Les modèles théoriques construits sur les jeux peuvent apporter des éléments d'analyse sur les mécanismes spécifiques des guerres d'usure. Il reste très difficile d'en évaluer une durée probable, d'où la nécessité accrue du renseignement qui permet de réduire les incertitudes et d'en tirer une conduite pour mettre fin au conflit.
This article reassesses the links between the origins of the political economy and the Christian theology during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I focus on the Jansenism movement-the most powerful Christian protest current in the pre-Revolution period. I reveal that the influence of this movement on economic ideas can be roughly divided into three issues. During the pre-Unigenitus (1713) period (first jansenism), (i) the original vision of labor that contrasts with the Protestant's approach and the Catholic doctrine, and (ii) the idea that self-interest can produce a social optimum were major contributions of the jansenism on economic debates. During the post-Unigenitus period (second jansenism), (iii) the confrontation between two parties-the "liberal" vs the "resistant" jansenism currents-on the interest-bearing loans issue led to the development of new economic arguments for or against the credit, while making reference to the Holy Writings.
This article reassesses the links between the origins of the political economy and the Christian theology during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I focus on the Jansenism movement-the most powerful Christian protest current in the pre-Revolution period. I reveal that the influence of this movement on economic ideas can be roughly divided into three issues. During the pre-Unigenitus (1713) period (first jansenism), (i) the original vision of labor that contrasts with the Protestant's approach and the Catholic doctrine, and (ii) the idea that self-interest can produce a social optimum were major contributions of the jansenism on economic debates. During the post-Unigenitus period (second jansenism), (iii) the confrontation between two parties-the "liberal" vs the "resistant" jansenism currents-on the interest-bearing loans issue led to the development of new economic arguments for or against the credit, while making reference to the Holy Writings.
Abstract Few studies have focused specifically on the physiocratic analysis of money. The physiocrats' position was based on their criticism of Law's system and more broadly on the role of finance. First, they rejected the idea that a large amount of money was the condition for the wealth of nations. Second, they rejected paper money, as well as any form of currency alteration. As a simple means of exchange, Quesnay and his followers recognized that money could be replaced by paper. However, in order to comply with the "value for equal value" principle of exchange, money had to be made of precious metals, as Le Trosne, the main architect of the physiocratic monetary doctrine, forcefully asserted. This doctrine of money created a tension: from the circulation perspective, money was not considered as a component of wealth and could be replaced by paper to simply represent flows in expenditure; but from the equality-of-exchange perspective, money had to be made of precious metals, thus becoming a storable asset in a portfolio. To overcome this tension, the économistes were to forcefully denounce hoarding and deny money the function of a store of value.
Why do Politicians not solve social problems? One reason may be that such problems are very difficult to solve. Another one may be that Politicians have not the ability to solve difficult problems, i.e. they are "incompetent". But there is another reason: Politicians sometimes lack the incentive to solve problems because of inefficiencies generated by electoral process in representative democracies. It is the case when Politicians have the incentive "to keep their enemies alive", precisely because they are competent in solving the problem: once the problem removed, competent Politicians lose their electoral advantage. In this paper, we show that reputational strengths can, to some extent, circumvent Politicians' incentives not to address the problems. If the reputation of an incumbent Politician depends on the amount of reforms he implements, and positively affects his probability of being reelected, the trade-off between reputation and the "need for enemies" leads to an incomplete set of reforms, which can handle only a part of the problems. This mechanism might contribute to the explanation of the high degree of persistence of some social or economic diseases such as, specifically, public indebtedness. ; Pourquoi les politiciens ne résolvent-ils pas les problèmes sociaux? L'une des raisons pourrait être que ces problèmes sont très difficiles à résoudre. Une autre peut être que les politiciens n'ont pas la capacité de résoudre des problèmes difficiles, c'est-à-dire qu'ils sont « incompétents ». Mais il peut exister une troisième explication : les politiciens manquent parfois d'incitation à résoudre des problèmes en raison des inefficacités générées par le processus électoral dans les démocraties représentatives. Tel est le cas lorsque les politiciens ont une incitation pour « garder leurs ennemis en vie », précisément parce qu'ils sont compétents pour résoudre un problème : une fois le problème éliminé, des politiciens compétents perdent leur avantage électoral. Dans cet article, nous montrons que les forces réputationnelles peuvent, dans une certaine mesure, contourner l'incitation des politiciens à ne pas résoudre les problèmes. Si la réputation du politicien au pouvoir dépend de la quantité de réformes qu'il met en oeuvre, et affecte positivement sa probabilité d'être réélu, l'arbitrage entre la réputation et le « besoin d'ennemis » aboutit à un ensemble incomplet de réformes, permettant de résoudre seulement une partie des problèmes. Ce mécanisme pourrait contribuer à l'explication du haut degré de persistance de certains problèmes économiques ou sociaux, tels que, en l'occurrence, l'endettement public.
Why do Politicians not solve social problems? One reason may be that such problems are very difficult to solve. Another one may be that Politicians have not the ability to solve difficult problems, i.e. they are "incompetent". But there is another reason: Politicians sometimes lack the incentive to solve problems because of inefficiencies generated by electoral process in representative democracies. It is the case when Politicians have the incentive "to keep their enemies alive", precisely because they are competent in solving the problem: once the problem removed, competent Politicians lose their electoral advantage. In this paper, we show that reputational strengths can, to some extent, circumvent Politicians' incentives not to address the problems. If the reputation of an incumbent Politician depends on the amount of reforms he implements, and positively affects his probability of being reelected, the trade-off between reputation and the "need for enemies" leads to an incomplete set of reforms, which can handle only a part of the problems. This mechanism might contribute to the explanation of the high degree of persistence of some social or economic diseases such as, specifically, public indebtedness. ; Pourquoi les politiciens ne résolvent-ils pas les problèmes sociaux? L'une des raisons pourrait être que ces problèmes sont très difficiles à résoudre. Une autre peut être que les politiciens n'ont pas la capacité de résoudre des problèmes difficiles, c'est-à-dire qu'ils sont « incompétents ». Mais il peut exister une troisième explication : les politiciens manquent parfois d'incitation à résoudre des problèmes en raison des inefficacités générées par le processus électoral dans les démocraties représentatives. Tel est le cas lorsque les politiciens ont une incitation pour « garder leurs ennemis en vie », précisément parce qu'ils sont compétents pour résoudre un problème : une fois le problème éliminé, des politiciens compétents perdent leur avantage électoral. Dans cet article, nous montrons que les forces ...
Why do Politicians not solve social problems? One reason may be that such problems are very difficult to solve. Another one may be that Politicians have not the ability to solve difficult problems, i.e. they are "incompetent". But there is another reason: Politicians sometimes lack the incentive to solve problems because of inefficiencies generated by electoral process in representative democracies. It is the case when Politicians have the incentive "to keep their enemies alive", precisely because they are competent in solving the problem: once the problem removed, competent Politicians lose their electoral advantage. In this paper, we show that reputational strengths can, to some extent, circumvent Politicians' incentives not to address the problems. If the reputation of an incumbent Politician depends on the amount of reforms he implements, and positively affects his probability of being reelected, the trade-off between reputation and the "need for enemies" leads to an incomplete set of reforms, which can handle only a part of the problems. This mechanism might contribute to the explanation of the high degree of persistence of some social or economic diseases such as, specifically, public indebtedness. ; Pourquoi les politiciens ne résolvent-ils pas les problèmes sociaux? L'une des raisons pourrait être que ces problèmes sont très difficiles à résoudre. Une autre peut être que les politiciens n'ont pas la capacité de résoudre des problèmes difficiles, c'est-à-dire qu'ils sont « incompétents ». Mais il peut exister une troisième explication : les politiciens manquent parfois d'incitation à résoudre des problèmes en raison des inefficacités générées par le processus électoral dans les démocraties représentatives. Tel est le cas lorsque les politiciens ont une incitation pour « garder leurs ennemis en vie », précisément parce qu'ils sont compétents pour résoudre un problème : une fois le problème éliminé, des politiciens compétents perdent leur avantage électoral. Dans cet article, nous montrons que les forces ...
Dans cet article, nous proposons un modèle prototype de croissance endogène stochastique pour étudier les canaux de transmission à travers lesquels la dette publique peut affecter le sentier de croissance potentielle et détériorer la productivité globale des facteurs. Dans un contexte de croissance endogène, les chocs transitoires et la manière dont l'économie s'y adapte, exercent un effet permanent (hysteresis). Nous envisageons ici deux stratégies d'ajustement des finances publiques en réponse à une augmentation de la dette publique causée par un choc technologique néfaste : une stratégie gradualiste ou une thérapie de choc. Notre modèle fait apparaître un arbitrage intertemporel entre ces deux stratégies, la première étant plus favorable à court terme, et la seconde à long terme. De surcroît, l'effet des chocs technologiques est fortement amplifié par le mode d'ajustement de la dette publique, mécanisme que nous qualifions « d'accélérateur de dette publique ».
The vampire metaphor has been used in numerous papers describing biological interactions between two populations. Such a metaphor translates well to a standard endogenous growth model with public debt. Public debt can be assimilated to a Vamp, whose blood-sucking behavior corresponds to the harmful effect of the debt burden on productive public expenditures. However, the complete destruction of public debt in the long-run is shown to be socially undesirable, because this would imply too much distortionary taxation, with damaging effects on the balanced growth path. By identifying ecological or biological processes with usual national account relationships, this analysis is one step further in the integration of macroeconomics and environmental economics.
The vampire metaphor has been used in numerous papers describing biological interactions between two populations. Such a metaphor translates well to a standard endogenous growth model with public debt. Public debt can be assimilated to a Vamp, whose blood-sucking behavior corresponds to the harmful effect of the debt burden on productive public expenditures. However, the complete destruction of public debt in the long-run is shown to be socially undesirable, because this would imply too much distortionary taxation, with damaging effects on the balanced growth path. By identifying ecological or biological processes with usual national account relationships, this analysis is one step further in the integration of macroeconomics and environmental economics.
Why do Politicians not solve social problems? One reason may be that such problems are difficult to solve, or that Politicians are incompetent. But there is another reason: in representative democracies, competent Politicians sometimes lack the incentive to solve problems to keep their enemies alive, in order to conserve an electoral advantage. This paper shows that reputational strengths can, to some extent, circumvent Politicians incentives not to address the problems. If the reputation of an incumbent Politician depends on the amount of reforms he implements, and positively affects his probability of being reelected, the trade-off between reputation and the need for enemies leads to an incomplete set of reforms, which can handle only a part of the problems. This mechanism might contribute to the explanation of the high degree of persistence of some social or economic diseases such as, specifically, public indebtedness.
The vampire metaphor has been used in numerous papers describing biological interactions between two populations. Such a metaphor translates well to a standard endogenous growth model with public debt. Public debt can be assimilated to a Vamp, whose blood-sucking behavior corresponds to the harmful effect of the debt burden on productive public expenditures. However, the complete destruction of public debt in the long-run is shown to be socially undesirable, because this would imply too much distortionary taxation, with damaging effects on the balanced growth path. By identifying ecological or biological processes with usual national account relationships, this analysis is one step further in the integration of macroeconomics and environmental economics.
Why do Politicians not solve social problems? One reason may be that such problems are difficult to solve, or that Politicians are incompetent. But there is another reason: in representative democracies, competent Politicians sometimes lack the incentive to solve problems to keep their enemies alive, in order to conserve an electoral advantage. This paper shows that reputational strengths can, to some extent, circumvent Politicians incentives not to address the problems. If the reputation of an incumbent Politician depends on the amount of reforms he implements, and positively affects his probability of being reelected, the trade-off between reputation and the need for enemies leads to an incomplete set of reforms, which can handle only a part of the problems. This mechanism might contribute to the explanation of the high degree of persistence of some social or economic diseases such as, specifically, public indebtedness.
