Suchergebnisse

The economic relation between market structure, government preferences, & the incidence of corruption is analyzed, drawing on Rose-Ackerman's (1975, 1978) microeconomic model of corruption. In this model, three types of agents are posited: the (honest) policymaker, the lower-level bureaucrat whose purchasing decisions may include bribes, & firms offering the government goods or services. The likelihood of corruption is assessed in the cases of corruption where the government has well-defined/unclear preferences, the goods are homogeneous/differentiated, & private markets for the goods exist. The policy implications of this model for encouraging/discouraging corruption & the usefulness of penalties are discussed. Efficient firms & nonstandard goods lead to a higher incidence of corruption; political influence may also play a role. 4 Figures, 1 Appendix. M. Pflum

We undertake an analysis of regulatory consistency using a database of publicly available regulatory decisions in Australia. We propose a simple exploratory model which allows us to test for regulatory consistency across jurisdictions and industries without detailed knowledge of the regulatory process. We compare two measures using our approach—the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and the proportion of firms' revenue requirement claims disallowed by the regulator. Our comparison suggests that the WACC is a very poor measure of regulatory consistency. Moreover, our empirical results may be interpreted as indicating that a range of measures ought to be considered when assessing regulatory consistency. Our results also provide an empirical foundation for theoretical modeling of regulatory processes. (JEL L51)

ABSTRACTThis paper investigates how price regulation under moral hazard can affect a regulated firm's cost of capital. We consider stylized versions of the two most typical regulatory frameworks that have been applied in the most recent decades by regulators: Price Cap and Cost of Service. We show that there is a trade‐off between lower operational costs and a higher cost of capital under Price Cap regulation and higher operational costs and a lower cost of capital under Cost of Service regulation. As a result, when the extent of moral hazard is not significant, Price Cap regulation generates lower welfare than does Cost of Service regulation.

ABSTRACT**:  This paper examines a two‐period model of an investment decision in a network industry characterized by demand uncertainty, economies of scale and sunk costs. In the absence of regulation we identify the market conditions under which a monopolist decides to invest early as well as the underlying overall welfare output. In a regulated environment, we consider a monopolist who faces no downstream (final good) competition but is subject to retail price regulation. We identify the welfare‐maximizing regulated prices when the unregulated market outcome is set as the benchmark. We show that if the regulator can commit to ex post regulation – that is, regulated prices that are contingent to future demand realization – then regulated prices that allow the firm to recover its total costs of production are welfare‐maximizing. Thus, under ex post price regulation there is no need to compensate the regulated firm for the option to delay that it foregoes when investing today. We argue, however, that regulators cannot make this type of commitment and, therefore, price regulation is often ex ante – that is, regulated prices are not contingent to future demand. We show that the optimal ex ante regulation, and the extent to which regulated prices need to incorporate an option to delay, depend on the nature of demand uncertainty.

Abstract Australia's principal container ports, located in its state capitals, are owned and operated by state authorities that largely return profits from port operations to state governments. Since they govern the volumes of trade in most merchandise, they command immense influence over the openness and flexibility of the national economy. In this study, we estimate the elasticities of substitution between container services of ports in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne. We also examine the pricing of port services to estimate the extent of their interaction, from which we derive conjectural variations parameters to assess the actual and potential levels of price collusion. The results confirm the conventional wisdom that the degree of substitution between the major east coast ports is small. While this highlights the possibility that these ports possess substantial market power, actual mark ups are considerably smaller than the predicted mark ups, suggesting that the ports' localised monopoly power is constrained by factors other than price competition.