Suchergebnisse

Im Zuge der Corona Krise werden europäische Gemeinschaftsanleihen zur Unterstützung von besonders betroffenen Mitgliedsländern intensiv diskutiert. Die Autoren zeigen, dass Gemeinschaftsanleihen europäischer Staaten keine Neuigkeit wären. Seit den 1970er Jahren hat die Europäische Kommission wiederholt Anleihen auf dem privaten Kapitalmarkt ausgegeben, die durch die Mitgliedsländer garantiert und an Krisenländer ausgeschüttet wurden. "Coronabonds", wie derzeit diskutiert, stünden in einer langen Tradition. Die erste Gemeinschaftsanleihe wurde 1976 zu Gunsten Italiens und Irlands emittiert, in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren folgten weitere Anleihen für Frankreich, Griechenland und Portugal, sowie, nach 2008, für Ungarn, Lettland und Rumänien. Zusätzlich wurde 2012 der ESM für Eurozonen-Länder etabliert. Aus der Geschichte kann somit die Lehre gezogen werden, dass die europäischen Regierungen in tiefen Krisen immer wieder bereit waren gemeinschaftliche Anleihen auszugeben und dafür zu haften, wenn auch nur für begrenzte Zeit. Die dafür notwendigen Institutionen wurden flexibel und kurzfristig entwickelt. Eine zweite Lehre ist, dass der EU Haushalt seit den 70er Jahren wiederholt genutzt wurde, um die Rückzahlung der Anleihen zu garantieren. Es ist kein Zufall, dass derzeit auch wieder vorgeschlagen wird "Coronabonds" über einen deutlich erweiterten EU Haushalt zu bedienen. ; The history of joint European bond issuance has been largely forgotten. The authors show that bonds issued and guaranteed jointly by European states are not a novel instrument, but have repeatedly been issued since the 1970s. The issuance of one-off "Coronabonds", as currently proposed, would not be unprecedented, but quite the contrary. The first European community bond was issued in 1976 to mitigate the adverse impact of the oil crisis, which threatened the viability of the European Economic Union. The funds were raised on private capital markets and then passed on to crisis countries, including Italy and Ireland. In the 1980s and 1990s community bonds were issued in favor of France, Greece and Portugal and, in 2008/2009, to support the non-Eurozone countries Hungary, Latvia and Romania. Moreover, the EFSF and ESM facilities were created after 2010 to support Eurozone members. The most important lesson from history is that, during deep crises, the European governments have repeatedly shown willingness to extend rescue funds along with substantial guarantees to other members in need. The necessary institutional arrangements were often set up flexibly and quickly. A second lesson is that the EU budget played a central role in past European bond guarantee schemes. Direct guarantees via country quotas were only the second guarantee tier, in case EU funds did not suffice, and only until 1981. Not coincidentally, the repayment of "Coronabonds" through an enlarged future EU budget is currently being discussed.

Nach einem aktuellen deutsch-französischen Vorschlag soll in 10 EU-Ländern, inklusive Deutschlands, eine Finanzmarkttransaktionssteuer (FTS) mit einem Steuersatz von 0,2% beim Kauf von Wertpapieren eingeführt werden und auf Aktien großer Unternehmen beschränkt sein. Die Autoren vergleichen in ihrer Studie diesen Vorschlag in internationaler Perspektive, beurteilen dessen Stärken und Schwächen auf Basis der empirischen Evidenz und entwickeln daraus Politikempfehlungen. Sie befürworten insgesamt aus ökonomischer Sicht die Einführung einer FTS mit einem Steuersatz von 0,2%, da eine FTS auf Aktien eine international und historisch bewährte Steuer ist, die zu minimalen Kosten erhoben werden kann und nutzungsabhängig ist. Erstmals könnte ein zentralisiertes und europaweit harmonisiertes, elektronisches Besteuerungssystem für Finanztransaktionen etabliert werden. Die Autoren sehen allerdings die Beschränkung auf börsennotierte Aktien als die größte Schwäche einer solchen FTS an. Die bei Finanztransaktionen dominierenden Derivate würden ebenso wie der außerbörsliche Handel ausgenommen, der klassische Aktienhandel würde diskriminiert und auf einen großen Teil der potenziellen Steuereinnahmen würde verzichtet. Daher bestände nach ihrer Ansicht die beste Lösung darin, die Steuer von Anfang an auch auf Derivate und Anleihen zu erheben sowie den außerbörslichen Handel und darüber hinaus mittelfristig den Hochfrequenzhandel einzubeziehen. ; According to a recent German-French proposal, a financial market transaction tax (FTT) at a rate of 0.2% on the purchase of securities is to be introduced in 10 EU countries, including Germany, and limited to shares in large companies. In their study, the authors compare this proposal in an international perspective, assess its strengths and weaknesses on the basis of empirical evidence and develop policy recommendations. Overall, from an economic perspective, they support the introduction of an EU FTT at a tax rate of 0.2%, since an FTT on equities is an internationally and historically proven tax that can be levied at minimal cost, and that is usage-based. For the first time, a centralised and Europe-wide harmonised electronic taxation system for financial transactions could be established. However, the authors regard the limitation to traditional stock market trading - excluding the dominant derivatives, bonds and intraday trading - as the greatest weakness of such an FTT. Corporate stock markets and equity financing would be discriminated and a large part of potential tax revenues would not be exhausted. Therefore, in their view, the best solution would be to introduce a broader tax that includes derivatives and bonds, as well as over-the-counter trading and, in the medium term, high-frequency trading.

The history of joint European bond issuance has been largely forgotten. The authors show that bonds issued and guaranteed jointly by European states are not a novel instrument, but have repeatedly been issued since the 1970s. The issuance of one-off "Coronabonds", as currently proposed, would not be unprecedented, but quite the contrary. The first European community bond was issued in 1976 to mitigate the adverse impact of the oil crisis, which threatened the viability of the European Economic Union. The funds were raised on private capital markets and then passed on to crisis countries, including Italy and Ireland. In the 1980s and 1990s community bonds were issued in favor of France, Greece and Portugal and, in 2008/2009, to support the non-Eurozone countries Hungary, Latvia and Romania. Moreover, the EFSF and ESM facilities were created after 2010 to support Eurozone members. The most important lesson from history is that, during deep crises, the European governments have repeatedly shown willingness to extend rescue funds along with substantial guarantees to other members in need. The necessary institutional arrangements were often set up flexibly and quickly. A second lesson is that the EU budget played a central role in past European bond guarantee schemes. Direct guarantees via country quotas were only the second guarantee tier, in case EU funds did not suffice, and only until 1981. Not coincidentally, the repayment of "Coronabonds" through an enlarged future EU budget is currently being discussed. ; Im Zuge der Corona Krise werden europäische Gemeinschaftsanleihen zur Unterstützung von besonders betroffenen Mitgliedsländern intensiv diskutiert. Die Autoren zeigen, dass Gemeinschaftsanleihen europäischer Staaten keine Neuigkeit wären. Seit den 1970er Jahren hat die Europäische Kommission wiederholt Anleihen auf dem privaten Kapitalmarkt ausgegeben, die durch die Mitgliedsländer garantiert und an Krisenländer ausgeschüttet wurden. "Coronabonds", wie derzeit diskutiert, stünden in einer langen Tradition. Die erste Gemeinschaftsanleihe wurde 1976 zu Gunsten Italiens und Irlands emittiert, in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren folgten weitere Anleihen für Frankreich, Griechenland und Portugal, sowie, nach 2008, für Ungarn, Lettland und Rumänien. Zusätzlich wurde 2012 der ESM für Eurozonen-Länder etabliert. Aus der Geschichte kann somit die Lehre gezogen werden, dass die europäischen Regierungen in tiefen Krisen immer wieder bereit waren gemeinschaftliche Anleihen auszugeben und dafür zu haften, wenn auch nur für begrenzte Zeit. Die dafür notwendigen Institutionen wurden flexibel und kurzfristig entwickelt. Eine zweite Lehre ist, dass der EU Haushalt seit den 70er Jahren wiederholt genutzt wurde, um die Rückzahlung der Anleihen zu garantieren. Es ist kein Zufall, dass derzeit auch wieder vorgeschlagen wird "Coronabonds" über einen deutlich erweiterten EU Haushalt zu bedienen.

This paper studies external sovereign bonds as an asset class. It compiles a new database of 266,000 monthly prices of foreign-currency government bonds traded in London and New York between 1815 (the Battle of Waterloo) and 2016, covering up to 91 countries. The main insight is that, as in equity markets, the returns on external sovereign bonds have been sufficiently high to compensate for risk. Real ex-post returns average more than 6 percent annually across two centuries, including default episodes, major wars, and global crises. This represents an excess return of 3–4 percent above US or UK government bonds, which is comparable to stocks and outperforms corporate bonds. Central to this finding are the high average coupons offered on external sovereign bonds. The observed returns are hard to reconcile with canonical theoretical models and the degree of credit risk in this market, as measured by historical default and recovery rates. Based on an archive of more than 300 sovereign debt restructurings since 1815, the authors show that full repudiation is rare; the median creditor loss (haircut) is below 50 percent.

This paper studies external sovereign bonds as an asset class. We compile a new database of 266,000 monthly prices of foreign-currency government bonds traded in London and New York between 1815 (the Battle of Waterloo) and 2016, covering up to 91 countries. Our main insight is that, as in equity markets, the returns on external sovereign bonds have been sufficiently high to compensate for risk. Real ex-post returns average more than 6 percent annually across two centuries, including default episodes, major wars, and global crises. This represents an excess return of 3-4 percent above US or UK government bonds, which is comparable to stocks and outperforms corporate bonds. Central to this finding are the high average coupons offered on external sovereign bonds. The observed returns are hard to reconcile with canonical theoretical models and the degree of credit risk in this market, as measured by historical default and recovery rates. Based on our archive of more than 300 sovereign debt restructurings since 1815, we show that full repudiation is rare; the median creditor loss (haircut) is below 50 percent.

This paper studies external sovereign bonds as an asset class. We compile a new database of 220,000 monthly prices of foreign-currency government bonds traded in London and New York between 1815 (the Battle of Waterloo) and 2016, covering 91 countries. Our main insight is that, as in equity markets, the returns on external sovereign bonds have been sufficiently high to compensate for risk. Real ex-post returns averaged 7% annually across two centuries, including default episodes, major wars, and global crises. This represents an excess return of around 4% above US or UK government bonds, which is comparable to stocks and outperforms corporate bonds. The observed returns are hard to reconcile with canonical theoretical models and with the degree of credit risk in this market, as measured by historical default and recovery rates. Based on our archive of more than 300 sovereign debt restructurings since 1815, we show that full repudiation is rare; the median haircut is below 50%.

This paper studies external sovereign bonds as an asset class. We compile a new database of 220,000 monthly prices of foreign-currency government bonds traded in London and New York between 1815 (the Battle of Waterloo) and 2016, covering 91 countries. Our main insight is that, as in equity markets, the returns on external sovereign bonds have been sufficiently high to compensate for risk. Real ex-post returns averaged 7% annually across two centuries, including default episodes, major wars, and global crises. This represents an excess return of around 4% above US or UK government bonds, which is comparable to stocks and outperforms corporate bonds. The observed returns are hard to reconcile with canonical theoretical models and with the degree of credit risk in this market, as measured by historical default and recovery rates. Based on our archive of more than 300 sovereign debt restructurings since 1815, we show that full repudiation is rare; the median haircut is below 50%.

This paper studies external sovereign bonds as an asset class. We compile a new database of 220,000 monthly prices of foreign-currency government bonds traded in London and New York between 1815 (the Battle of Waterloo) and 2016, covering 91 countries. Our main insight is that, as in equity markets, the returns on external sovereign bonds have been sufficiently high to compensate for risk. Real ex-post returns averaged 7% annually across two centuries, including default episodes, major wars, and global crises. This represents an excess return of around 4% above US or UK government bonds, which is comparable to stocks and outperforms corporate bonds. The observed returns are hard to reconcile with canonical theoretical models and with the degree of credit risk in this market, as measured by historical default and recovery rates. Based on our archive of more than 300 sovereign debt restructurings since 1815, we show that full repudiation is rare; the median haircut is below 50%.