Suchergebnisse

So none of the wild rumours came true in the end. Those expecting representatives of Parliament and Council on the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, or seats for 'main stakeholders' were likely either disappointed or relieved when the European Commission's reinforced Better Regulation package was published on 19 May 2015. As it turns out the transformation of the Impact Assessment Board, which had been in the air for a while is a partial one only, for the moment at least. Indeed, the former Impact Assessment Board got a stronger mandate and a broader reach, apart from a new name, yet it retains very much the character of an 'in–house' body. The long-awaited 'external members' of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board will be recruited as temporary agents, turning 'independence' to some extent into an issue of labour law.

"The Court considers that the Commission should give due consideration to the principles of clarity of objectives, simplification, realism, transparency and accountability when designing new and revising existing interventions."

This paper maps the use of digital tools in the Icelandic constitutional revision process of 2011 and discusses its aftermath in subsequent years. Although causal links between the digital elements of the process and the content and fate of the constitutional bill are impossible to establish, an analysis of the Icelandic constitution-writing efforts as 'digital democracy' reveals some important lessons. High-quality input into constitution-making processes through digital participation is possible, but the very threat of this to vested institutional interests also makes consensus on and enforcement of the 'rules of the game' of paramount importance.

As the monitoring of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is mostly left up to the EU institutions, internal quality control bodies could play an important role in developing tests and standards which represent part of 'subsidiarity and proportionality in action.' In this context, the Impact Assessment Board (Board), established within the European Commission in 2006 and recently renamed 'Regulatory Scrutiny Board' (to review impact assessments) holds a key position. This paper presents an analysis of opinions from the Board from 2010 and 2011 as an alternative jurisprudential source regarding subsidiarity and proportionality. The analysis tells us something about the 'everyday meaning' of these principles, but also about the way the Board functions as an 'in-house' regulatory review board.

It is clear that 'constitutional dialogue' often serves as a convenient metaphor, but how can we employ it in such a way that it advances contemporary research in public law? This article presents a structured literature review on the subject, draws out certain possible caveats and provides suggestions for how to forge ahead with developing and using the concept of 'constitutional dialogue'. We explore various theoretical approaches to 'constitutional dialogue' in relation to different institutional settings. The concept of constitutional dialogue can be applied in institutional settings beyond courts and legislatures and is increasingly being applied in such a way. As part of our exploration of the implications for legal research we propose distinguishing between the use of 'constitutional dialogue' as a 'lens' and as a 'method' and making a clear choice between empirical and normative analysis.

It is clear that 'constitutional dialogue' often serves as a convenient metaphor, but how can we employ it in such a way that it advances contemporary research in public law? This article presents a structured literature review on the subject, draws out certain possible caveats and provides suggestions for how to forge ahead with developing and using the concept of 'constitutional dialogue'. We explore various theoretical approaches to 'constitutional dialogue' in relation to different institutional settings. The concept of constitutional dialogue can be applied in institutional settings beyond courts and legislatures and is increasingly being applied in such a way. As part of our exploration of the implications for legal research we propose distinguishing between the use of 'constitutional dialogue' as a 'lens' and as a 'method' and making a clear choice between empirical and normative analysis.