set of this project. After introducing the Weka software used to make our analysis, we will discover the most useful data mining techniques and algorithms; and we will show how these results can be used to violate the privacy of the same public transport operators. At the end, despite is off topic of this work, we will spend also a few words about how it's possible to prevent this kind of attack.

The paper discusses to what extent Parmalat's failure can be considered a particularly Italian case. The main characteristics of Parmalat's corporate governance structure are compared and contrasted with those prevailing among Italian listed companies as well as with the highest corporate governance standards in Italy. Empirical evidence seems to confirm the lack of a monitoring structure in making corporate insiders accountable in the presence of a corporate governance system characterised by a controlling shareholder. The role of the ownership and control structure (with special regard to the controlling shareholder's role) and of the board of statutory auditors have Italian traits and might suggest that the Parmalat case is a particularly Italian scandal. However, Italian corporate governance standards were not completely at fault in the Parmalat case. Parmalat's corporate governance structure failed to comply with some of the key existing Italian corporate governance standards of best practice, such as the presence of independent directors and the composition of the internal control committee. Besides, the role of the external auditor as well as the internal control committee as non‐effective monitors seem to put Parmalat into the global argument case, not very different, mutatis mutandis, from other corporate scandals.

This paper discusses the role of the board of statutory auditors as a monitoring device within the prevailing Italian corporate governance system, characterised by the presence of a strong blockholder. We describe the structure and functioning of the board of statutory auditors in the listed companies in terms of size, composition, method of appointment, powers, and duties after the changes due to the Draghi reform and the Preda Code of conduct.

This paper has analysed the Italian prevailing corporate governance system in terms of issues such as ownership and control structures, structure and functioning of the boards, executive remuneration and evaluation, the mission of the companies, the role of banks and market for corporate control. The issues determined by the presence of the blockholder have been analysed as well as the changes that derive from the Draghi reform. The Italian system of corporate governance seems to be effectively summarised by the expression 'weak managers, strong blockholders and unprotected minority shareholders', paraphrasing Roe's (1994) sentence.

AbstractResearch Question/IssueThis study investigates how and to what extent country‐level institutional characteristics and firm‐ and independent director‐level risk and responsibilities are related to independent director compensation, in terms of amount and design.Research Findings/InsightsUsing an international sample of 5,220 independent directors on 727 non‐financial listed firms in 16 countries, this study revealed that both country‐level institutional characteristics and firm‐ and director‐level agency account for the variation of independent director compensation amount. Firm‐level ESG‐related reputational risk and director‐level observable responsibilities on the board are strongly related to independent director compensation amount. These agency relationships vary in the different institutional settings. Country‐level director liability substitutes for firm‐level and director‐level monitoring. Firms conform to institutional pressures for independent director compensation design. Institutional embeddedness comes from the firm's primary institutional environment and its exposure to foreign financial markets.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThis study develops a multilevel theory of the antecedents of independent director compensation. Firm‐ and director‐level agency issues are nested in, and interact with, the institutional context in which the agency relationship between shareholders and independent directors is embedded.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThis study helps practitioners to understand how director liability regulations, a firm's ESG‐related reputational risk and the specific responsibilities on the board are related to independent director compensation. It helps firms explain to shareholders (and stakeholders) how independent director compensation is determined. Firms should consider that the consequences of their ESG practices extend beyond direct costs. Policymakers can find our results useful when regulating on director liability and developing best practices.

This article investigates whether and how the demand for information at country and firm levels affects the selective use of key performance indicators graphs in corporate annual reports. Our study finds that the country-level and firm-level demands for information provide an incentive, rather than a curb, for a selective display of key performance indicators, which is an important concern in corporate communication and reporting. The external pressure from the demand for information seems to encourage, rather than discourage, impression management. We suggest that annual report readers should use graphical information with caution as companies are likely to provide a self-serving, nonneutral, account of their performance in those contexts where the pressure to perform is higher.

AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssueThis study examines whether and to what extent the compensation of independent monitors at the board level is the outcome of an optimal contract between independent parties or the result of involvement with corporate insiders.Research Findings/InsightsBy using a hierarchical linear regression model with a sample of 559 statutory auditors, whose main task is to monitor the acts and the decision‐making process of the board of directors, this study provides evidence that statutory auditors' compensation is mainly based upon the effort and responsibilities that are observable by shareholders. However, our findings highlight that the additional, poorly disclosed, compensation that a statutory auditor may receive, unrelated to his/her role, is associated with his/her involvement with corporate insiders.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsBy analyzing a de facto three‐tier hierarchical agency model, this study gives insights into how and to what extent the optimal contracting and managerial power perspectives provide complementary, rather than competing, explanations to the basis and design of compensation at the board level. Not only do these perspectives of agency theory co‐exist at an aggregate level, but also seem to be complementary at both the firm level and individual level.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThis study offers insights to policymakers by questioning the current regulation that allows threats to the de facto independence of a formally independent corporate governance mechanism. We recommend further disclosure about the criteria and the rationales of the additional compensation received by statutory auditors. In addition, we suggest investors and other stakeholders, who may rely on the work of the board of statutory auditors as independent monitor, to be careful about the way statutory auditors are paid.

This study examines how and why the board of statutory auditors, an important accounting institution, has continued to operate from its establishment in 1882 until today, with little change in its nature and role. This is despite the fundamental changes that have occurred in the Italian social, economic and political environment. This study reveals that even though Italy's societal institutions have substantially changed, the board of statutory auditors has continued to exist with no real change in its essence. This long-lived accounting institution has continued to operate, with no material change in its nature, across different historical blocs, such as monarchy, fascism, post-war socio-democratic republic, neoliberal republic, and major changes in Italian politics and economy. This accounting institution has also faced a series of potentially significant sources of change, which appeared dramatic at first sight, but had no significant far-reaching historical impact, as hegemony was unaffected. In Italian society, the board of statutory auditors has provided a reassurance role, in principle this is to monitor company directors, a role which is perceived to benefit all society. However, in practice, this institution has provided a legitimating, rather than a substantive monitoring mechanism. It helped to exercise a hegemonic control for the ruling class, whose power was diffused across society through civil institutions during various historical blocs.

This study investigates two potentially complementary reporting scenarios in annual reports: reactive impression management and retrospective sense-making. It examines stock market performance graphs in European listed banks' annual reports before and during the global financial crisis. Our results indicate that banks reacted to the global financial crisis by omitting stock market performance graphs from the annual report and from its most prominent sections. On the other hand, banks reduced favorable distortions and favorable performance comparisons. No significant evidence of retrospective sense-making is found. Overall, the findings are consistent with impression management incorporating human cognitive biases, with companies preferring misrepresentation by omission over misrepresentation by commission. Under high public scrutiny, banks appear to seek to provide a more favorable view by concealing negative information rather than by favorable distortions or comparisons. The study contributes to the development of impression management theories. It uses a psychological interpretation that incorporates human cognitive biases, rather than adopting a purely economically based perspective.