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This article discusses current explanations of issues of institutional change and innovation in the global environment, with specific reference to the diffusion of pension-policy paradigms. It argues against explanations which stress unilaterally the role of external actors and shows the limitations of approaches based on diffusion models in which the actor's choice space is not examined. It argues that domestic factors are crucial in determining the outcomes of policy-diffusion processes. Although current policy ideas and models are important, the extent to which they are influential and shape concrete policy choices are primarily determined by domestic political institutions and pathdependent domestic factors. Ideas and policy paradigms provide a possibility set for an institutionally and path-dependent constrained choice. Drawing on a case study of the diffusion of the reform model advocated by the World Bank, the article argues that Brazil's non-reform can be best explained by path dependency and by the "politics of loss imposition" that characterizes pension reform. Brazilian reformers copied a model from an existing policy template, but this emulative behavior can be best viewed as an instance of a path-dependent, constrained, institutional choice, rather than a mimetic behavior associated with a cultural, linguistic, or regional pattern as suggested by strands of the diffusion literature.

The common wisdom is that when presidential political systems coincide with multiparty systems the result is gridlock; parties squabble and presidents are not able to stitch together the majorities they need to move forward with the business of governing. Latin America's presidential systems were supposed to have been a disaster. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, presidentialism and multipartism seem to work rather well. E pur se muove , to quote Galileo. Over the last decade or so, multiparty presidentialism has become the modal form of presidential democracy, especially in Latin America. Once thought to be a precursor of democratic breakdowns, no compelling explanations have emerged to account for its success in countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. The surprising sustainability of coalition-based presidentialism demands an explanation, yet political scientists are ill-equipped to answer this puzzle.

AbstractOver the last decade scholars of urban governance and deliberative democracy have produced large literatures. Theorists of deliberative democracy have conceptualized the normative implications of 'deliberation' and explored real‐world decision‐making arrangements that approximate those ideals. Scholars of urban governance have theorized and explored the outcomes of different institutional arrangements for the governance of cities and regions. Whereas empirical democratic theory has increasingly been interested in local contexts, researchers of urban governance have been progressively more concerned about the implications of emerging patterns of urban governance for democratic accountability. However, despite the recent mutual interest among researchers in both fields, debates within these literatures frequently ignore each other and are not systematic. This introductory article reviews recent contributions that have fruitfully investigated the tension between deliberation and governance in a more systematic fashion, and concludes that our understanding of those issues is significantly improved by a research agenda that pursues an integrated approach.

A politica de habitacao popular recente, a despeito de algumas inovacoes importantes, introduzidas ao longo dos anos - em particular durante a Nova Republica - mantem, quanto ao formato organizacional e ao padrao de financiamento, um forte apego ao modelo implantado pelo regime burocratico-autoritario em 1964

This paper investigates the determinants of compliance with fiscal rules. Using information from 27 Brazilian state governments, the paper shows that the level of political competition and the degree of political autonomy of the fiscal watchdogs explain the extent of creative accounting in the Brazilian federation. Despite hard budget constraints imposed by the much-acclaimed Fiscal Responsibility Law, state governors retain the strategic ability to undertake fiscal window dressing in response to fiscal stress. As fiscal watchdogs are not immune to the influence of the legislature and state governor, however, this paper demonstrates that their level of independence and autonomy is associated with the degree of creative accounting. In addition, we show that political competition encourages non-compliance through various causal mechanisms. Building effective and autonomous institutions is a precondition for deterring fiscal misconduct but this solution is ultimately a by-product of a political equilibrium resulting from self-enforced behavior of politicians.