Suchergebnisse

Hydrogen is often seen as a promising future energy carrier given the major reliance of today's transport sector on finite fossil fuels. This working paper assesses the macroeconomic effects of introducing hydrogen as fuel in passenger transport within the framework of the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model PACE-T(H2). Our simulation results suggest small improvements in the macroeconomic performance in almost all European countries from the introduction of hydrogen. The magnitude of economic effects however depends on the assumed learning curve of hydrogen cars and on the future development of hydrogen infrastructure costs. The results presented in this paper build on data and projections developed in the EU funded "HyWays" project.

Auch in Deutschland kam es in den letzten Jahren vermehrt zu Hochwasserereignissen mit erheblichen ökonomischen Schäden. Die privaten Haushalte sind auf derartige Katastrophen oft schlecht vorbereitet, da ihnen gar nicht bekannt ist, dass ihre Wohngebäude- oder Hausratversicherung in solchen Fällen nicht greift. Meist tritt der Staat dann ad hoc ein, ohne vorab klare Ansprüche zu definieren. Medienwirksamkeit, Haushaltslage und Wahltermine bestimmen dann willkürlich, wer eine Schadenregulierung bekommt und wie hoch diese ist. Die Autoren fordern daher eine verpflichtende Basisversicherung. ; The recent flood events in Germany have demonstrated that the nation's current system of private flood insurance is suboptimal. The article provides novel nationwide survey data on stated flood insurance penetration (suggesting that many households overestimate their own insurance coverage), damage compensation expectations (a significant share of the population expects governmental relief payments), and on the dissemination of private flood mitigation measures. Taking into account fundamental economic considerations and the empirical insights, the authors propose a limited compulsory insurance, covering only the most basic risks and leaving incentives for further private insurance and precaution.

The increase of the share of renewable energy in total energy production is a stated goal of environmental and industrial policy in many developed countries. Governments adopt regulation to support the investment into renewable energy infrastructure, in particular in power generation. Two main policy instruments emerge: renewable quotas and feedin-tariffs. Quota systems, such as the British ROCs, oblige an electricity producer to certify that a fixed share of his electricity is 'green', i.e. generated from renewable sources. Feed-in-tariffs, such as the German EEG tariffs, guarantee a certain, fixed price for 'green' electricity, depending on the technology. The decisive difference between the instruments is the allocation of price risk. The paper presents a real option framework to study the effect the instruments on investment and innovation of renewable energy plants. The modelled is calibrated on data for German Wind power plants. We find that the propensity to invest is higher under a quota system. So the presence of price risk spurs technological innovation.

Hinter der Forderung nach höherer Energieeffizienz stehen üblicherweise konkrete umwelt- und energiepolitische Ziele wie Klimaschutz, Versorgungssicherheit und Ressourcenschonung. Das vorliegende Papier analysiert diese Argumente und diskutiert mögliche Politikinstrumente zur Zielerreichung. Dabei zeigt sich, dass eine rationale Wirtschaftspolitik im Fall von energierelevantem Marktversagen und Problemen intergenerationaler Gerechtigkeit kosteneffiziente, spezifische Instrumente nutzen sollte. Hierzu zählen informatorische Maßnahmen, CO2-Zertifikate und spezifische Energiesteuern. Eine höhere Energieeffizienz ist Ergebnis einer solchen rationalen Politik und nicht Mittel zum Zweck. Pauschale Instrumente, die direkte Energiesparvorgaben machen, wie Weiße Zertifikate und Zwangsstandards sind dagegen nicht zu empfehlen.

This paper compares electricity market reforms in the European Union with reforms in Chile and Brazil. The paradigm of competitive market structures for the electricity sector, as developed in the economics literature, is outlined: competitive markets in generation and retailing and an independent regulator of the natural monopoly in transmission and generation. We present the institutional framework as well as the development of electricity markets in the European Union, Chile and Brazil and discuss in how far they comply with the textbook paradigm. Considerable differences emerge: While the European Union follows a path of full liberalization, facing, however, great difficulties in achieving unbundling of vertically integrated electricity companies and transnational competition, Chile and Brazil have only partially liberalized their electricity sector, enacting regulation to ensure household consumer protection and security of supply.

We estimate the impact of fiscal decentralization on different indicators of pollution for more than 80 countries from 1970 to 2000. Our cross country estimates show that fiscal decentralization increases pollution. However, higher quality of institutions can limit the destructive environmental effects of decentralization. The empirical results confirm a strand of the literature on decentralization that predicts a race to the bottom under federalism. The mitigating effect of good governance can be explained by relative preferences of local and central governments for environmental quality.

This paper compares electricity market reforms in the European Union with reforms in Chile and Brazil. The paradigm of competitive market structures for the electricity sector, as developed in the economics literature, is outlined: competitive markets in generation and retailing and an independent regulator of the natural monopoly in transmission and generation. We present the institutional framework as well as the development of electricity markets in the European Union, Chile and Brazil and discuss in how far they comply with the textbook paradigm. Considerable differences emerge: While the European Union follows a path of full liberalization, facing, however, great difficulties in achieving unbundling of vertically integrated electricity companies and transnational competition, Chile and Brazil have only partially liberalized their electricity sector, enacting regulation to ensure household consumer protection and security of supply.

This paper analyses the macroeconomic costs of environmental regulation in European energy markets on the basis of existing macroeconomic simulation studies. The analysis comprises the European emssion trading scheme, energy taxes, measures in the transport sector, and the promotion of renewable energy sources. We find that these instruments affect the European economy, in particular the energy intensive industries and the industries that produce internationally tradeable goods. From a macroeconomic point of view, however, the costs of environmental regulation appear to be modest. The underlying environmental targets and the efficient design of regulation are key determinants for the cost burden.

In the absence of an international agreement on climate policy, unilateral carbon abatement creates two problems: It tends to have a detrimental effect on domestic competitiveness, and it leads to an increase in carbon emissions abroad (leakage). This paper analyses two policies that have recently been proposed to mitigate these problems: Border tax adjustments (BTA) and integrated emission trading (IET). The former policy levies a quantity-based, the latter an emission based duty on imports from non-abating countries. In a stylised two-country model we demonstrate that the policies address both problems. However, BTA protects domestic competitiveness more effectively, while IET achieves a greater reduction in foreign emissions. A computational general equilibrium analysis of the unilateral abatement policy adopted by the European Union confirms our theoretical insights for the sectors covered by the offsetting measures. However, the implications for the competitiveness of noncovered sectors are negative. These two effects constitute the central trade-off in the implementation of both policies.

Given the scarcity of resources, an economic approach is necessary in order to determine an optimal strategy of adaptation to climate change. In this paper we develop an economic framework for the study of adaptation which allows distinguishing between decentralised adaptation by private agents, on the one hand, and centralised adaptation measures by the government, on the other hand. The paper is in two parts: in the first we present the neoclassical view of adaptation policy, which is based on the paradigm of market failure. In the second part we deal with challenges and complements of the neoclassical view arising from the introduction of equity principles, security of supply concerns, and a polycentric approach to the provision of public goods. The analysis is illustrated with examples of adaptation measures in Germany.