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Post‐socialist constitutions: The de jure–de facto gap, its effects and determinantsa
In: Economics of transition and institutional change, Band 29, Heft 2, S. 175-196
ISSN: 2577-6983
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on constitutional rules and their economic effects by extending focus to the de jure–de facto constitutional gap. First, evidence is provided that size of this gap matters as higher gaps lower the effectiveness of the constitutional commitment mechanism. Second, several explanations of this gap are identified, in particular relating to the democratization process, political conflict, age and comprehensiveness of the constitution. The conclusions are based on an empirical study for the unique setting of the post‐socialist countries of Europe and Asia, which all enacted new constitutional frameworks after 1989 and it is shown that in some of these countries constitutions acted as blueprints.
Should we pay, and to whom, for biodiversity enhancement in private forests? An empirical study of attitudes towards payments for forest ecosystem services in Poland
In: Land use policy: the international journal covering all aspects of land use, Band 48, S. 261-269
ISSN: 0264-8377
Leader characteristics and constitutional compliance
In: European journal of political economy, Band 84, S. 102423
ISSN: 1873-5703
Political conflict, political polarization, and constitutional compliance
In: Constitutional political economy
ISSN: 1572-9966
AbstractWhile the economic approach to constitutions highlights their contribution to resolving conflict, recent work on the de jure–de facto distinction in relation to various constitutional rules suggests that political conflict and polarization could play a role in explaining the size and evolution of the gap between constitution text and constitutional practice. In this paper, we are interested in the relationship between the degree of conflict in the political arena within the state, captured by the polarization of the political landscape, as well as the underlying political polarization in society, and compliance of government actors with the country's constitution. Based on a number of theoretical arguments, we provide an empirical investigation for ca. 170 countries in the period 1975–2020, using the new Comparative Constitutional Compliance Database. Our results suggest that constitutional non-compliance is associated with more intense political polarization in society, but it does not seem to be correlated with polarization of the political landscape.
The comparative constitutional compliance database
In: The review of international organizations
ISSN: 1559-744X
World Affairs Online
The comparative constitutional compliance database
In: The review of international organizations, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 95-115
ISSN: 1559-744X
AbstractThis article introduces a novel database that measures governments' compliance with national constitutions. It combines information on de jure constitutional rules with data on their de facto implementation. The individual compliance indicators can be grouped into four categories that we aggregate into an overall indicator of constitutional compliance: property rights and the rule of law, political rights, civil rights, and basic human rights. The database covers 175 countries over the period 1900 to 2020 and can be used by researchers interested in studying the determinants or the effects of (non)compliance with constitutions. Our investigation of the stylized facts of constitutional compliance reveals a long-term increase in compliance, which occurred primarily around the year 1990. The Americas experienced the steepest increase in compliance, but also Africa and Europe improved particularly at the end of the Cold War. Democracies – particularly those with parliamentary and mixed systems – show more constitutional compliance than nondemocracies, among which military dictatorships perform the worst. Constitutional design also matters: Constitutions that allow for the dismissal of the head of state or government for violating constitutional rules are being complied with more.
Leader Characteristics and Constitutional Compliance
In: ILE Working Paper Series Working Paper 2023 No. 70
SSRN
SSRN
The Comparative Constitutional Compliance Database
This article introduces a novel database that measures governments' compliance with national constitutions. It combines information on de jure constitutional rules with data on their de facto implementation. The individual compliance indicators can be grouped into four categories that we aggregate into an overall indicator of constitutional compliance: property rights and the rule of law, political rights, civil rights, and basic human rights. The database covers 168 countries over the period 1900 to 2020 and can be used by researchers interested in studying the determinants or the effects of (non)compliance with constitutions. Our investigation of the stylized facts of constitutional compliance does not reveal a long-term trend toward more compliance. Parliamentary democracies are the regimes with the highest level of constitutional compliance, whereas military dictatorships perform the worst. Although compliance is not determined by a constitution's breadth, constitutional design does still matter. Constitutions that allow for the dismissal of the head of state or government for violating the constitution achieve higher compliance levels.
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