Suchergebnisse

Public perception of risk is being cited as a documented reason to rethink a very contentious congressionally mandated process for siting interim storage and permanent disposal facilities for high‐level radioactive waste. Rigorous survey research has shown that the public holds intense, negative images of "nuclear" and "radioactive" technologies, activities, and facilities. Potential host states and opponents claim that these negative images, coupled with an amplification of negative risk events, will potentially stigmatize the area surrounding such facilities and result in significant economic losses. At issue is whether a supporting social amplification of risk model is applicable to communities hosting facilities that are part of the U.S. Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Complex. An initial assessment of high‐profile discrete and cumulative key negative risk events at such nuclear facilities does not validate that there has been stigmatization or substantial social and economic consequences in the host areas. Before any changes to major national policy are implemented, additional research is required to determine if the nearby public's "pragmatic logic," based on practical knowledge and experience, attenuates the link between public opinion and demographic and economic behaviors.

Surveys of public opinion about perceptions of risk associated with the nuclear fuel cycle have shown that the public professes a widespread feeling of dread, a fear of associated stigmas, and a concern about possible catastrophic nuclear accidents. Various interest groups and state governments that oppose congressionally mandated siting of centralized high‐level radioactive waste (HLW) storage and disposal facilities are using this negative imagery to create a powerful, emotional obstacle to the siting process. From statistical analyses of images and location preferences, researchers have claimed that possible significant economic losses could potentially accompany the siting of HLW facilities. However, several paradoxes, or self‐contradictory statements, apparently exist between the responses expressed in surveys and the actual economic and demographic behavior evidenced in the marketplace. Federal policymakers need to evaluate whether the request for a change in siting policy is based on subjective fear of a potential negative economic effect or on proven negative effects. Empirically observed behavior does not support predicted negative economic effects based on survey responses.

National, regional, state, and local surveys have revealed that people have intensely negative images of "nuclear" and "radioactive" technologies, activities, and facilities, as well as associated fears of stigmatization. In light of these perceptions, the debate over where to temporarily store or permanently dispose of spent nuclear fuel (at the reactor site, an interim storage facility, or a permanent repository) provokes immense concern among possible host jurisdictions. To address these concerns, one needs to know if people's subjective opinions conform with the choices they make and are therefore reflected in their economic behavior. Argonne National Laboratory researchers used a hedonic model to complete a study of residential property value dynamics over a 5‐year period within a 15‐mile radius of two California nuclear power plants. They tracked the economic ramifications of decisions about the spent nuclear fuel stored at those reactors. The study revealed that no significant negative effects on residential property values resulted from a decision to move spent nuclear fuel from wet storage to a dry‐cask storage facility or from a request to extend the reactor operating permit (given future changes in the type of nuclear fuel storage facility that would accompany such an extension).

ABSTRACTNuclear power plants can theoretically influence property values through a number of different channels. The public perception of risk associated with the potential hazard from the operation of a nuclear reactor and the storage of nuclear waste may lead to lower bids on properties in close proximity to the plant. In contrast, workers at the plant may be less concerned with any potential hazards, and may actually value being in proximity to the workplace. Hence, one cannot a priori sign the distance gradient of homes in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant. In this study, a hedonic model coupled with geographic information system (GIS) techniques is used to estimate housing price surfaces around two nuclear power plants in California. The use of GIS software allows more potential influences to housing prices to be accurately incorporated than previously included in hedonic studies. Based on the evidence from the plants chosen, these findings do not support the contention that negative imagery surrounding nuclear power plants or stored nuclear waste has a significant detrimental influence on residential home prices in the immediate vicinity of these facilities.

State governments are increasingly requiring state and local emergency management offices to maintain lists of persons with special needs who may require assistance in disaster situations. In addition, federal courts are beginning to apply the Americans with Disabilities Act. to emergency planning. This study characterizes special-needs households that are located in the vicinity of a chemical weapons storage site in Alabama. For this study, a special-needs household is defined as a residence having at least one person with physical or mental problems, a transportation dependence, or a child who is home alone at limes and requires assistance from outside the family or current circle of relatives, friends, and neighbors to take specific protective actions. The special-needs households were identified throngh a myriad of collection methods, including random sampling, saturation mailing/self-registration, targeted distribution/self-registration, agency and support provider lists, and referrals. Attitudes toward specific protective actions and an assessment of the ability of the special-needs household to take those actions were also sought out. Approximately 9 percent of the community's households were identified as containing persons with special needs who require assistance during emergencies. The study also identified the highly perishable nature of special-needs population records maintained by emergency management agencies. During a data verification process conducted 3 months after the data collection effort concluded, almost half of the previously identified 3,294 individuals with special needs had their situation change or could not be reached for verification. Concurrently, 1,090 new persons with special needs identified themselves as needing assistance. Recommendations are made to the emergency planning community for addressing the support needs of special populations.

A graphical depiction of the entire emergency response process via a synchronization matrix is an effective management too for optimizing the design, exercise, and real-life implementation of emergency plans. This system-based approach to emergency planning depicts how a community organizes its response tasks across space and time. It gives responders the opportunity to make real-time adjustments to maximizing the often limited resources in protecting area residents. An effective response to any natural or technological hazard must involve the entire community and must not be limited by individual jurisdictions and organizations acting on their own without coordination, integration, and synchronization.An emergency response to an accidental release of chemical warfare agents from one of this nation's eight chemical weapons stockpile sites, like any other disaster response, is complex. It requires the rapid coordination, integration, and synchronization of multiple levels of governmental and nongovernmental organizations from numerous jurisdictions, each with varying response capabilities, into a unified community response. The community response actions occur in an area extending from an on-site storage location to points 25 or more miles away. Actions are directed and controlled by responding local governments and agencies situated within the response area, as well as by state and federal operations centers quite removed from the area of impact. Time is critical and the protective action decision-making process is greatly compressed. To ensure an effective response with minimal confusion, given the potential catastrophic nature of such releases, the response community must carefully synchronize response operations.