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In: Polis: the journal for ancient greek political thought, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 512-534
ISSN: 2051-2996
Abstract
In Book 3 of Plato's Laws, we read that a legislator must aim to endow the polis with a trio of properties: freedom, wisdom, and internal friendship (philia). This paper explores what such freedom consists in, with a focus on the so-called doctrine of the mixed constitution. It argues that such freedom is a constitutional matter; that it is not to be identified with 'voluntary servitude to the laws' cultivated by persuasive preludes to the laws; nor is it the rational self-control essential to virtuous character, or citizens' ability to decide and act for themselves; nor is it a restriction on the size of individual political authority. Rather, it is a freedom based on equality: a polis is free to the extent that its constitution mitigates the inherent inequality between rulers (archontes) and ruled (archomenoi), between those who wield political authority and those who are subject to that authority.
Introduction: Moral responsibility and Aristotle's concerns -- 1. Moral responsibility and moral character -- 2. Voluntariness, praiseworthiness, and character -- 3. The dialectical inquiry into voluntariness -- 4. Force, compulsion, and the internal origin of action --5. Responsibility for character: its scope and significance --6. Moral agency and the origination of action -- App. I. Varieties of knowledge and ignorance -- App. II. "Up to us" and the internal origin
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 250-273
ISSN: 1471-6437
A perennial subject of dispute in the Western philosophical tradition is whether human agents can be responsible for their actions even if determinism is true. By determinism, I mean the view that everything that happens (human actions, choices, and deliberations included) is completely determined by antecedent causes. One of the least impressive objections that is leveled against determinism confuses determinism with a very different view that has come to be known as "fatalism": this is the view that everything is determined to happen independently of human choices, efforts, and deliberations. It is a common fallacy, among students contemplating the implications of determinism for the first time, to argue: "But if everything is determined in advance, then it doesn't matter what we decide to do; what is determined to happen will happen no matter what." This argument fallaciously infers fatalism from determinism.
In: Clarendon Plato series
In: Issues in ancient philosophy 3
In: Plato dialogue project
In: Oxford scholarship online
This is the second volume in the 'Plato Dialogue Project' series: it is devoted to the Statesman, and offers a comprehensive philosophical analysis of that dialogue. A team of scholars scrutinize the Statesman section by section, bringing to the forefront each one of the dialogue's many themes.
Fifteen leading philosophers explore a set of themes from the pioneering work of Gail Fine and Terence Irwin in the history of philosophy. They discuss knowledge, rhetoric, freedom and practical reason, virtue and the good life, ethics and politics in Plato and Aristotle and beyond.