The legal challenges arising from the Adolf Eichmann trial in Jerusalem are widely discussed in legal theory. Less attention is given to the trial in the framework of political and moral philosophy, where the key focus remains on the nature and the origins of evil (without a doubt, fuelled by Hannah Arendt's definition of banality of evil). However, the trail itself present equally challenging question of human response to evil: how are we, the members of the modern political locus to respond to the evil of inhuman proportions? This article aims to answer the question through the reconstruction of debate that took place during the period of the trail (from the date of capture of Eichmann in 1960, till his execution in 1962) and the arguments "for" and "against" the trial by Arendt, Karl Jaspers, Isaiah Berlin, Gershom Scholem and Martin Buber. Beyond these arguments, there is an engaging philosophical debate about the nature and origins of justice, the limits of guilt and retribution, crime and punishment. It is argued that Arendt's pro-trail stance provide for a way of engagement with the questions of evil by modern political men.
The legal challenges arising from the Adolf Eichmann trial in Jerusalem are widely discussed in legal theory. Less attention is given to the trial in the framework of political and moral philosophy, where the key focus remains on the nature and the origins of evil (without a doubt, fuelled by Hannah Arendt's definition of banality of evil). However, the trail itself present equally challenging question of human response to evil: how are we, the members of the modern political locus to respond to the evil of inhuman proportions? This article aims to answer the question through the reconstruction of debate that took place during the period of the trail (from the date of capture of Eichmann in 1960, till his execution in 1962) and the arguments "for" and "against" the trial by Arendt, Karl Jaspers, Isaiah Berlin, Gershom Scholem and Martin Buber. Beyond these arguments, there is an engaging philosophical debate about the nature and origins of justice, the limits of guilt and retribution, crime and punishment. It is argued that Arendt's pro-trail stance provide for a way of engagement with the questions of evil by modern political men. ; Adolfo Eichmanno teismo Jeruzalėje metu atsivėrusios teisinės dilemos yra gana nuosekliai analizuotos teisės teorijos darbuose. Daug rečiau teismo procesas patenka į politinės ir moralės filosofijos akiratį. Čia pirmiausia telkiamasi į blogio ištakų ir prigimties klausimą, taigi į paties Eichmanno asmenį ir veiksmus (tam didelę įtaką, be abejo, turėjo ir Hannah'os Arendt blogio banalumo tezė). Tačiau pats teismas iškėlė atsako į blogį dilemą. Šiame straipsnyje keliamas klausimas, ar įmanomas (ir koks gali būti) modernios politikos atsakas į "nežmonišką" blogį? Kaip teisiškai atsakyti į nusikaltimą, kuris, esant pastangoms suvokti jo prielaidas ir motyvus, bent iš dalies lieka anapus žmogiškos galimybės jį priimti? Į šiuos klausimus atsakymo ieškoma rekonstruojant teismo metu (nuo pat A. Eichmanno suėmimo 1960 m. iki mirties bausmės jam įvykdymo 1962 m.) užsimezgusią netiesioginę diskusiją tarp Hannah'os Arendt ir kitų filosofų, tokių kaip Karlas Jaspersas, Isaiah'a Berlinas, Gershomas Scholemas ar Martinas Buberis. Anapus argumentų "už" ir "prieš" teismui atsiveria polemika dėl politikos, moralės ir transcendencijos santykio, ribų tarp kaltės ir atsakomybės, nusikaltimo ir bausmės vertinimo. Analizuojant H. Arendt argumentus už "politinio atsako tinkamumą" brėžiamos modernaus žmogaus santykio su blogio klausimu gairės politikoje.
The legal challenges arising from the Adolf Eichmann trial in Jerusalem are widely discussed in legal theory. Less attention is given to the trial in the framework of political and moral philosophy, where the key focus remains on the nature and the origins of evil (without a doubt, fuelled by Hannah Arendt's definition of banality of evil). However, the trail itself present equally challenging question of human response to evil: how are we, the members of the modern political locus to respond to the evil of inhuman proportions? This article aims to answer the question through the reconstruction of debate that took place during the period of the trail (from the date of capture of Eichmann in 1960, till his execution in 1962) and the arguments "for" and "against" the trial by Arendt, Karl Jaspers, Isaiah Berlin, Gershom Scholem and Martin Buber. Beyond these arguments, there is an engaging philosophical debate about the nature and origins of justice, the limits of guilt and retribution, crime and punishment. It is argued that Arendt's pro-trail stance provide for a way of engagement with the questions of evil by modern political men.
There are two ways of looking at the relationship between politics and imagination. Imagination is a capacity to create images and objects that directly cannot be perceived. As such imagination often is perceived as a capacity to create make-believes, taking us away from the reality, therefore imagination should have no role in the political world. Contrary to this position, one can overall deny the clear distinction between reality and imagination, due to the fact that political works is made from values, believes, myths, stories – all that separates the world of political from the world of nature. Both positions have their own faults. The first one ignores and fails to explain the various influences on the political – such as myths, beliefs, and religious arguments. This position largely treats policy knowledge as though it were a matter of rational calculation. The second – drives towards the Baudrillard-like view of the world made if simulacra and signs failing at the same time to draw a distinction between make-believes and the products of imagination that have real political effect. The objective of the article is to research the relationship between politics and imagination.This is done applying the functions of imagination to political sphere. Imagination helps to create "something that is not given directly". Imagination therefore allows crossing the line between the imagined and the real. In the context of political world, different human experiences, first and foremost religious experiences are analyzed as allowing crossing the line between the rational domain of policy and its knowledge and the imagined. Religious experiences represent a world that has its own standard of reality affecting the political domain. We can talk about different realities then, made visible to us though different forms of imagination – scientific, art, religious, historical – all giving different answer to the question what is real and those different worlds collide in the political domain. Therefore it is argued that the political cannot have the clear distinction between the real and the imagined.Secondly, the capacity of imagination to introduce the distance between the reality and the imagined is discussed in the context of the political domain. This particular capacity of imagination is crucial for moral act, as seen in Kant, Smith, or Nussbaum. It is argued that the same need to introduce the distance between the moral agent and the decision to be made is applicable to political decisions. Here also the distance between the reality (such as social inequality) and the political metaphors shaping policy (such as social equality and freedoms) is discussed. Political reality is made from various metaphors, such as liberty, sovereignty, the will of people, which are objects of imagination as much as of knowledge or experience which makes the political reality not only as "something present", but something that "we aspire to as a political entity".Lastly, the capacity of imagination to connect different objects is discussed as a capacity connecting people with certain values or desires. It is argued that metaphors, history, and tradition – all are a source and at the same time a form of imagination that creates and separates different communal and political identities. The political entity cannot be separated from the capacity of its people to keep creating and recreating common identify. ; Galima skirti du požiūrius į vaizduotės ir politikos santykį. Pirmas remiasi prielaida, jog vaizduotė politiką pakeičia fantazijomis, iliuzijomis, todėl siekia atskirti politinę tikrovę nuo vaizduotės. Antras požiūris apskritai neigia tikrovės ir įsivaizdavimo skirtį. Šį požiūrį galima paaiškinti tuo, kad kinta pats tikrovės statusas, o riba tarp to, kas realu, ir to, kas įsivaizduota, nyksta. Abu požiūriai turi rimtų trūkumų. Pirmasis nemato daugelio politiką veikiančių dalykų, kaip antai tikėjimas, prietarai, mitologija, pagaliau nepakankamai atsižvelgia į tai, kad politika sudaryta iš daugelio objektyviai neapčiuopiamų, ne empirinių dalykų. Antrasis, palenkdamas politinę tikrovę įsivaizdavimo veiksmui, neleidžia skirti fantazijų nuo realias politines pasekmes turinčių vaizduotės esinių ir galiausiai politiką paverčia spektakliu ar žaidimu. Straipsnio tikslas – konceptualizuoti politikos ir vaizduotės santykį. Skiriamos trys vaizduotės savybės, kurios taikomos politiniam pasauliui siekiant atskleisti vaizduotės prasmę politikos supratimui.
Galima skirti du požiūrius į vaizduotės ir politikos santykį. Pirmas remiasi prielaida, jog vaizduotė politiką pakeičia fantazijomis, iliuzijomis, todėl siekia atskirti politinę tikrovę nuo vaizduotės. Antras požiūris apskritai neigia tikrovės ir įsivaizdavimo skirtį. Šį požiūrį galima paaiškinti tuo, kad kinta pats tikrovės statusas, o riba tarp to, kas realu, ir to, kas įsivaizduota, nyksta. Abu požiūriai turi rimtų trūkumų. Pirmasis nemato daugelio politiką veikiančių dalykų, kaip antai tikėjimas, prietarai, mitologija, pagaliau nepakankamai atsižvelgia į tai, kad politika sudaryta iš daugelio objektyviai neapčiuopiamų, ne empirinių dalykų. Antrasis, palenkdamas politinę tikrovę įsivaizdavimo veiksmui, neleidžia skirti fantazijų nuo realias politines pasekmes turinčių vaizduotės esinių ir galiausiai politiką paverčia spektakliu ar žaidimu. Straipsnio tikslas – konceptualizuoti politikos ir vaizduotės santykį. Skiriamos trys vaizduotės savybės, kurios taikomos politiniam pasauliui siekiant atskleisti vaizduotės prasmę politikos supratimui.
There are two ways of looking at the relationship between politics and imagination. Imagination is a capacity to create images and objects that directly cannot be perceived. As such imagination often is perceived as a capacity to create make-believes, taking us away from the reality, therefore imagination should have no role in the political world. Contrary to this position, one can overall deny the clear distinction between reality and imagination, due to the fact that political works is made from values, believes, myths, stories – all that separates the world of political from the world of nature. Both positions have their own faults. The first one ignores and fails to explain the various influences on the political – such as myths, beliefs, and religious arguments. This position largely treats policy knowledge as though it were a matter of rational calculation. The second – drives towards the Baudrillard-like view of the world made if simulacra and signs failing at the same time to draw a distinction between make-believes and the products of imagination that have real political effect. The objective of the article is to research the relationship between politics and imagination.
There are two ways of looking at the relationship between politics and imagination. Imagination is a capacity to create images and objects that directly cannot be perceived. As such imagination often is perceived as a capacity to create make-believes, taking us away from the reality, therefore imagination should have no role in the political world. Contrary to this position, one can overall deny the clear distinction between reality and imagination, due to the fact that political works is made from values, believes, myths, stories – all that separates the world of political from the world of nature. Both positions have their own faults. The first one ignores and fails to explain the various influences on the political – such as myths, beliefs, and religious arguments. This position largely treats policy knowledge as though it were a matter of rational calculation. The second – drives towards the Baudrillard-like view of the world made if simulacra and signs failing at the same time to draw a distinction between make-believes and the products of imagination that have real political effect. The objective of the article is to research the relationship between politics and imagination.
There are two ways of looking at the relationship between politics and imagination. Imagination is a capacity to create images and objects that directly cannot be perceived. As such imagination often is perceived as a capacity to create make-believes, taking us away from the reality, therefore imagination should have no role in the political world. Contrary to this position, one can overall deny the clear distinction between reality and imagination, due to the fact that political works is made from values, believes, myths, stories – all that separates the world of political from the world of nature. Both positions have their own faults. The first one ignores and fails to explain the various influences on the political – such as myths, beliefs, and religious arguments. This position largely treats policy knowledge as though it were a matter of rational calculation. The second – drives towards the Baudrillard-like view of the world made if simulacra and signs failing at the same time to draw a distinction between make-believes and the products of imagination that have real political effect. The objective of the article is to research the relationship between politics and imagination.
There are two ways of looking at the relationship between politics and imagination. Imagination is a capacity to create images and objects that directly cannot be perceived. As such imagination often is perceived as a capacity to create make-believes, taking us away from the reality, therefore imagination should have no role in the political world. Contrary to this position, one can overall deny the clear distinction between reality and imagination, due to the fact that political works is made from values, believes, myths, stories – all that separates the world of political from the world of nature. Both positions have their own faults. The first one ignores and fails to explain the various influences on the political – such as myths, beliefs, and religious arguments. This position largely treats policy knowledge as though it were a matter of rational calculation. The second – drives towards the Baudrillard-like view of the world made if simulacra and signs failing at the same time to draw a distinction between make-believes and the products of imagination that have real political effect. The objective of the article is to research the relationship between politics and imagination.
