Suchergebnisse

This research utilizes the methods of geography, mathematics and political ecology to outline the political areas and to define the profiles of political competition within the region of Southwest Finland using parliamentary election results from the 2010s. Additionally the research investigates the areal concentration and dispersion of support for the parliamentary parties and the effect of the regional level of aggregation to the concentration of the political support. Our research questions are: (1) are there distinctive political areas in Southwest Finland? And (2) can political areas of stable and unstable competition patterns be identified by investigating election results over time? Using cluster analysis and map visualizations we show that there are distinctive political areas of competition to be found in contemporary Southwest Finland and that the map of political support changes significantly at the municipal and polling district levels.

This research utilizes the methods of geography, mathematics and political ecology to outline the political areas and to define the profiles of political competition within the region of Southwest Finland using parliamentary election results from the 2010s. Additionally the research investigates the areal concentration and dispersion of support for the parliamentary parties and the effect of the regional level of aggregation to the concentration of the political support. Our research questions are: (1) are there distinctive political areas in Southwest Finland? And (2) can political areas of stable and unstable competition patterns be identified by investigating election results over time? Using cluster analysis and map visualizations we show that there are distinctive political areas of competition to be found in contemporary Southwest Finland and that the map of political support changes significantly at the municipal and polling district levels.

Abstract. The a priori voting powers of member countries in the council of ministers of the European Union have been discussed in the literature mainly from the view–point of Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik indices. This paper discusses — in the light of these and other more recent (Colomer's, Holler's as well as Deegan and Packel's) power indices — the interaction of the council ministers and the European Parliament (EP) under the assumption that the consent of both bodies is needed to carry a motion or piece of union–wide legislation. Moreover, the double–majority principle is discussed from the view–point of voting power distribution. Finally we consider the voting power distribution in a three–chamber system consisting of Commission, Council and EP.

The a priori voting powers of member countries in the council of ministers of the European Union have been discussed in the literature mainly from the view-point of Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices. This paper discusses - in the light of these and other more recent (Colomer's, Holler's as well as Deegan and Packel's) power indices - the interaction of the council ministers and the European Parliament (EP) under the assumption that the consent of both bodies is needed to carry a motion or piece of union-wide legislation. Moreover, the double-majority principle is discussed from the view-point of voting power distribution. Finally we consider the voting power distribution in a three-chamber system consisting of Commission, Council and EP. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)