Suchergebnisse

This paper uses an analytical framework derived from Pierre Bourdieu's sociology to explain the genesis of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Long-term social and institutional processes at work in the making of ESDP are addressed through an emphasis on the institutionalization of social fields, the impact of structural crises, and the socialization of policy makers into specific schemes of perception and action (habitus). Two arguments follow from this framework. First, the paper shows that the creation of ESDP after 1998 would have been impossible without the prior institutionalization of two transgovernmental arenas: (1) the European foreign policy field, wherein EU diplomats vie for influence over EU policies; and (2) the international defense field, centered upon military relations within NATO. Second, ESDP results from the strategies of a number of diplomats and military leaders who, following the end of the Cold War, perceived that they faced important organizational crises in their respective fields. This sociological framework provides a more nuanced account of ESDP's creation than that proposed by the two dominant explanations in international relations theory--realism's balancing and constructivism's strategic culture convergence. Combining structural and ideational factors, it elucidates three empirical puzzles: the lack of opposition to ESDP when it was launched, the motives of policy makers who proposed ESDP, and the disappearance of alternative options for the European security architecture. Adapted from the source document.

In this article in the section on Multidimensional Security, the cultural versus geopolitical dilemma of Canada's defense policy is explored to argue that Canada will have to do defense with the Americans, & crisis management with the Europeans. A discussion of the overestimation of NATO by Canada identifies the changing attitudes toward the organization by US disengagement, & the EU response by crafting its own crisis management. Upgrading the security relationship with the EU in concrete forms of cooperation by increased engagement with the EU as "strategic partners, " & increased involvement with the ESDP & the European Defence Agency. The author concludes with four objectives for policy recommendations to coordinate Canadian & EU crisis management policies, enhance interoperability between Canadian & European militaries, develop the Canadian defense business in Europe, & raise Canada's profile in the EU. References. J. Harwell

Why are international institutions designed in one way and not another? Using the European security and defence policy (ESDP) as a case study, this article suggests that the social representations dominating the national and organizational world of institution-makers are key to our understanding the shape and content of an emerging institution of international security cooperation. A focus on social representations, which are the product of institutional practices, helps to break the interest/idea dichotomy that underpins most theories of preference formation when they try to explain institutional designs.This article shows that foreign and defence policy-makers from France, Germany and the United Kingdom have shaped ESDP by projecting their respective social representations, notably with regard to the role of the state, the nature of security challenges and the purpose of their organization. Tables, References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2006 NISA.]

This article explores the paradox of constructive ambiguity. Based on a focused, longitudinal comparison of the European Union's energy and defence policies, it analyses the role played by strategies of ambiguity in European integration. Ambiguity is found to be an attractive strategy for political entrepreneurs when member state preferences are heterogeneous and the EU's legal basis is weak. It is likely to be effective, however, only if it is embedded in an institutional opportunity structure -- that is, a formal-legal context -- that entrepreneurs can fold into their strategic repertoire of ideas. While ambiguity can be strategic in circumstances where clarity would create strong opposition, it is not sufficient to entrench a European policy if it does not rest on an institutional basis. This suggests that European political entrepreneurs should be wary of relying on coalition building by ambiguity only. Adapted from the source document.

Historically associated with transatlantic discords about the Atlantic alliance, burden-sharing is a term that comes and goes on the policy agenda. Accusations of free-riding have marred transatlantic relations ever since the creation of the Atlantic alliance in 1949. Then as now, the rhetoric of burden-sharing has served as a useful rhetorical weapon to blame those who were seen as not contributing enough to the cause. Adapted from the source document.

The aim of this article on the role of the transatlantic link in Canadian strategic culture is twofold. From a theoretical standpoint, it seeks to break with the notion of a homogenous Canadian interest or identity at the international level. Secondly, to underscore the cleavages found in all strategic cultures, it examines the place that Europe has occupied in the minds of Canadian thinkers and decision-makers since the end of the Second World War. Adapted from the source document.