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AbstractVice epistemology studies the qualities of individuals and collectives that undermine the creation, sharing, and storing of knowledge. There is no settled understanding of which epistemic vices exist at the collective level. Yet understanding which collective epistemic vices exist is important, both to facilitate research on the antecedents and effects of collective epistemic vice, and to advance philosophical discussions such as whether some collective epistemic vices are genuinely collective. I propose an empirical approach to identifying epistemic vices in corporations, analyzing a large dataset of online employee reviews. The approach has parallels to the methodology for identifying the big-five personality traits. It surfaces epistemic vices that are attributed to corporations by its own members and reduces the number of vices to the minimum required to describe differences between corporations. This approach yields a new taxonomy of epistemic vices for corporations. While two vices identified have close correlates in the existing literature, four others have not been identified at all or only in aspects. Two of these vices are 'genuinely' collective in the sense that they can only be attributed to collectives.

Wann Einkommen und Vermögen gerecht verteilt wären, ist unter politischen Philosophinnen umstritten. Die unterschiedlichen Standpunkte beruhen auf unterschiedlichen Theorien von Gerechtigkeit und auf unterschiedlichen ökonomischen Annahmen. Einig sind sich viele Autorinnen aber darin, dass die tatsächliche Verteilung von Einkommen und Vermögen in entwickelten Marktwirtschaften ungerecht sei. Eine gerechte Verteilung von Einkommen und Vermögen erfordere folglich Eingriffe in deren vom Markt hervorgebrachte tatsächliche Verteilung. Diese weithin geteilte Einsicht wirft die Frage auf, wo und wie in die Verteilung von Einkommen und Vermögen eingegriffen werden sollte. Steuern und Transferzahlungen werden allgemein für geeignet gehalten, vom Markt hervorgebrachte Verteilungen gerechter zu machen. Strittig ist, ob darüber hinaus auch die Märkte selbst so gestaltet werden können, dass sie Einkommen und Vermögen gerechter verteilen. Einflussreiche politische Philosophinnen wie John Rawls halten Steuern und Transfers für hinreichend. Ich halte dagegen, dass diese Eingriffe nicht hinreichen, und dass zur Schaffung von Gerechtigkeit in die Regulierung von Märkten eingegriffen werden sollte. Ihre Regulierung sollte nicht nur Kriterien der Effizienz folgen, sondern auch Kriterien der Gerechtigkeit.

Politicians around the globe wrangle about how to deal with trade imbalances. In the Eurozone, members running a trade deficit accuse members running a surplus of forcing them into deficit. Yet political philosophers have largely overlooked issues of justice related to trade imbalances. I address three such issues. First, what, if anything, is wrong with trade imbalances? I argue that in monetary unions, trade imbalances can lead to domination between member states. Second, who should bear the burden of rebalancing trade? I argue that surplus and deficit countries should share that burden. The current situation placing the burden squarely on deficit countries is unjust. Third, which institutional arrangements should monetary unions adopt to regulate trade balances? Monetary unions can either reduce trade imbalances within the monetary union, neutralise the impact of trade imbalances on the economic sovereignty of member states, or delegate economic policy affecting trade balances to a legitimate supranational institution. The Eurozone must adopt one of these options to prevent member states from domination. Which option protects members best against domination depends on what makes interference between members arbitrary, an unresolved question in republican theories of justice.

…laut Carl Schmitt, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet. Abseits von Schmitt's Lust an der Letztentscheidung und der Person, die sie in seinen Augen zu treffen habe, hat sich der Begriff "Ausnahmezustand" auch außerhalb der klassischen Domäne des sog. Staatsrechts als eine Kategorie etabliert, die in Kürze der Satz beschreibt: "Außergewöhnliche Umstände erfordern außergewöhnliche Maßnahmen." Aber auch durch außergewöhnliche Kompetenzverschiebungen? Dürfte beispielsweise die Bundeswehr einem Bundesland zu Hilfe kommen, in dem Straßenkämpfe zwischen Polizei und Gipfelgegnern eskalieren? Sagen wir… in Hamburg? Was sagt eigentlich das Grundgesetz dazu?

This paper addresses the electoral consequences of the German government's anti-nuclear power policy shift after the Fukushima accident. Building on a cost-benefit framework and insights from political psychology, the theoretical analysis anticipates that the policy shift could not earn governing parties additional votes but could avoid vote loss. Utilizing data from multiple surveys and employing simulation techniques, the evidence demonstrates that voters, in particular incumbents' supporters, became more skeptical of nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster. At the same time, governing parties' supporters were particularly eager to perceive a credible change in the government's nuclear power stance. As a consequence, governing parties did not garner additional votes but inhibited their supporters from voting for other parties and thus avoided vote loss. Generally speaking, the novel approach proposed in this paper is suitable for shedding light on electoral effects of parties' policy shifts that have thus far gone unnoticed.

This article addresses the role of response latencies in affecting the attitude-behavior consistency in a German subnational referendum. As voters faced a comparatively easy choice in this referendum, it puts the hypothesis concerning the role of attitude accessibility in increasing attitude-behavior consistency to a particularly hard test. Utilizing data from a two-wave panel survey, the analysis examines the effect of response latencies on the attitude-behavior consistency concerning participation and vote choice. The evidence confirms hypotheses derived from attitude-consistency theory only in a limited number of cases. The institutional setting and the nature of choice thus appear to make a difference. Moreover, substantive findings depend partially upon the procedure to measure response latencies. Accordingly, sensitivity tests should be employed by default. Irrespective of operationalization, response latencies play a crucial role when it comes to respondents who answered that they would 'perhaps' participate. Whereas a quickly uttered 'perhaps' was indicative of a rather low likelihood of participation, a slowly given 'perhaps' indicated a considerably high probability. Adapted from the source document.