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This article expands on David Garland's proposal that punitive practices are influenced by logics of (in)sensitivity, shaping how punishment is conceived and applied. It argues that (in)sensitivity is not a mere peripheral aspect of punishment but a central element thereof. Drawing from this premise, the article elucidates the most prominent features of Garland's proposition, highlighting the conceptual framework it builds upon. Based on this foundation, the discussion branches into two closely related directions. Firstly, it analytically explores Garland's contribution, explicating the depth underlying notions of meaning and sensitivity; a development that will underscore the significance of corporeality in fully understanding the imposition of punishment. Secondly, this analysis will be projected onto the context of the current discursive hegemony of security and, more specifically, in the specific manner it manifests in the regulation of migrant mobility. The undeniable preeminence of securitized borders will thus become the fundamental space of analysis to project Garland's proposal regarding an underlying (in)sensitivity permeating the imposition of punishment. Within this context, it asserts that migrant bodies crossing the border endure punishment, yet their suffering lacks empathy within the security discourse.

RESUMEN La definición de la tortura dista mucho de ser una cuestión sencilla a través de la cual se podría delimitar con nitidez por la diferencia de esta práctica punitiva con respecto a otro tipo de castigos. Los límites de la tortura pueden ser ciertamente esquivos en su ejercicio por acometer una desestructuración radical de lo humano. Para abordar esta cuestión, este artículo se adentra en este terreno de la caracterización de la tortura a través de un doble plano. Por una parte, se realizará una lectura crítica de la definición más empleada y que está contenida en el texto de la Convención contra la tortura y otros tratos o penas crueles, inhumanos o degradantes promovida por las Naciones Unidas. Por otro lado, se articulará una propuesta de definición construida a partir de tres dimensiones interconectadas que remiten a la captura (ligada de un modo directo o indirecto al entramado público-estatal), a lo inhabitable (referida a la producción de un cuerpo doliente sin protección) y a la otredad (concernida con las subjetividades no reconocidas sobre las que se proyecta).

The aim of this paper is to propose a conceptualization of social movements that is not limited to the set of theories developed in the academic scope of new social movements; on the contrary, a different theoretical scenery will be suggested in order to throw a new analytic gaze on the social practices reproduced by the, so called, new social movements. This gaze will be built on three distinct but interrelated premises. Firstly, it will be stressed the paradoxical dimension of identitarian practices and, consequently, the impossibility to define a social reality according to a single dimension. Secondly, paradoxical dimension will be taken to the scope of social movements in order to propose a definition of social movements that takes into account a constitutive paradox where a proxemic sociality and actor-network theory are put in relation. Lastly, the unfolding of such paradox is analyzed looking at its ironic style.