Suchergebnisse

This paper focuses on some major conceptual predicaments the issue of intergenerational re-sponsibility poses. The main point which it is raised is that a genuine thinking of a justice for fu-ture generations – besides all argumentative adjustments it imposes on mainstream theories – requires a true and proper ethico- and legal-anthropological revolution. In the last two sections of the paper such a radical break will be also analysized by addressing tenets coming from a phenomenology of transcendence and futurity pivoting around Levinas's scholarship.

Basándose en la distinción paradigmática entre una forma absoluta y una forma radical de la contingencia política, este trabajo trata de mostrar su importancia estructural, así como las preocupantes consecuencias de su olvido, especialmente en la búsqueda de un modelo que sea capaz de poner de relieve las transgresiones de los sistemas político-jurídicos en una perspectiva basada en la democracia. Una justificación de un modelo de este tipo es importante sobre todo en el marco de la política radical, que ha llamado la atención sobre el carácter decisivo del pluralismo y del conflicto como rasgos fundamentales para entender la democracia fundada en la apertura y en la posibilidad de transformación. Ajustándose a este supuesto básico, a través de un preciso análisis comparativo con la destacada teoría política de Chantal Mouffe, sostendré que una forma apropiada de contingencia democrática radical –así como de conflicto y de desafío– no puede entenderse en su concepción agonística de la política basada en la apropiación del modelo absolutista de antagonismo de Carl Schmitt, sino más bien en la configuración de una transgresión político-jurídica que mira más de cerca a formas alternativas que pueden expresar articulaciones extremadamente reforzadas de conflicto e impulsos transformativos sin tener que decaer en configuraciones exorbitantes. Como mostraré en la última parte del trabajo, un buen candidato a este fin puede encontrarse en la explicación de la transformación político-jurídica como una política de la a-juridicidad de Hans Lindahl. ; Holding onto a paradigmatic distinction between a radical and an absolute form of political contingency, this paper seeks to show its structural relevance and the unsettling consequences of its elision especially when searching for an adequate model for seizing the transgression of politico-legal orders in a democracy-based perspective. An account of such a model becomes especially important in the area of radical politics which has drawn attention to the crucial nature of pluralism and conflict as an essential feature for understanding democracy as based on openness and transformability. In line with this basic assumption, and by way of an analysis that deploys a thorough confrontation with Chantal Mouffe's influential political theory, I will argue that an apt form of radical democratic contingency, conflict and challenge cannot be found in her agonistic design of politics based on the appropriation of Carl Schmitt's absolutistic model of antagonism, but rather in a configuration of politico-legal transgression which looks much closer at alternative forms which can thoroughly express extremely enhanced articulations of conflict and transformative impulses without having to decay into exorbitant figurations. As I will show in the last section of the paper a good candidate for such a scope can be traced in Hans Lindahl's account of politicolegal transformation as a politics of a-legality.

In this paper I seek to respond to some of the critiques and remarks raised by the authors invited by the journal Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics to discuss my book on intergenerational justice Lo scandalo del futuro. Per una giustizia intergenerazionale (Roma, 2016). In engaging these critical reviews coming from the perspective of different fields – especially, legal philosophy, ethics and theoretical philosophy – I also attempt to readdress some pivotal points of the book which need be better formulated, deepened and revised.

Preliminary Material -- Vorwort -- Einleitung -- Die symbolische Dimension des Ursprungs -- Vom symbolischen zum politischen Moment -- Ausdruck, Demokratie, Repräsentation Das Politische "bei Heidegger" und "über Heidegger hinaus" -- Zur Antipolitizität Heideggers -- Abkürzungsverzeichnis -- Literatur -- Namensregister.

More than trying to make explicit an ethical discourse that – for whichever reason – would have remained only implicit in Heidegger's philosophy, the aim of this article is to trace, in Heidegger's work, the eventual presence of the structural premises for such a discourse. Premises which, in our perspective, can be brought back to the following two elements: first of all, to the character of contingency of experience and absence of ontological foundation, which only makes ethics a genuine discourse of responsibility and not a simple application of pre-given rules; and, second (given such lack of ontological foundation), to the unavoidable political institution of this same discourse. Now, the pivotal point of this article is that such premises, in Heidegger's work, far from being traceable in Being and Time or in his later works, are to be rather found in his previous texts, and precisely in his early Freiburg lectures (from 1919 to 1923), in which his thought appears to be still not so much seduced by an ontological drive.

In this article I intend to trace and discuss a contradiction, which – I believe – lies in Arendt's thought: the one between her concept of plurality and her concept of power. In a more specific way, I will argue that Arendt, by admitting only an intransitive understanding of power, betrays her vision of plurality, as this one cannot exclude a transitive conception of power. Furthermore, I will try to detect how this same contradiction reflects itself in another topical place of Arendt's thought, i.e. her critical opposition to political representation. Here the direction of my arguing can be expressed by a simple question: isn't maybe representation a much more adequate way to correspond plurality than Arendt's tendency to acclaim an aggregative and quasi-organic collective participation?

Every order lies on the claim or pretension to give itself as an accomplished realm, i.e. as a closed scene which is capable to give shape, orientation and sense to the totality of elements embraced by it. Yet, from the same operation of ordering, a paradox soon arises, in that no order can avoid its contingent genealogy, that means: it cannot avoid the fact that, in enclosing and including something, it must simultaneously exclude something else, which, therefore, can always challenge and threaten its stability or total "delimitation". In this sense, that which is excluded can be seen as an alien element, which structurally prevents order from a definite closure and thus keeps it in a permanent (historical and nondialectisable) movement. Now, what I would like to convey in my following reflections is that this dynamics of impossible closure of order, given to a non-appropriable alienness, is exactly the one operative in the realms of translation and tragedy, so that, once we carefully investigate these realms, we may dare to affirm that saying that orders are unclosed scenes is as much true as to say that they are constantly "in translation", always "in tragedy".